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ART. I.—SUCCESSION OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND
EXAMINED.

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Continued from page 264.

V. Alliance of Church and State.

This alliance is attended with so many disadvantages, that it seems strange more vigorous efforts have not been adopted to sever the connection. We do not here pretend to enumerate all the evils of this alliance, nor to give extended views of those which we will present. A few brief observations are all we have room for.

1. This connection of church and state reduces the church to a servile condition, inconsistent alike with Scripture and the example of the primitive church. The clergy are in a state of abject dependance on the civil magistrate, and of miserable subjection to unconstitutional canons. The king and parliament may fashion the church into any shape they see fit, in opposition to the united exertions of the clergy. King Henry did this once; and it may be done again whenever the king and parliament are so disposed. For one hundred years the convocation has done no business; and it is not likely the king can be persuaded to permit it to do any, though the most serious changes are about to take place in the government of the church by the king and parliament.

2. The dogmas of the church seem to be in opposition to the constitution of the state. The result that always may be expected from such a connection is, contention and continually clashing interests coming into contact with each other. Both kinds of jurisdiction, the civil and religious, are made strangely to encroach on one another. We do not here particularly refer to the judicial power of the bishops' courts, in matrimonial or testamentary matters, though these are purely secular. As church censures are followed with civil penalties, the loss of liberty or imprisonment, and the forfeiture of the privileges of a citizen, the clergy must have become absolute lords of the persons and properties of the people, had there not been lodged in the civil judicatories a superior jurisdiction, by which the sentences of the spiritual courts can be revised, suspended, and annulled.

We have an instance of this collision in the sacramental test, by which the participation of one of the sacraments is perverted into a

test for civil offices. A minister may be compelled by the civil magistrate to admit a wicked and profligate person to the Lord's supper. Thus, by the law of the land, the institution of Christ is made void. The sacrament is made a qualification or test, necessary for the attainment of a lucrative office, and for securing continuance in it when attained. There is, indeed, no way in which the spirit, power, and use of the sacrament could be more effectually abrogated by statute, than by thus retaining the form, and at the same time altering its proper design.

3. Another consequence of the confusion of spiritual and secular jurisdiction in the English Church is, that ecclesiastical censures now have little or no regard, agreeably to their original destination, to purity and good morals. They serve only as a political engine for the eviction of tithes, surplice fees, and the like, and for the execution of other sentences in matters purely temporal. No possible method could be more effectual in rendering the clerical character odious, and the discipline contemptible, than this.

4. Besides, a plan of relief, retaining the present alliance of church and state, seems impossible, without involving the state in the most serious calamities. England, in consequence of her religious establishment, is now agitated to an extent which threatens seriously her political existence and the cause of true religion. We will here introduce the sentiments of Warburton on this subject, in his *Alliance*, as quoted by Dyer :—"While the civil magistrate endows the clergy, and bestows on them a jurisdiction with coercive powers, these privileges create one supreme government within another, if the civil magistrate have not, in return, the supremacy of the church. And nothing is so much to be dreaded as an ecclesiastical government not under the control of the civil magistrate. It is ever encroaching on his province, and can never be satisfied. In the Roman Church, when spiritual men had got influence enough to be exempted from civil courts, and to set up a separate jurisdiction, popes became, by degrees, the sovereigns of emperors and kings. Cardinals, the beloved children of these popes, became princes; and bishops, as their brothers, became at once secular and spiritual lords. And, on the other hand, the Presbyterian government, during the little time it prevailed in England, gave no favorable proofs of its designs when its progress was retarded by Oliver and his adherents. A religious establishment, free of many of those political evils which are wont to attend a state on account of religion, might, I aver, be framed; but the true policy is, to let religion and civil government exist apart, and to encourage each to attend to its own province. Both, then, will flourish."

5. Moreover, true religion cannot be promoted by coercion. Men, however, have been long in discovering, and even yet seem scarcely to have discovered, that genuine religion is of too delicate a nature to be compelled by the coarse implements of human authority and worldly sanctions. The law of the land ought to restrain vice and injustice of every kind, as ruinous to the peace and good order of society, for this is its province; but let it not tamper with religion, by attempting to enforce its exercises and duties. These, unless they be free-will offerings, are nothing. They are even worse than nothing; they are injurious to all concerned. By such an alliance, and ill-judged aid,

hypocrisy and superstition may be greatly promoted, but genuine piety never fails to suffer.

Add to this that the jurisdiction of the church is purely spiritual. No man ought to be compelled, by rewards or punishment of a temporal or political nature, to become a member of any Christian church ; or to continue in it any longer than he honestly believes it to be his duty. All the ordinances of the church are spiritual, and so are her weapons and censures. The weapons of the church are Scripture and reason, accompanied with prayers and tears. These are her pillars, and the walls of her defence. The censures of the church are admonitions, reproofs or declarations of persons, unfitness for her communion, commonly called excommunications, which are of a spiritual nature, and ought not to affect men's lives, liberties, or estates. No man ought to be cut off from the rights of a citizen or subject merely because he is disqualified for Christian communion ; nor has any church on earth authority from Christ to inflict corporeal punishments, seize persons, distrain goods, or employ ecclesiastical censures, by an indirect coercion, as tools for effecting the same worldly purpose. Coercive measures are the weapons of civil magistrates, who may punish those who break the laws of their country with corporeal pains and penalties, as guardians of the civil rights of citizens ; but *Christ's kingdom is not of this world*. (See Neal's Hist. Pur., vol. i, p. 26.)

From this part of our subject may we not legitimately infer, that the alliance of the English Church with the state is neither Scriptural, apostolical, primitive, nor useful ; but, on the whole, it is unfavorable to the interests of true religion ? We may also infer that it was neither schismatical nor sinful for Mr. Wesley and others to reject this part of the English polity, and take for their guide the Holy Scriptures and the example of the primitive church, as far as she followed Scripture. We will next consider,—

VI. *The early doctrine and fundamental principles of the English Church respecting Episcopacy and Succession.*

The fathers of the English Church did not believe that bishops and elders were different orders of clergy, nor did they place episcopacy on the footing of *divine right*, so as to nullify ordination by elders ; but, in process of time, they so far deviated from the great principle of Protestantism, of Scripture, and the primitive church, as to place the principal jurisdiction in bishops, and thus reject the supremacy of the body of elders. In this they receded from original principles, and retrograded towards Rome. It is proper, however, to remark, that the clergy, as we have seen, had little to do with the reformation of the English Church, as this was effected by the king and parliament. To clear up this matter to the satisfaction of the reader, the following arguments are adduced :—

1. The English Church, in her early days, did not maintain that episcopacy was of divine right, and that ordination by presbyters was invalid. Indeed, reordination of persons ordained by presbyters was a perfect novelty in this church at her formation, and for many years after. It was reserved for recent times to profane the ordinance of Christ by reordinations, and to exclude from the character of true churches those who were more intent on following Scripture and primitive usage, than to receive a fundamental element of popery as a rule

of practice. Nevertheless, the doctrine of the English Church, as expressed in her articles, homilies, and liturgy, gives no foundation for recent exclusiveness. The proofs of this declaration will be called for, and they are the following:—

(1.) In a "Declaration, made of the functions and divine institution of bishops and priests," signed by Cromwell, the two archbishops, eleven bishops, and twenty divines and canonists, in the year 1637 or 1638, it is declared, speaking of the ministerial office, "That this office, this power and authority, was committed and given by Christ and his apostles unto certain persons only; that is to say, unto priests or bishops, whom they did elect, call, and admit thereto by their prayer and imposition of their hands." The same document, in speaking of what the fathers of the church did, says, "They did also institute certain inferior orders or degrees,—janitors, lectors, exorcists, acolytes, subdeacons,—and deputed to every one of these certain offices to execute in the church, wherein they followed undoubtedly the example and rites used in the Old Testament; yet the truth is, that in the New Testament is no mention made of any degrees or distinctions in orders, but only of deacons or ministers, and of priests or bishops; nor is there any word spoken of any other ceremony used in the conferring of this sacrament, but only of prayer and the imposition of the bishop's hands." (Burnet, *Hist. Ref.*, vol. —, p. 322, and *Addenda*, p. 467, Col. v, p. 394.) Such were the views of the first reformers from popery in the English Church.

(2.) In a book published in 1543, called "The Necessary Erudition of a Christian Man," similar sentiments to those expressed above are uttered. This book was drawn up by a committee of bishops and divines, and was afterward read and approved by the lords spiritual and temporal and the lower house of parliament, published by King Henry's authority, and was designed for a standard of Christian faith. (Burnet, vol. i, pp. 369–374.) In this book we have the following view concerning the orders of clergy:—"Their (deacons') office in the primitive church was partly to minister meat and drink, and other necessities, to the poor, and partly to minister to the bishops and priests. Of these two orders only, that is to say, priests and deacons, Scripture maketh express mention, and how they were conferred of the apostles by prayer and imposition of hands; but the primitive church afterward appointed inferior degrees." (Neal, vol. i, c. i, p. 31, to whom we are indebted for this quotation. See also Miller's *Letters*, letter vi, p. 141.) According to this book, deacons were no order of clergy at all in the primitive church, bishops and elders were of the *same order*, and the authority of archbishops and metropolitans was only of human appointment.

(3.) In the year 1540, in the reign of Henry VIII., we find the sentiments of the early reformers, respecting ecclesiastical orders, very clearly expressed in "the resolutions of several bishops and divines of some questions concerning the sacraments." They were "a select number of divines, who sat by virtue of a commission from the king, confirmed in parliament." (Burnet, vol. i, pp. 369–374; and Col., No. xxi, p. 256.) Cranmer was the leader in this select committee. In answer to the tenth question, which is, "Whether bishops or priests were first? and if the priests were first, then the priests made the

bishop," we find the following among other answers. Cranmer says—"The bishops and priests were at one time, and were no two things, but both one office in the beginning of Christ's religion." The archbishop of York gave the following answer:—"We think that the apostles were priests before they were bishops, and that the divine power which made them priests made them also bishops; and although their ordination was not by all such course as the church now useth, yet that they had both visible and invisible sanctification we may gather of the gospel. And we may well think, that when they were made bishops, when they had not only a flock, but also shepherds appointed to them to overlook, and a governance committed to them by the Holy Ghost to oversee both; *for the name of a bishop is not properly the name of order, but a name of office, signifying an overseer.* And although the inferior shepherds have also care to oversee their flock, yet forasmuch as the bishop's charge is also to oversee the shepherd's, the name of overseer is given to the bishops, and not to the other; and as they be in degree higher, so in their consecration we find difference even from the primitive church." The next is the bishop of London's sentiment:—"I think the bishops were first, and yet I think it is not of importance whether the priest then made the bishop or else the bishop the priest; considering (after the sentence of St. Jerome) that in the beginning of the church there was no (or if it were, very small) difference between a bishop and a priest, especially touching the signification." The opinions of others are to the same purpose, but our limits do not allow us to enlarge. In their *agreement*, or summary of opinions on this tenth question, we find the following answers as the sum of their decision:—1. "At the beginning they (bishops and priests) were all one." 2. "That the apostles were priests, and after were made bishops, when the overseeing of other priests was committed to them." 3. "That the apostles first were bishops, and they after made other bishops and priests." 4. "That the apostles were made bishops, and they were after made priests." 5. "That bishops, as they be now-a-days called, were before priests." 6. "It is no inconvenience if a priest made a bishop in that time."

The eleventh question discussed is—"Whether a bishop hath authority to make a priest by the Scripture or no? And whether any other but only a bishop may make a priest?" The answers to this question were as follows:—Some thought that bishops had no authority to make priests without the authority of the prince; but others thought the authority came from God, but that bishops could not use it without permission from the prince. Others believed that laymen had power to make priests, especially in time of necessity.

The twelfth question is—"Whether, in the New Testament, be required any consecration of a bishop and priest, or only appointing to the office be sufficient?" Cranmer believed that appointment or election was sufficient. Others thought imposition of hands and prayer were required.

Thus, according to Cranmer and the principal divines of his day, episcopacy was not a distinct order from presbytery, by divine right, but only a prudent ecclesiastical constitution for the better government of the church. Dr. Miller (letter vi, p. 141) places this transaction in the year 1548, and in the reign of Edward VI.; but Bishop Burnet,

whom we follow, placed it in the year 1540, and consequently in the reign of Henry VIII. As nearly as we can ascertain, Dr. Millar is mistaken in his date.

Bishop Burnet considers the deliberations and decisions of this company of divines "as great an evidence of the ripeness of their proceedings as can be showed in any church or any age of it." (Hist., vol. i, p. 373.) Indeed, their sentiments were formed at a time when they had just thrown off the principal dogmas of popery, and while they were calmly inquiring after truth, and before they were influenced by the peculiarities of a system. Nevertheless, some of the sentiments delivered are somewhat singular.

(4.) In King Edward's ordinal there is no acknowledged difference made between elders and bishops as *distinct orders* of clergy. In this the form for ordaining a bishop and priest is the same, there being no express mention in the words of ordination whether it be for the one or the other office. It is true, priests and bishops were distinguished in other parts of this official, though there was none in the words of consecration; but the distinction in other parts of the ordinal was not such as to point out that both were of *different orders*, though it did of *different functions*. (See Burnet, vol. ii, p. 188. Neal, vol. i, p. 57.) This ordinal was made in 1549. Above a hundred years afterward, in the reign of Charles II., this service was revised and altered; and the greater part of the alterations indicate an intention to make the whole speak a language more favorable to the *divine right* of prelacy. The alteration was made when a distinction between the two offices became current, so as to make them two distinct orders of clergy; but this was not the received doctrine of the English reformers. And even now, the ordinal service does not contain the doctrine of the divine right of episcopacy in the sense in which high churchmen use the term.

(5.) The early and first, and, indeed, the best doctrine of the Church of England was, as we have seen, that elders and bishops were not, according to Scripture, of two orders, but one; and that any difference made in their offices was not, by divine right, a separate jurisdiction arising from a superior order. Such was the constant opinion of the first reformers, Cranmer, Pilkington, Jewel, Grindal, Whitgift, &c.

2. The doctrine of the divine right of bishops, as a superior order to presbyters, as possessing supreme jurisdiction in ordination, government, and discipline, originated in the English Church subsequently to her organization.

Archbishop Whitgift was the first who defended the hierarchy from the practices of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, when the Roman empire became Christian; but Dr. Bancroft, his chaplain, divided off the bishops from the body of presbyters, and advanced them into a superior order by divine right, with the sole power of ordination and the keys of discipline, so that, from this time, they began to reckon three orders in the English hierarchy, viz., bishops, priests, and deacons. Bancroft broached, in form, this doctrine in a sermon at St. Paul's Cross, Jan. 1, 1588; and maintained that the bishops of England were a distinct order from the priests, and had superiority over them, *jure divino*, and directly from God. He affirmed this to be of God's own appointment; if not by express Scripture terms, yet by plain Scriptural inference. This was new doctrine for that time.

Those that preceded said that the superiority of bishops above presbyters had been a useful and wise appointment, for the more orderly government of the church, begun about the third or fourth century ; and, indeed, it was not till then there was any thing like the diocesan episcopacy that afterward prevailed. But Bancroft was one of the first who advanced it into a divine right. It was asserted by Dr. Heylin, in the beginning of the 17th century, (1638,) "That the archbishop of Canterbury was lineally descended from St. Peter, in a most fair and constant tenor of succession." And Dr. Pilkington advanced, "That if he who now sits archbishop of Canterbury could not derive his succession from St. Austin, St. Austin from St. Gregory, and St. Gregory from St. Peter, we would be miserable." (See Neal, vol. i, pp. 5, 10, 432.)

Nevertheless, Bancroft himself was far from being scrupulous on this subject, and as tenacious of popish forms as some of his successors ; for when Dr. Andrews, bishop of Ely, moved that the Scottish bishops elect should first be ordained presbyters, in the year 1610, Bancroft replied that it was unnecessary, since *ordination by presbyters was valid* ; and the Scottish bishops were accordingly ordained. Bishop Moreton was of the opinion, that to ordain was the *jus antiquum* of presbyters. (*Idem*, vol. ii, p. 387.) But the Church of England advanced in her claims, and removed, by degrees, to a greater distance from the other European Protestant Churches.

3. In the articles of the English Church the doctrine of succession, as held by high churchmen, is not found either in express words or by legitimate inference.

When the great reformers of the English Church, after preparing the way by proper deliberation, went to frame fundamental articles of religion, they carefully guarded against any exclusive claim on the subject in question. If they had believed that an order of bishops, superior to presbyters, was indispensably necessary to the regular organization of the church, the validity of Christian ordinances, and that presbyters in presbyterial churches must be *reordained* on coming over to their communion, they would certainly have embraced it in their article, in which they formally state their doctrine respecting the Christian ministry. This article, which is the twenty-third, is as follows :—"It is not lawful for any man to take upon him the office of public preaching, or ministering the sacraments in the congregation, before he be lawfully called and sent to execute the same. And those we ought to judge lawfully called and sent which be chosen and called to this work by men who have public authority given unto them in the congregation, to call and send ministers into the Lord's vineyard." The language of this article was studiously chosen, in order to embrace the other reformed churches whose ordination was presbyterial, and to recognize as valid their ministry and ordinances. Were the recent doctrine of exclusion the doctrine of the first English reformers, they would certainly have embraced it in the articles ; but they were of quite a different mind.

This succession by divine right of episcopacy, to the exclusion of presbyters, appears to us an innovation in the English Church ; and we cannot consider it as a part of the scheme that Christ and his apostles have laid down in the New Testament. We must, on the

other hand, view it as accompanied and followed with many evils, either in comparison of a presbyterial government, or of an episcopacy under the control of, and derived from, the presbytery or body of elders. The following reasons appear to us to be subversive of the high pretensions of churchmen, in reference to the divine right of their bishops :—

4. They attempt to derive this succession from the apostles, through the Church of Rome. That this is inconsistent, we prove by the following reasons :—1. The Church of Rome, in her ordinations, never endowed any man with episcopal authority with the intention of leaving their communion ; and without the *intention* in the person officiating, no ordination, according to them, could be valid. 2. The English reformers were all excommunicated by the pope, and, of course, their succession was cut off ; especially viewing succession to be uninterrupted, which is the general idea attached to it by its assertors.

5. In several instances this succession in the English Church was actually broken. The following are given as specimens :—

The case of Archbishop Parker.—He was the first archbishop of Canterbury under Elizabeth, on her accession to the throne ; all the bishops except one, to the number of fourteen, were deprived by her because they would not take the oath of supremacy, being all of them firm papists. Dr. Matthew Parker was consecrated archbishop of Canterbury, at Lambeth, by some of the bishops that had been deprived in the reign of Mary, for none of the present bishops would officiate. The persons concerned in the consecration were Barlow and Scory, bishops elect of Chichester and Hereford ; Miles Coverdale, the deprived bishop of Exeter ; and Hodkins, suffragan of Bedford. The archbishop was installed December 17th, 1559, soon after which he consecrated several of his brethren, whom the queen had appointed to vacant sees ; as Grindal to the bishopric of London, Howe to Winchester, Pilkington to Durham, &c. The Roman Catholics urged the unlawfulness of the proceedings against the new bishops, who began to doubt the validity of their ordinations, or at least their legal title to the bishoprics. The affair was at length brought before parliament, and, to silence all future clamors, Parker's consecration and that of his brethren were confirmed by the two houses, about seven years after they had filled their respective sees, and had, during that time, ordained numbers of persons to deacons' and elders' orders.

To this ordination it may be objected, 1. The persons engaged in it had been legally, and, indeed, ecclesiastically deprived in the last reign, and were not yet restored ; and Coverdale and Hodkins never exercised their episcopal functions afterward. 2. Because the consecration ought, by law, to have been directed according to the statute of the 25th of Henry VIII., and not according to the form of King Edward's ordinal, which had been set aside in the late reign, and was not yet restored by parliament. 3. The parliament, by this act, assumed the right of validating an *irregular* or *null* appointment to the ministry ; and, although a civil body, they assumed the highest act of the ministerial or ecclesiastical functions. 4. How an act of parliament could have a retrospective view we cannot tell, so as to make valid the various ordinations irregularly performed during the space of several years previous. 5. What can we say to the unlawful ordinations that took place during these several years of officiating ? These, surely,

must have corrupted the church, and made a breach on the regularity of succession. (See Neal, vol. i, p. 133.)

The case of Archbishop Juxon, in 1663 or 1660.—Immediately after the protectorate of Cromwell, the succession of the Anglican Church was in imminent danger. Many of the bishops at the protector's death were dead, and in a few years there would be none to consecrate; and thus the succession must be broken unless they could receive it anew from Rome, a thing not to be expected, or admit of ordination by presbyters. This induced some of the ancient bishops to petition the king to fill up the vacant sees with all possible expedition, in which they were supported by Sir Edward Hyde, chancellor of the exchequer, who prevailed on the king to nominate certain clergymen for these high preferments. It was necessary, however, to carry on this design with great secrecy, lest the governing powers would secure the bishops, and by that means put a stop to the entire proceedings. But the greatest difficulty was, to do it canonically, when there were no deans or chapters to elect, and, consequently, no persons to receive a *congé d'elire*, according to former custom. Several expedients were proposed for remedying this difficulty, the most prominent of which are the three following:—

The first plan was that which was proposed by Chancellor Hyde, and was as follows:—"That the proceedings should be by a mandate from the king to any three or four bishops, by way of collation, upon a lapse, instead of the dean and chapter's election. But it was objected, that the supposal of a lapse would impair the king's prerogative more than the collation would advance it, because it would presuppose a power of election *pleno jure*, (*of full right*,) in the deans and chapters, which they have only *de facultate regia*, (*from royal authority*;) nor could they petition for such a license, for most of the deans were dead, some chapters extinguished, and all of them so disturbed that they could not meet in the chapter-house, where such acts generally are to be performed." Such was Chancellor Hyde's plan.

Dr. Barwick proposed, "That his majesty should grant his commission to the bishops of each province respectively, assembled in provincial council or otherwise, as should be most convenient, to elect and consecrate fit persons for the vacant sees, with such dispensative clauses as should be found necessary upon the emergency of the case, (his majesty signifying his pleasure concerning the persons and the sees;) which commission may bear date before the action, and then afterward upon certificate, and petition to have his majesty's ratification and confirmation of the whole process, and the register to be drawn up accordingly by the chief actuary, who may make up his memorials hence, and make up the record there." This was the second plan.

The third way was that proposed by Dr. Bramhall, bishop of Derry. It was the method used in Ireland, where the king has an absolute power of nomination, and, therefore, no way seemed to him so safe as consecrating the persons nominated to void sees in Ireland, and then transferring them to the vacant sees in England; which, he apprehended, would clearly elude all those formalities which seemed to perplex the affair.

To terminate the difficulty, Dr. Wren, bishop of Ely, and Dr. Coscius, bishop of Petersborough, were in favor of the second plan, recom-

mended it to the court, and which was accordingly adopted. (See Neal, *Hist. Pur.*, vol. iv, c. iv, p. 228.) Such were their narrow views as to suppose the essence of Christianity, and the essence of all divine ordinances, depended on the transmission of ecclesiastical power in an unbroken chain from the apostles.

The case of the non-jurors.—In the reign of King William III., and in the year 1689, the divisions among the friends of prelacy ran high, and terminated in that famous schism in the English Church which has scarcely yet been entirely healed. Sancroft, archbishop of Canterbury, and eight other bishops, viz., Lloyd of Norwich, Turner of Ely, Kenn of Bath and Wells, Frampton of Gloucester, Thomas of Worcester, Lake of Chichester, Cartwright of Chester, and White of Peterborough, deemed it unlawful to take the oath of allegiance to the new king, because they considered James II., though banished from his dominions, their rightful sovereign. In consequence, because they would not acknowledge the title of the new king to the British crown, King William, as supreme head of the church, and as sovereign ecclesiastical judge, deprived them of their sees, and put others in their place. The new bishops were Tillotson, Moore, Patrick, Kidder, Fowler, Cumberland, &c. Several peers, and about four hundred of the parochial clergy, were among the non-jurors. The deposed bishops and clergy formed a new Episcopal church, entirely separated from the established church. They were called *non-jurors* because they refused to swear or take the oath of allegiance to William. They maintained that the church was not dependant on the jurisdiction of the king and parliament, but was subject to the authority of God alone, and empowered to govern itself by its own laws; and that, consequently, the sentence of deprivation pronounced against them by the great council of the nation was destitute of justice and validity; and that it was only by the decree of an ecclesiastical council that a bishop could be deprived. They also maintained that those who were put in their places were unjust possessors of other men's property, and were schismatics in the church; that all who held communion with them were chargeable with schism; and that this schism is a most heinous sin, and that grievous punishment must fall upon their opponents unless they would return to the bosom of the non-juring church, from which they had causelessly departed. (See Mosheim, cent. 17, sec. 11, Part ii, c. ii, No. xxvi. Also New-York Churchman of March 25th, 1837, for an article from the British Critic on this subject.)

Sancroft, while the case was pending, in order to prevent the approaching schism, issued a commission, giving his authority for the consecration of bishops and pastors to the bishops of London, St. Asaphs, and others. It was under this commission that Burnet was consecrated bishop of Salisbury by Compton. Archbishop Sancroft, however, afterward recalled this, and consigned the same powers to Lloyd of Norwich, one of his deprived brethren. A schism was thus formed in the heart of the Anglican Church. There were two distinct communions: the one under the old metropolitan, Sancroft, and the other under the new one, Tillotson. The state of the matter is clearly this: that the non-jurors, according to the primitive church and Scripture, were the regular church. But then the Church of England does not derive her succession through bishops or the clergy, but through

the parliament and the king ; and their boast of apostolical succession through bishops is utterly incorrect, when their succession is regal succession through popes and bishops, or prelates ; for it is a glaring instance of misnaming to call the English diocesans bishops. They are properly *prelates* ; i. e., persons *preferred* or *raised above* the ecclesiastical supervision of the pastors. The case, therefore, of the non-jurors furnishes another instance of a breach in the succession of the English Church, from which all the wisdom and learning of her ablest sons can never clear her.

Miserable indeed must the state of the Christian world be when a bishop cannot be chosen without a royal mandate, and the nominal or farcical election of a dean and chapter ; when, for many hundred years after Christ, there was no such thing in the world as a *congé d'élire*, or permission to elect in this manner : and if the validity of all sacerdotal ministrations must depend on an uninterrupted succession from Peter, through prelates, popes, kings, and parliaments ! And this is peculiarly strange, in regard to the papacy, when, in a succession of fifty popes, not one pious man sat on the throne ; that there had been no popes for some years together, and, at other times, two or three at once ; and when there had been between twenty and thirty schisms, one of which continued fifty years, the popes of Rome and Avignon excommunicating each other, and yet conferring orders on their several clergy. It would reduce Christianity, indeed, to a low standard, to require its heavenly character to undergo a genealogical examen through such ancestors as popes and apostate bishops up to Christ its heavenly founder.

6. The Church of England, in admitting the validity of ordinations by presbyters, overturns her assumed succession by bishops only.

(1.) Those who had been ordained in foreign churches in the reign of Mary, were admitted in Elizabeth's reign to their ministerial offices and charges, as well as those ordained in England ; and, to legalize this, an act of parliament was passed in the thirteenth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, allowing of *ordination of presbyters without a bishop*, on their subscribing the articles of faith. Both houses of parliament would not probably pass such an act, unless the *principle* of it had been approved of by the most influential divines and churchmen. The thing, however, was disallowed by some bishops in this reign, as well as at the restoration of King Charles I. But what can bishops or clergy do if the parliament undertake to regulate the church ; nay, should they even undertake to change altogether the established religion ? (Neal, vol. i, p. 237.)

(2.) The recognition of presbyterial ordination as valid was several times made by the English Church in the reception of ministers of the Church of Scotland, which is strictly Presbyterian. The reformation of this church commenced in 1560, and was, at its first organization, a Presbyterian Church. In the year 1610 prelacy was violently introduced, against the sense of the nation ; and, in the same year, Spotswood, Lamb, and Hamilton, presbyters by presbyterian ordination, were consecrated bishops in London by some English prelates, and, on their return home, imparted the episcopal office to a number of others. Archbishop Bancroft consecrated them, without requiring them to be previously ordained as priests ; expressly delivering it as his opinion, that

their former Presbyterian ordination was valid. Furthermore, the bishops agreed that the body of the Presbyterian clergy should be considered as regular ministers in the church, on consenting to acknowledge the bishops as their ecclesiastical superiors, without submitting to be reordained; and this arrangement was actually carried into effect. Nor is this all. Many of the clergy and people removed from Scotland to the north of Ireland, where the clergy, who were all Presbyterians, were received as presbyters or priests in the established Church of Ireland without reordination. The Church of Scotland remained episcopal till 1639, when prelacy was abolished and bishops deposed. On this occasion three of these prelates renounced their episcopal orders, were received by the Presbyterian clergy as plain presbyters, and officiated as such while they lived. The rest were either excommunicated from the church, or deprived of their ministerial functions. In the year 1661 episcopacy was again introduced into Scotland, at which time the same plan was agreed on which took place in 1610, though a much smaller number of clergymen submitted to its terms. At the Revolution in 1688, episcopacy was again laid aside and Presbyterianism restored. At this time four hundred episcopal clergymen came into the Presbyterian Church, acknowledged the validity of her orders and ministrations, and were received as ministers. (Miller's Letters, let. vi, p. 146. Neal, vol. ii, p. 82.) From the foregoing we learn that the validity of Presbyterian ordination was acknowledged, at least as late as 1661, by the Church of England, which was more than a hundred years after her organization as a church.

(3.) Our readers may be pleased to see the following. It is a license granted April 6th, 1582, to the Rev. John Morrison, a Presbyterian minister. It was granted by Grindal, archbishop of Canterbury, through Dr. Aubrey, his vicar-general, to the Scotch divine, permitting him to preach throughout his province. "Since you, the said John Morrison, were admitted and ordained to sacred orders and the holy ministry by the imposition of hands, according to the laudable form and rite of the reformed Church of Scotland, we, therefore, as much as lies in us, and as, by right, we may, approving and ratifying the form of your ordination and preferment, done in such manner aforesaid, grant unto you a license and faculty, that in such orders, by you taken, you may, and have power, in any convenient places, in and throughout the whole province of Canterbury, to celebrate divine offices and to minister the sacraments," &c. This is a full testimony, by the highest dignitary of the English Church, that presbyterial ordination is valid. He even calls the form a *laudable* one, and considers Mr. Morrison as authorized not only to preach and celebrate divine offices, but also to administer the sacraments. In later times the archbishop would be pronounced a schismatic, and Mr. Morrison would have to receive a reordination; but the present is not the reformed Church of England precisely.

(4.) The English Church received and corresponded with the reformed churches who held to presbyterial ordination. Several eminent divines of these churches were received into, and obtained benefices in the church and universities. They were received, too, in the precise ecclesiastical character which they held at home, viz.: that of presbyters without any reordination, and, for want of it, laboring under no disability. Modern churchmen, however, have learned to profane

the ordinance of Christ by practising reordination. There is nothing which is more truly sacrilegious; and if the name of *anabaptist* or *rebaptizer* has become a hissing and a by-word, that of reordainer is worthy of tenfold more odium and reproach. Perhaps the most ready and sober way of accounting for this is, that, finding themselves unable to support their own system of ecclesiastical economy, they have fallen on this method of superstition to match the Scriptural arguments of their opponents. If this does not account for the profanation alluded to, we must leave it with others to trace it to its proper source.

King James's sending over divines to the synod of Dort, was an open acknowledgment of the validity of ordination by presbyters; here being a bishop of the Church of England sitting as a private member in a synod of divines, of which a mere presbyter was the president.

(5.) The fifty-fifth canon of the Anglican Church, enacted in 1604, when the Church of Scotland was Presbyterian, requires all her clergy "to pray for the Churches of England, Scotland, and Ireland, as parts of Christ's holy Catholic Church, which is dispersed throughout the world." The authors of this canon considered Presbyterian churches as true churches of Christ. The plan of reordination was reserved for after times, and the invention of it for different persons from Cranmer, Grindal, and Abbot. Besides, was it not the very same authority (the parliament and king) that established the Church of Scotland, as well as the other? The power was precisely the same in the one case as in the other. The principal difference is, that the Scotch Church is much nearer, as to her polity, both to Scripture and the primitive church. The Church of England approaches nearer to Rome, and is a resuscitation of the regal form of government which usurped what had been previously usurped by the prelates from the pastors and bishops of the primitive form of church government. It is also well known that the founders of the English Church corresponded with the principal reformers, as Bucer, Calvin, Melancthon; and held them in high estimation as ministers of Christ.

7. It might be worth while to notice the judgment of bishops and divines of the English Church upon this controversy, which has broken the bonds of brotherly love and charity between that church and all the Protestant churches who have no bishops, or who have not bishops according to their recent doctrine concerning episcopacy; for the peculiar views of high churchmen of the Anglican Church form the most recent system of church polity. Our limits do not permit us to enlarge; we must, therefore, content ourselves with two or three specimens.

(1.) We will quote first from *Synopsis Papismi*; that is, a *Generall View of Papistrie*, by Dr. Willet, a distinguished divine of the Church of England in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, to whom the three first editions were dedicated. The next was dedicated to King James, printed in London in 1634. On the subject before us he gives the doctrine of the Church of England as it was held in his day, and as it was distinguished from the doctrines of popery on this point. He says, "Bishops and other ministers do not differ in order, but in office of government." (*Contiev. v, Quest. 3, Ener. 75, p. 266.*) He states the Roman Catholic doctrine on this point to be, "That bishops are not only in a higher degree of superiority to other ministers, but they are

as princes of the clergy, and other ministers as subjects, and in all things to be commanded by them ; and that bishops are only properly pastors, and that to them only it doth appertain to preach, and that other ministers have no authority, without their license or consent, to preach at all ; and that not principally or chiefly, but solely and wholly to them appertaineth the right of consecrating or giving orders." (P. 269.) This is substantially the doctrine of high churchmen, who, in this respect, are true Romanists, except that they substitute the supremacy of the king for that of the pope, as we have already seen. But, in combating this popish doctrine of the successionists, Mr. Willet, in the same page, proceeds to state the true doctrine of the then English Church, since his day exchanged for the popish doctrine. "That every godly and faithful bishop is a successor to the apostles, we deny not, and so are all faithful and godly pastors and ministers ; for, in respect of their extraordinary calling, miraculous gifts, and apostleship, the apostles have properly no successors, as Mr. Benbridge, martyr, saith, that he believed not bishops to be the successors of the apostles, for that they be not called as they were, nor have that grace. That, therefore, which the apostles were especially appointed unto, is the thing wherein the apostles were properly succeeded. But that was the preaching of the gospel, as St. Paul saith, *He was sent to preach, not to baptize*, 1 Cor. i, 17. (Isa. lix, 21, is also quoted.) The promise of succession, we see, is in the preaching of the word, which appertaineth as well to other pastors and ministers as unto bishops, as afterward shall be declared. Again, seeing, in the apostles' time, *episcopus* and *presbyter*, a *bishop* and a *priest*, were neither in name nor office distinguished, it followeth, then, that either the apostles assigned no succession while they lived, neither appointed their successors, or that, indifferently, all faithful pastors and preachers of the apostolic faith are the apostles' successors." In the 273d page the following sentiments are expressed, and they are such as are now maintained in substance by the Methodist Episcopal Church ; such as were contended for by the fathers of the English and other reformed churches :—"Of the difference between bishops and priests there are three opinions : the *first*, of Aerius, who did hold that all ministers should be equal ; and that a bishop was not, neither ought to be, superior to a priest. The second opinion is, the other extreme is of the papists, as we have seen, that would have not only a difference, but a princely pre-eminence of their bishops over the clergy, and that by the word of God ; and they urge it to be necessary, that they have no churches which receive not their pontifical hierarchy. The third opinion is between both : that although this distinction of bishops and priests, as it is now received, cannot be directly proved out of Scripture, yet it is very necessary, for the policy of the church, to avoid schisms, and to preserve it in unity. Of this judgment Bishop Jewel, against Harding, sheweth Chrysostom, Ambrose, and Jerome to have been. Jerome thus writeth :—"That the apostle teacheth evidently that bishops and priests were the same, but that one afterward was chosen to be set over the rest. It was done to be a remedy against schism." To this opinion of St. Jerome subscribeth Bishop Jewel and another most reverend prelate of our church, Archbishop Whitgift." He also maintains that such was the doctrine of Augustine ; and the Church of England rejected the party of Aerius

and embraced the third system, which is rejected by the recent English Church, but maintained and practised by the Methodist Episcopal Church. Many other quotations, to the same purpose, might be given from Willet.

(2.) Archbishop Usher, in his letter to Dr. Bernard, says, "I have ever declared my opinion to be, that bishop and presbyter differ only in *degree*, and not in order; and, consequently, where bishops cannot be had, the ordination by presbyters standeth valid. Yet the ordination made by such presbyters as have severed themselves from those bishops to whom they have sworn canonical obedience I cannot excuse from being schismatical. I think that churches that have no bishops are defective in their government; yet, for my justifying my communion with them, (which I do love and honor as true members of the church universal,) I do profess, if I were in Holland, I should receive the blessed sacrament at the hands of the Dutch with the like affection as I should from the hands of the French ministers were I at Charenton."

(3.) Bishop Burnet observes—"As for the notion of distinct offices of bishop and presbyter, I confess it is not so clear to me; and, therefore, since I look upon the sacramental actions as the highest of sacred performances, I cannot but acknowledge those who are empowered for them must be of the highest office in the church." (See *Vindication of the Church of Scotland*, p. 336, as quoted by Neal, vol. ii, p. 387.)

(4.) At the close of King Edward's reign, and for a considerable time after, churchmen, among other things, believed that there were but two orders of clergy authorized by Scripture, viz., bishops and deacons; and, consequently, that bishop and elder were of the same order, though of different ranks or degrees. They, consequently, gave the right hand of fellowship to foreign churches and ministers who had not been ordained by bishops, there being no dispute about reordination in order to any church preferment till the latter end of Elizabeth's reign. In these points our modern churchmen have departed from the doctrine and practice of the founders of the English Church. That all the Protestant Churches of Europe, except the English, together with a great many even of this church, are mistaken on this point, and that the truth lies with the papists and a part of the English Church, and that part of recent origin, looks somewhat unreasonable.

VII. *Defects, or want of apostolical character in the Anglican Church.*

We have now a number of reasons to offer which will go to show, that notwithstanding the pretensions of the English Church in challenging to herself apostolical succession, she is, in many respects, wanting in apostolical character. It is not meant, hereby, that she is not a church of Christ; but the meaning is, that although she boasts much of her descent or pedigree, she has several traits in her character not authorized by Scripture, but contrary thereto; nor found in any of the churches organized by the apostles, or in any of the churches that immediately followed them; and that she is destitute, or very partially possessed, of several Scriptural qualifications of great importance. We do not refer to those peculiar rites or forms by which she is distinguished from other churches, which may vary much to suit time and circumstances, and which do not affect the vitals of Christianity; but we mean leading and important traits of character, that have a serious influence on the lives and conduct of men, and strik-

ingly affect any religious body in the capacity of a church. Nay, more ; as her church polity is the peculiar boast of the English Church, she has less cause of boast, on this very score, than any other church in Europe or America, if we except the Roman Catholics, and those ill-governed minor sects who have no regularly organized form of government. We notice the following defects or deficiencies of the Church of England :—

1. We object against her that she is under the entire dominion of a civil power. Both the *kind* and *degree* of power exercised by the parliament over the church are unwarranted by Scripture.

That a *civil* head should govern the Church of Christ, appears to us both unreasonable and unscriptural. It is unreasonable or very unfit that the parliament, which is a civil body, and different in its character from the church, should have the power of regulating the church, which is a society not formed after the kingdoms of this world. That it is unscriptural, who that reads the New Testament can doubt ? Can it be found that any primitive church was under the control of a civil legislature ? I presume not. Besides, just glance at the component parts of a parliament. A small part are bishops. The peers, or lords temporal, are such by birth or creation. Those created are made by the king. Those of noble blood, as they are called, become lords by lineal descent. Are not these strange methods of creating an ecclesiastical body ? As to the commons, they are composed of churchmen, Presbyterians, dissenters, Roman Catholics, and infidels ; some of them religious, and some of them wicked men. They are also the representatives of churchmen, Presbyterians, dissenters, Romanists, and infidels ; all of whom, in electing, are influenced, more or less, by their peculiar religious or irreligious sentiments. Such is the supreme ecclesiastical legislature of the Anglican Church. Is it possible that such a body of men can be safe legislators for any church ? Are they above all apostolic rulers ?

Moreover, the *degree* of power claimed and exercised by the parliament over the church is enormous, and fenced in by altogether inadequate barriers or guards. It hath, as we have shown, sovereign and uncontrollable authority in ecclesiastical as well as in civil affairs ; and to such a degree as to *alter the established religion of the land*. The church, then, can be altered in any manner, and to any extent possible, by the parliament. It can be changed in its doctrines and discipline, in its rites and ceremonies, in the qualifications of its ministers, and, in short, in every thing ; so that no church synod can, in any degree, control or prevent the changes, however serious they may be. The civil power, or parliament, can make what laws they please to bind the church ; but the church can make no laws to bind either themselves or parliament. The state can render valid the irregular acts of the church, as in the case of Archbishop Parker's ordination. Nor will it be of any avail to say that the king, as head of the church, is bound to preserve the privileges of the church, when the parliament is absolutely omnipotent in changing or annulling any old law and in making any new ones, whether civil or ecclesiastical, so as to affect, or even change, any thing that refers to doctrines, discipline, bishops, priests, deacons, church livings, church membership, preaching, prayers, sacraments, &c.

That the parliament *can* alter or change the Church of England into any possible form there can be no doubt. It is not a mere possibility, for this they actually have done in several instances. The church was changed, under Henry VIII., from popish to Protestant. In the reign of Mary it was again changed to popery. The parliament, under Elizabeth, changed it from popish to Protestant. It was subsequently altered from prelatical to Presbyterian, and from Presbyterian to prelatical again; or, rather, the Church of England assumed, under parliament, in its last change, the regal form of government, for it is not presbyterial, because elders have not the chief rule; nor is it episcopal, because bishops, deriving their authority from elders, and accountable to them for its exercise, are not highest in office; nor is it prelatical, because bishops or prelates have not the chief rule, seeing this belongs to the parliament and king. It is true, they claim to be episcopal, but this is a mistake; for episcopacy proper derives its jurisdiction from the pastors and people. It is even a mistake to call it *prelatical*, as Presbyterians usually denominate the English Church; for the bishops are appointed by the king, and are accountable to him solely, unless the parliament interpose. The prelatical form of government invests bishops with the power of *jurisdiction* and of *conferring orders*; but the English bishops do not possess either of these powers as of right belonging to their distinct order of bishops. We know they *teach* this doctrine, and attempt to practise accordingly, but this is a mere private opinion. It is not the *principle* which governs. The principle places the jurisdiction in the parliament and king, as the sources of ecclesiastical legislation and of executive power respectively; for the bishops had their sees under the immediate authority of the king and parliament. The *regal* is, therefore, the proper ecclesiastical form of the Anglican Church, unless the word *parliamentary* might be deemed better. On this topic, however, we will not dwell. Thus the Church of England has undergone several changes already, and who can tell what changes may yet take place in her constitution in a very short time? Surely such an institution was not reared by the apostles of Christ, who taught that his kingdom was from heaven.

The Church of Scotland, too, as a branch of the British establishment, has gone through several changes. After the Reformation in this country, which commenced in 1560, the titles of archbishop and bishop were introduced in 1572, and bestowed on clergymen ordained members of cathedral churches. By act of 1592, c. cxvi, Presbyterian church government was established by kirk sessions, presbyteries, provincial synods, and general assemblies. By act 1606, c. ii, bishops were restored; but in 1638 presbytery was a second time introduced. By act 1662, c. i, presbytery was again displaced by prelacy; and finally, by acts 1689, c. iii, and 1690, c. v, xxix, presbytery was re-established, and has since continued. (Blackstone, b. i, c. xi, p. 380, note 9.) We have presented these changes in the Church of Scotland as a farther confirmation of the power of parliament in making ecclesiastical changes in national churches. The Scotch Church, however, even as an establishment, is in a far less exceptionable form than the English Church, and, in consequence, Scotland has been less agitated from without, and less affected by political influence, than the English Church. Indeed, North Britain, to a good degree, has preserved the

free exercise of her general assembly, her synods, presbyteries, and sessions, which have proved very beneficial, and promoted her spiritual interests.

2. We object to the Anglican Church, her temporal and spiritual head in the person of the reigning monarch, whether king or queen, and, in case of a minor, the king's council. Here, too, as in the case of the parliament, we object to both the kind and degree of power vested in the British monarch.

(1.) As to the kind of power, we object three things: first, the simple headship; secondly, its being vested in a female; and, thirdly, its exercise by a minor, whether male or female.

The king is the supreme head of the church under Christ. This, we think, is in opposition to the following passages of Scripture:—"And hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be the head of all things to the church;" Eph. i, 22. "And he is the head of the body, the church;" Col. i, 18. The title, *head of the church*, though qualified by the phrase, *under Christ*, is improperly applied to any human being; for, when the apostle says Christ is κεφαλή, *the Head*, it is as much as if he had said Christ, and no other, is head. No civil magistrate, as such, ought to be chief moderator or president in church matters; nor to have such authority as that ecclesiastical persons, without him, can make no church regulations or ceremonies. Church matters ought, ordinarily, to be handled by church officers. The principal direction of them is given, by God's ordinance, to the ministers of religion. As these ought not to meddle with the making of civil laws, so the civil magistrate ought not to meddle with the concerns of the church, so long as they do not intrench upon his civil authority. Nor can we believe that the phrase, *under Christ*, sufficiently qualifies the headship of the king; as we do not see the least trace of Scriptural authority for having any vicegerent for him who is head of all things to the church. To none of the apostles did our Lord give this supremacy, much less did he give it to any layman. It arose from the high pretensions of the pope; and, as Dyer says, *was stripped, by King Henry, with violence from the triple crown*. Indeed, the pope himself claims nothing more than to be the vicegerent of Christ upon earth; and as with the pope, so with the king, the qualifying expressions or words, *vicegerent, under Christ*, and the like, have never yet presented any barrier against the exercise of spiritual tyranny. Nay, on the other hand, there is no other plea ever made use of, under which greater enormities have been committed, than under the cover of this vicegerency or headship. The pope, by virtue of this alone, governed the church and the state with absolute sway; and the English monarchs, by virtue of their headships, have performed the highest acts of the supreme ecclesiastical executive authority, in regulating and ordering every thing pertaining to the church.

(2.) Besides, this power, too, is vested in queens as well as kings. It is needless to delay here by producing argument. That a woman should be supreme head of the church under Christ has no countenance from Scripture, antiquity, or the reason of the thing. Not but that queens may often make as good heads as kings, as was actually the case in Elizabeth and Queen Ann. Is this, too, apostolical? Is this female headship of divine right, and of apostolical succession too?

What authority is there that women, as heads of Christ's church, shall be supreme judges in matters of faith, should order rites and ceremonies, regulate the discipline of the church, have the principal part of ordination in their hands, have the power of suspending and depriving bishops, have the power of calling and directing convocations, and of sanctioning or negating their decrees, and that they should be the dernier resort, in cases of appeal, in all ecclesiastical matters?

(3.) That a *minor*, too, should be head of the church, can never be sustained as Scriptural or consistent. Nor is this case much mended by the substitute of a council which may be composed of persons but badly calculated to act as a united head of the church under Christ. In this case the difficulties are so numerous, and the thing itself is so far wrong, that it is needless to dwell thereon.

(4.) Moreover, the degree of authority, and the various powers invested in the English monarchs by the supremacy, appear to us quite too large. It is allowed these were given to the crown by parliament, but this was done at a time when the parliament itself was under the regal control; and successive parliaments continued these powers, with a few abatements and some small modifications. Still, the king's power, in our apprehension, is altogether without any proper Scripture warrant. He can exercise authority, in matters of faith and discipline, such as was never given to any succession of men since the world began. Those who sat in Moses's seat made no such pretensions. The pope only, whose successor the English monarch is, can equal him in these matters. His power in making rites and ceremonies, as well as in appointing bishops, and in convoking, restraining, and dissolving convocations or synods, places him before any of the apostles, in point of church authority. No human being, inspired or uninspired, was ever invested from above with such authority; and for a mortal to claim it is an assumption of the most dangerous kind; and for a church to submit to it is to overlook their own privileges and the kingly office of Christ. It is true, the late kings of England have exercised their ecclesiastical powers somewhat sparingly, and the churchmen of the day qualify the king's spiritual prerogative to a considerable degree. Add to this the exigency in which it was first used, may serve as some apology; but that enlightened churchmen would now pass the sentence of exclusion upon all churches that have not bishops, or bishops such as they have, is going beyond all proper bounds of moderation.

(5.) In justification, however, of the king's supremacy, it is said that the power he exercises is only *temporal*, but that the bishops exercise the *spiritual* power. The misfortune with this apology is, that it is utterly unfounded. Where is there any distinction, from Scripture or reason, between a temporal and a spiritual head over Christ's church, which is a spiritual body? Besides, are the regal acts only in reference to temporal matters? Are they not also exercised in spiritual? To be supreme judge in matters of faith, to order rites and ceremonies, to appoint bishops, to convoke, regulate, postpone convocations, &c.,—are these temporal acts? If they be, then there are no spiritual ones, for all must be temporal. In short, this plea of *temporal* head completely overturns the whole fabric. Divines see and know that the spiritual headship of the king is the same as the supremacy of the pope, and, therefore, untenable from Scripture, antiquity, or argument.

By arguing that it is temporal, they say, virtually, that the regal supremacy is all wrong; and that the English Church, in deed and in truth, (which is the case,) is fundamentally wrong in its polity, and at variance with every sound principle. There is, however, an apparent good design in calling this a temporal power. It is probably intended, by divines of the English Church, indirectly to unteach the spiritual headship of the king, and substitute for it the temporal. This is a good intention; how consistent, we say not just now. We will say, however, that the very plea is a clear abdication of the regal ecclesiastical system of Britain; and its opponents need no other evidence to prove to them the unsoundness of the fundamental ecclesiastical polity of the English Church, than that its ablest apologists are compelled to have recourse to an expedient by which they leave their opponents in complete possession of the ground which they maintain.

3. Another departure from apostolical character is, the subjection of the church to the state.

This is an unavoidable consequence, arising from the powers vested in the king and parliament. The church cannot call her convocation without the royal mandate, whatever exigence may occur. When assembled, they are under the king's control; and their enactments are of no authority, unless his majesty give them his assent. Now, we would ask, where is there any Scripture authority for this, or is it any way consonant with reason and Scripture? Did the council of Jerusalem receive any such commission to assemble? Or were they under royal control while employed in their deliberations? Or did they need the emperor's signature, in order that their decrees should be of authority among the Gentiles? Or were the decisions of church judicatories of no account before there were Christian kings to superintend and control their acts? We presume the decisions of ecclesiastical consistories were at least as correct before, as they were after they came under the management of kings, emperors, or popes.

One effect of this want of power in the church or convocation is, that she is too much under the power of worldly-minded and political men, who fashion her after the kingdoms of this world.

Another serious difficulty is, that for want of the power of convening and doing business, the convocation is perfectly powerless of itself. For upwards of one hundred years, the convocation has not been permitted to do any business. At present, serious changes in the polity of the church are about to take place; nevertheless, the king delays or refuses to convene the convocation, or to permit them to do business. But on this topic it is needless to dwell. Churchmen are compelled to acknowledge this defect in their church. What we are surprised at is, that they should manifest a spirit of exclusiveness toward other Protestant churches which have far fewer defects than they themselves have. This, alas! is another proof of the inconsistency of the human race.

4. The appointment of bishops by the crown is replete with many evils. This, surely, cannot be viewed either as apostolical or primitive. In early times, those called bishops were elected by the body of elders over whom they presided, and with the consent of the people whom they served. This is so well defined, and so generally acknowledged, that it cannot be called in question. The appointment of

bishops was not vested in bishops, but in elders. This, too, is fully established from antiquity. In this, then, the Church of England differs widely from Scripture and the apostolical churches. The bishops in these times were elected by the elders, in conjunction with the people. It is true, in some cases the deans and chapters elect in the English Church by *congé d'elire*; but this, as we have shown, is only a mere sham for an election, when the persons nominated by the king must be both elected and consecrated, under pain of premunire; so that, properly, the king *nominates, elects, and consecrates*; for what he does by his officers, who *must not* resist his will, he does himself. In short, to use the language of the English law, applied to this case, he *makes or creates bishops*. He also makes or creates peers, dukes, &c., though he does not himself go through the ceremonies of mere investiture; so he makes or creates bishops, though others may consecrate them, which consecration is only a part of the outward ceremonial of making them. Election is the principal part of making bishops, and this the king does to all intents and purposes; or, in other words, he sums up all in his mandate to the dean and chapters, or in his letters patent, where there are no deans and chapters, and in his mandate for consecration; thus throwing election to the winds, and authoritatively commanding his servants, the deans, chapters, and bishops, to go through the outward ceremonials of their nominal forms, in reference to his chosen one, and to none other. He that can receive this as Scriptural, apostolical, primitive, or proper, let him receive it; and then he can receive all popery and all inconsistency, and every thing, however absurd, with all readiness.

5. The unnatural alliance of church and state is another defect in the Church of England. This junction is injurious to both. The civil powers are embarrassed with religious tests and ecclesiastical encroachments. The church is loaded with political principles and political ministers in the place of evangelical ones. Thus each receives injury from the alliance. Such was not the form of the Christian church for several centuries after Christ.

6. In comparing the dignitaries of the English Church with the primitive bishops, we see an amazing contrast.

Indeed, it is difficult to draw the comparison between the opulent, unpreaching prelates of the Anglican Church, and the self-denying and humble apostles, whose undoubted successors they claim to be. Between them there are very few common traits of character. The primitive bishops were elected by the free suffrages of the presbyters; but these are immediately appointed by the king, or chosen by a *congé d'elire* from him, as was already shown. Those did not proceed against criminals but with the consent of the presbyters, and upon the testimony of witnesses; these proceed by an act *ex officio*, by which men are obliged to accuse themselves. The primitive bishops had no lordly titles; the latter are called *lords, lords spiritual, his grace, right reverend, &c.* The former had no lay chancellors, commissaries, nor other officials; the latter have such at command. The primitive bishops did not engage in secular affairs; our modern lords spiritual, who have a seat in parliament, differ widely from them. Those were not unpreaching prelates; but these are rarely employed in preaching the gospel. On comparing both we see a vast dissimilarity, and a serious

want of apostolical character in these dignitaries, when compared with the apostles or primitive bishops. It is true, times have changed; but with these changes surely Christianity has not lost all its heavenly temper and tendencies, although its form may appear under different aspects in different circumstances.

7. We ought not to forget, that the worldly and political mould into which the Church of England was cast in her legislative head, the parliament, in her executive head, the king, and in her official head, the bishops, is seen and felt in her ministers in general. Their pride and luxury, before they were put to the blush during the last hundred years by their more circumspect neighbours, were truly alarming. And even still they are, as a body, far from being examples to the flock. Look at their sinecures and those who possess pluralities, and who are, of course, non-residents. The following we quote from Dr. Humphrey's tour respecting Ireland in 1836, as published in the New-York Observer. The tithe system, of which the following is a correct specimen, is a true index of the Christian character of those who can have hearts to live by this species of ecclesiastical and political plunder:—

"In the *first place*, the *revenues* of the Irish Church are enormous. 'Twenty-two bishops,' says a beneficed clergyman, (Metropolitan, vol. iii, p. 397,) 'divide, in rents and fines, £220,000 per annum; that is, they receive an average income, if this estimate be correct, of £10,000, or nearly \$50,000.' The same writer estimates the income of the benefices of the Irish Church at £1,500,000, and the average worth of each living at £800, a little short of \$4,000. Now, if this is any where near the truth, what monstrous oppression is that which extorts these princely incomes, in part, at least, from a half-clad and starving Catholic tenantry! *Ten thousand pounds* paid to a single bishop, is a sum, no doubt, above the comprehension of many of them; but their priests and political agitators know very well how to make the most of it, and in this way to influence them still more against the Protestants and the Protestant religion.

"In the *second place*, the greater part of this enormous income goes to support pluralists, and other non-resident incumbents, in idleness and luxury. 'Until lately,' says the writer above quoted, 'curates were obliged to work for £60 a year, and, I believe, get no more now than £75; and more than two-thirds of the duty is performed by them.' The following extracts, from authentic tables now before me, will give your readers some idea of these crying abuses:—

'No. 2. Rector not resident; never was a curate; duty done by two curates; tythe £3,000, (nearly \$15,000;) Protestant population two hundred and fifty; pay of the two curates £150; glebe and house £300.

'No. 3. Rector not resident; highly beneficed in another country; tythe £800; duty done by one curate at £75; Protestant population fifty; congregation thirty.

'No. 4. Rector not resident; never was a curate; tythe £400; Protestant population ten.

'No. 5. Rector not resident; never was a curate; highly beneficed, and resides on his other living; tythe £1,200; Protestant population sixty; congregation forty; paid for duty £68.

'No. 21. Rector resident, but does no duty; was never a curate;

benefice was resigned to him when he was a young man; duty done by a curate; tythe £1,600.

‘Rector non-resident; is also rector of another large benefice, on neither of which did he ever reside; tythe £1,100.’

“I might carry out this list to an indefinite extent, but I forbear. A glance is sufficient. Kind reader, what do you think of it? Do you wonder that the Catholics of Ireland are not converted when such flagrant abuses exist before their eyes, and their deep poverty is taxed to perpetuate them? Suppose the established church should exist there in this attitude three hundred or three thousand years longer; is there the least probability that the people would, through her instrumentality, be brought over to the Protestant faith? Verily, it must require such faith as few Christians have any notion of to expect it.

“In the *third place*, not only are there hundreds of men, resident clergymen, supported by tithes in Ireland, but there are scores of *sine-cure* benefices, in every sense of the term. In 1834, as appears from the report of the commissioners of public instruction, the whole number of benefices was about one thousand three hundred and eighty-five. In three hundred and thirty-nine of these the incumbent was non-resident; in two hundred and ten there was no church; and in one hundred and fifty-seven no service was performed by any person whatever, either incumbent or curate. In some of these parishes not a solitary Protestant could be found. In all the one hundred and fifty-seven last mentioned there was not one congregation, and in many others the term congregation was a mere ludicrous misnomer. And yet, till very lately, the whole tithe machinery was brought to bear, with unmitigated severity, upon the Catholic population. For example, in one parish, the Protestant residents are put down at ten, congregation six, tithes £500; in another, population thirty, congregation fifteen, tithes £1000; and in another, population fifteen, congregation five, tithes £500.

“Now some of these parishes contain thousands of Catholics, who, beside supporting their own clergy, are compelled to pay very large salaries to Protestant incumbents, for residing they know not where, and for doing just nothing at all, either by person or by curate. And yet some excellent people in the establishment, acquainted with all these facts, think it very remarkable that the truth has made so little progress in Ireland. They are astonished that so few Catholics have been converted; that under the shining of the true light, ever since the Reformation, the vast majority have continued in darkness until now. Is not the *real* matter of astonishment that any of them have been converted, under the goading, exasperating, and oppressive measures, both political and ecclesiastical, which have constituted the reigning policy of their Protestant masters?”

Now, according to the best calculations, the whole amount of Protestant population does not exceed a *million and a half*, while the Roman Catholics number *six millions and a half*. About one half the Protestants of Ireland are dissenters from the established church. Hence, more than *seven millions*, after *voluntarily* supporting their own clergy, are *compelled*, by law, to pay enormous salaries in behalf of the *seven hundred and fifty thousand* churchmen! And this *proportion* does not differ materially from what it has been for nearly these three hundred years.

Let the reader also glance at these ministers following the chase, and pursuing all the follies, not to say many of the vices, of the age. Do they watch over their flocks, and become examples for their imitation? Do they feed them and rule over them for their good, so as to reprove the obstinate and comfort the feeble-minded? Very few of these duties are done. The clergy of this church will certainly suffer in comparison with those of other reformed churches. But how great will the contrast be, if we compare our English and Irish rectors, vicars, and even curates, with the primitive ministers? How absurd their claims to almost exclusive apostolic *succession* among reformed churches, and how much more defective in genuine apostolical *character* than their neighbors, who make no such lofty pretensions!

8. Besides, their people, as might be expected, are very much like their leaders. What profaneness and glaring wickedness almost everywhere prevail among all classes of this communion! And where this is not so much the case, and where morality is inculcated and observed, how great is the ignorance of the doctrines of Christianity, and more especially of experimental religion! Certainly they are far from being truly apostolical, however they may trace their succession as regularly through Rome to Peter, as the Jews could their genealogical descent to Abraham, and claim to be his children. The Scripture requires that Christians should be holy, that they should forsake sin, and live in obedience to Christ's commandments. But this is not the case with the greater portion of this church, for we make our estimate of character from the majority or the greater part. We ought, nay, we are willing and desirous to make all proper allowance for unsound persons that may, for a time, be attached to any great body of men; yet, when we see the majority in this condition, we are forced to conclude that, *as a church*, there is great want of conformity to the spirit and practice of religion.

9. There is another particular in which we think there is an exceedingly great lack of primitive excellence in the English Church; that is, her laxity in, or almost total neglect of, gospel discipline. Her members, in general, are members by birthright or baptism, and are regenerated, according to their generally received views, by baptism. No proper conditions are required of those who come into her pale; but any one who thinks fit may attach himself to her communion, however unqualified he may be to bear the Christian name. Besides, as members of the establishment, there are no proper Christian requirements enjoined and exacted, any more than from others who make no pretensions to religion. Indeed, their church membership has scarcely any thing more sacred in it than citizenship, or to be born in some part of the British dominions. Sin is neither rebuked nor punished in any effectual degree. Drunkards, swearers, Sabbath-breakers, profane and impure persons, are retained in her communion without any adequate censure. Did the primitive church admit of persons of scandalous lives to attach themselves to her society? Or did they permit such to remain in her communion and approach her sacraments? We believe no person can say they did either of these.

That this view of the exercise of discipline is correct, no one acquainted with the Church of England will pretend to deny. Many of her own bishops, ministers, and people, are aware of this. Bishop

Burnet, in his History of the Reformation, speaking of discipline in reference to Elizabeth's reign, under the year 1559, observes,—“As for the canons and rules of the church government, they were not so soon prepared. These came out, some in the year 1571, and more in the year 1597; and a far larger collection of them in the first year of King James's reign. But this matter has yet wanted its chief force; for penitentiary canons have not been set up, and the government of the church is not yet brought into the hands of churchmen; so that, in this point, the reformation of the church wants some part of its finishing, in the government and discipline of it.” (*Hist. Ref.*, vol. ii, p. 518.)

Under the year 1553, in the conclusion of King Edward's reign, he inquires,—“Have we of the clergy made the steps which became us, and that were designed in the former age for throwing out abuses, for regulating the courts, and restoring discipline? While we have, for one hundred and fifty years, expressed once a year a faint wish that the primitive discipline were again restored, and yet have not made one step toward it. What a venality of the advowsons to livings do we hear of; and, at best, the disposing of them goes generally by secular regards, by importunities, obligation, or friendship; and, above all, how few of those who labor in the gospel do labor indeed, and give themselves wholly to it! How much of their time and zeal is employed in things that do not deserve it so well as the watching over, the instructing, and the building up their flock in the most holy faith! How few do fast and pray, and study to prepare themselves and their people for the evil day that seems nearer us than the greatest part are willing to apprehend, that so we may, by our intercessions, deliver our church and nation from that which is ready to swallow us up; or, at least, to be so fortified and assisted that we ourselves, and others by what they see in us, may glorify God in that day of visitation.” (*Idem*, vol. iii, p. 264.)

In the conclusion of his admirable history, Bishop Burnet remarks,—“The proviso that had passed in Henry VIII.'s time, that continued all the canon law then received in England till a code of ecclesiastical laws was prepared, which, though attempted and well composed, was never settled, has fixed among us gross abuses, beside the dilatory forms of these courts, which make all proceedings in them both slow and chargeable. This has, in a great measure, enervated all church discipline. A faint wish, that is read on Ash-Wednesday, intimates a desire of reviving the ancient discipline; yet no progress has been made to render that more effectual. The exemptions settled by the papal authority do put many parts of this church in a very disjointed state; while in some places the laity, and in many others presbyters, exercise episcopal jurisdiction independent on their bishops, in contradiction to their principles, while they assert a divine right for settling the government of the church in bishops, and yet practise episcopal authority in the virtue of an act of parliament, that provisionally confirmed those papal invasions of the episcopal power, which is plainly that which, in a modern name, is called Erastianism, and is so severely censured by some who yet practise it; since, whatsoever is done under the pretence of law against the divine appointment, can go under no better name than the highest and worst degree of Erastianism.” (*Burnet*, vol. iii, p. 397.)

According to this candid bishop, agreeably to the established polity of the Church of England, there were cases in which *both the laity and presbyters exercised episcopal jurisdiction, independent on their bishops, by virtue of an act of parliament which confirmed this, though it was a papal invasion.* Let this be distinctly remembered, as its application will be presently seen. It is useless to enlarge on the want of gospel discipline in the English Church, since it is acknowledged by their own divines and bishops.

VIII. *Good qualities of the Anglican Church.*

Notwithstanding the various defects of the English established church, enumerated as above, and they are such as are inconsistent with their claims to exclusive apostolicity, there are, nevertheless, many excellent traits to be found in her, of great utility to mankind, and of acknowledged Christian character. And though we have freely, and without ill-will or malice, but with sentiments of respect, pointed out her defects, it is with the greatest cheerfulness that we acknowledge her good qualities, and are willing and desirous to point them out.

1. Her firm opposition to papal tyranny calls for the praise of the world, and all Protestants in particular. The power of the pope had risen to the greatest pitch at the Reformation. The secession and opposition of Luther and the continental reformers gave a mortal wound to papacy. This wound was likely to be healed, had it not been for the timely and firm resistance to popery from the English nation. In almost every age since, and in every great exigency, England has stood as the great bulwark of the Protestant world; and she, and perhaps she alone, could cope with papal tyranny so as to preserve, or rather bring about, that liberty of conscience which now is gaining so much ground in the world. Indeed, the whole Protestant world are, under God, indebted to Britain, and Protestant Britain, for the freedom from papal usurpations which they now possess. It is, however, to be noted, that the dissenting Protestant portion of England have been, and are yet, on the lowest scale of calculation, nothing behind the portion that are attached to the establishment. Be this as it may, Protestant Britain is the palladium of liberty to Protestantism; in a great degree also to Roman Catholicism in time of need; for, when her persecuted clergy fled for protection, they found in England both protection and assistance. And what is the liberty of the United States but British freedom stripped of its encumbrances, and called forth into unrestrained practice in the free institutions of our government!

2. The English Church, to a very considerable extent, has fostered and promoted learning of every kind. Her learned divines and gifted laity have blessed the world with many of the best productions on the subject of divinity and Biblical criticism, as well as on every branch of science and literature. Her early progress, and her continued advancement in promoting knowledge of almost every kind, has produced, and continues to produce, a benefit to the world that future ages will be thankful for and acknowledge, when those party divisions that now refuse to confess it will have no existence in the world. The names of Newton, Tillotson, Watson, Walton, and a host of others, will ever be held in veneration and esteem.

3. Notwithstanding her defects, there have been, and there still

are, many pious people and ministers in her communion ; and though the great bulk of her members are very little acquainted with experimental religion, there are still many that love and serve God. And we have reason to believe that the number of pious ministers and people is on the increase ; and that she can number many more of this class now than she could sixty or a hundred years ago.

4. Add to this, that in her bosom a great and extensive revival of religion has taken place within these last hundred years. Some of her ministers, with the Rev. John Wesley at their head, prophesied. On many others, also, the Spirit rested. By the labors of both, great has been the work in her midst. And it is a matter of surprise, as well as of thankfulness to God, that the opposition to this blessed renovation from her lukewarm clergy has been so little, rather than that it was such as did really exist.

5. Besides, her *moderation* and *tolerance*, especially in latter times, call for admiration. It is true, the puritans, and various branches of dissenters, have suffered much, and still labor under privations. Yet no other church in her circumstances would, perhaps, be equally indulgent to those who differed from them. Her example in this is acknowledged to be salutary, and, no doubt, will have an extensively beneficial effect on the Christian world. It may be said that the tolerance and moderation of the English nation and church are to be traced to the principles and influence of the puritans, and dissenters, and Methodists. Be this as it may, this effect was accomplished where the English Church had supreme rule ; and if we proceed to the immediate instruments, they were those who received their first lessons, at least, in the very cradle of the Church of England.

6. Her vast efforts in the Bible cause ought not to be passed by. Her kings, her lords and commons, her high church dignitaries, her clergy and her people, have conspired together, by a superhuman effort, *to cause* that the Bible will speak to every people under heaven in their own native dialect. She has been singularly foremost and active in bringing about a new pentecost, as to tongues and spiritual influence, that shall continue and extend till the kingdoms of this world shall become the inheritance of Christ. Her liberality and giant efforts, in these respects, must not be envied and overlooked by those who are either unable or unwilling to do as she has done or is now doing.

With the greatest cordiality we acknowledge the excellencies of the English Church, though we deem it our privilege to point out her errors, that we may give reasons to others why the Methodist Episcopal Church feels herself justified in doing as she has done in forming a separate organization in America ; and why Wesleyan Methodism in Europe has taken the course which it has done, in so far as it has separated from the English establishment ? As to any plea which the Protestant Episcopal Church can make against the Methodist Episcopal Church for separating from her, nothing is more foolish than its bare mention. She had no being when the Methodist Episcopal Church was formed ; and for her to talk about schism or separation in such a case is the height of presumption, if not of dementation.

7. A few reflections, however, will be necessary on the character of King Henry, and on some circumstances connected with it. This is the more proper because some Protestants, and almost all Roman Catholics, have transferred to the English Church all the sins of this extraordinary man.

(1.) King Henry certainly possessed a considerable portion of knowledge and learning, especially in divinity; and excelled most princes of that, or any age, in intellectual endowments and attainments. Hence, he wrote a book against Luther; but it is doubtful whether this was his own production. This gave occasion to those excessive flatteries from the pope and his party, which, while it obtained for him the title of *Defender of the Faith*, in a great measure corrupted his temper and disfigured his whole government. When he threw off the pope's yoke, the Reformers, in their turn, offered him all the flatteries they could decently give. This, too, had an injurious effect on this monarch. (See Burnet, vol. iii, p. 206.)

(2.) King Henry was not a little pleased with his title of *Supreme Head of the Church of England*, which, by act of parliament, was joined to the other titles of his crown. He thought that infallibility was to accompany supremacy; and as this, in the popish system, belonged to the pope, he must also have infallibility attached to the crown. Those, therefore, who formerly yielded to the one, he thought ought now to submit to the other. He also turned against the Reformers when he saw their complaisance did not go so far as to acknowledge his infallibility, and for some time seemed fast going over to popery again, so that he was all the time fluctuating in both his opinions and practices; sometimes progressing in reformation, and at other times returning back to his old opinions. (*Idem*, vol. iii, pp. 126, 209.)

(3.) As it regards his divorce, whether he was sincere in pretending to have conscientious scruples with regard to his first marriage, is known to God alone; but whatever his secret motives were, he had the constant tradition of the Roman Church on his side, of which he was a member. This was carefully searched and proved; and no author older than Cajetan could be found in opposition to the current of tradition. And in the disputes of that age with those called heretics, the Romanists always made their appeals to tradition, as the only infallible expounder of Scripture. King Henry, therefore, had the acknowledged standard of the times on his side. (*Idem*, vol. iii, p. 438. Col., No. ii.)

(4.) Bishop Burnet holds the following language, in reference to Henry's breach with the pope:—"There appears to have been a signal train of providence in the whole progress of this matter, that thus ended in a total rupture. The court of Rome, being overawed by the emperor, engaged itself for it at first; but when the pope and the king of France were so entirely united as they knew they were, it seems they were under an infatuation from God to carry their authority so far, at a time in which they saw the king of England had a parliament to support him in his breach with Rome. It was but too visible that the king would have given all up, if the pope would have done him common justice; but when the matter was brought so near a total union, an entire breach followed, in the very time in which it was thought all was made up. Those who favored

the reformation saw all their hopes, as it seemed, blasted ; but of a sudden all was revived again. This was an amazing transaction ; and how little honor soever this full discovery of all the steps made in it does to King Henry, who retained his inclinations to a great deal of popery to the end of his life, yet it is much to the glory of God's providence that made the persons most concerned to prevent and hinder the breach, to be the very persons that brought it on, and, in a manner, forced it." (*Idem*, vol. iii, p. 112.)

(5.) The same excellent writer makes the following observations on the conduct of Henry, in the part he took in the Reformation :—
 " But whatever he was, and how great soever his pride, and vanity, and his other faults were, he was a great instrument in the hand of Providence for many good ends. He first opened the door to let light in upon the nation ; he delivered it from the yoke of blind and implicit obedience ; he put the Scriptures in the hands of the people, and took away the terror they were formerly under by the cruelty of the ecclesiastical courts ; he declared this church to be an entire and perfect body within itself, with full authority to decree and regulate all things, without any dependance on any foreign power ; and he did so unite the supreme headship over this church to the imperial crown of this realm, that it seemed a just consequence that was made by some in a popish reign, that he who would not aver that this supremacy was in him, did, by that, renounce the crown, of which that title was made so essential a part that they could no more be separated.

" By attacking popery in its strong holds—the monasteries—he destroyed them all, and thus he opened the way to all that came after, even down to our days ; so that, while we see the folly and weakness of man in all his personal failings, which were very many and very enormous, we, at the same time, see both the justice and the goodness of God in making him, who was once the pride and glory of popery, become its scourge and destruction ; and in directing his pride and passion so as to bring about, under the dread of his unrelenting temper, a change that a milder reign could not have compassed without great convulsions and much confusion. Above all the rest, we ought to adore the goodness of God in rescuing us, by his means, from idolatry and superstition ; from the vain and pompous shows in which the worship of God was dressed up so as to vie with heathenism itself, into a simplicity of believing and a purity of worship, conformed to the nature and attributes of God, and the doctrine and example of the Son of God." (*Idem*, vol. iii, p. 210.) The foregoing sentiments are those of sobriety, and in them every sound Protestant will acquiesce, and Romanists cannot give them a confutation.

But it would be altogether improper to disparage the Reformation of the Church of England on account of King Henry's faults. As far as it is agreeable to the word of God it is right, whatever part this monarch may have taken in establishing it ; and so far as it is not agreeable to Scripture, or is inconsistent with it, so far it is wrong, whoever may have been actors in it. The unsteady favor which the Church of England received from Henry can no more blemish it, than the vices of those princes that first promoted Christianity can blemish the Christian religion. If the crimes of Clovis, as related

by Gregory of Tours, be compared with the worst crimes of King Henry, we will find more falsehood, more cruelty, in the French than in the English monarch. Nor can we find any hints of Clovis's repentance, nor any restitution of his ill-gotten possessions. And this was the first Christian king of the Franks. While Henry is condemned to inevitable perdition by Romanists, they extol Clovis, a worse man, as a good Catholic and a good Christian. It is true, we can find many things in Henry VIII. worthy of severe reprehension; but, on comparison, we shall find him nothing worse than Pope Paul III., the French king, or German emperor; all three of whom gave as many proofs of their insincerity and want of principle as he manifested. This is necessary to be said of King Henry, that however we may reprehend many parts of his conduct, we ought not to overlook the bad examples he had in the pope himself in intrigue and falsehood; as well as the wrong opinions he had, in early life, imbibed from the Roman doctrines.

(6.) Upon the whole, in the reformation from popery, we may see the watchful care of Providence. When the light seemed almost extinguished in one place, it broke out in another; and when aid and protection seemed shut up in one source, God afforded help from another. In the beginning of King Henry's reign, by the breaking up of the Smacaldic league, by the capture of the Landgrave of Hesse and the Elector of Saxony, and by the *Interim*, the Reformation appeared almost extinguished in Germany. At this time it was advancing in England, which proved a refuge for the persecuted in Germany. And in the year previous to the death of Edward VI., there was a lasting settlement provided for the Reformation in Germany; so that those who fled from England in the reign of Mary found an asylum among the German Protestants. Thus God has provided for his truth in a manner, and by such means, as the wisdom of man could never devise. (*Idem*, vol. iii, p. 264.)

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ART. II.—HISTORICAL VIEW OF UNIVERSALISM IN THE UNITED STATES.

BY THE REV. F. P. TRACY, OF THE NEW-ENGLAND CONFERENCE.

THE doctrine of the ultimate holiness and happiness of the whole human family has been held and taught at different times, and by various individuals, since the days of Origen. It has formed a component part of several systems, and has had some few able defenders, but no considerable portion of the nominal Christian Church has, at any time, avowed faith in it; and among those who have believed it, there has been more difference of opinion as to the means by which the event is to be brought about, the true principles on which the doctrine should be founded, and the time when all men shall partake of the benefit, than has existed on any other point of theology whatever.

But notwithstanding these differences, it has still, through a thousand metamorphoses, retained its being. Rising, like the phoenix,

from the ashes of its former destruction, it has found for itself a new mode of existence and defence when the older has failed it.

In Europe, the doctrine has been received by some sects of the Anabaptists, and to a considerable extent by the English Unitarians; and has also received countenance from several minor parties of theologians in various communions.

The first person who publicly taught this sentiment in the United States was Dr. George De Benneville, who, after having suffered various evils in Europe on account of his tenets, came to America about 1741, and preached occasionally until his death, in 1793. His residence was in Berks county, Pennsylvania; and his field of ministerial labor in the western part of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia.

During the latter part of the labors of De Benneville, i. e., subsequent to 1754, it is supposed that Richard Clarke, rector of St. Philip's, Charleston, S. C., preached the doctrine of universal restoration. He was connected with this church until 1759, when he returned to England. He was considered a man of talents and industry, and published several works, which, however, do not seem to have secured for him a very lasting fame.

The only work in defence of the sentiment which had been published in America before 1770, was an edition of Seigvolk's *Everlasting Gospel*. This was issued from a press in Germantown, Pa., in 1753. Who the publisher was is not known; probably, however, one of the Mennonites, whose principal congregation was at Germantown, and who were, in a certain sense, Restorationists.

The treatise was probably written early in the 17th century, but the author, at this time, is utterly unknown; history not having deigned so much as to notice him.

This is about all that can be said of the existence of Universalism under any of its forms in this country prior to 1770. Perhaps other traces of it might be found, but it was a subject very little thought of among the people. There was too little of a disposition to change among the puritanic fathers of those days to admit of an apostacy which the easier morals of later days have rendered feasible, and have, in fact, produced.

In the year 1770 John Murray, who had for some time been a preacher of universal restoration in England, landed at a place called Cranberry Inlet, in New Jersey, and preached his first sermon in America in a chapel built by one Mr. Potter, an inhabitant of that place. Mr. Murray soon visited New-York and Philadelphia, and some other towns in the vicinity; and in 1772 made his first tour to New-England, and preached in Newport and Providence. He went south, however, to spend the winter, but returned again in the spring; and, preaching at various places on his way, arrived at Boston Oct. 26, 1773, where he proclaimed his new doctrine in what was called the Factory, in Tremont-street. He pushed forward in this journey as far as Portsmouth, New-Hampshire.

Having passed the ensuing winter in the south, he came back to New-England in the spring of 1774; and after spending the major part of the time, until autumn, in Boston, he, in November of the same year, visited the town of Gloucester, when, with considerable opposition, he publicly taught his sentiments until he was appointed

a chaplain in the army, then quartered at Cambridge. Ill health in a short time compelled him to leave the field, and he returned to Gloucester, and there remained afterward as a public teacher of universal restoration until his removal to Boston in 1793, where he died in the year 1815. Under his auspices the first Restorationist society in America was formed in Gloucester, on the 1st of January, 1779; and the first church belonging to this sect was erected in the same place in 1780.

While the changes named in this sketch were passing over Mr. Murray, others rose up to engage in defending the same doctrine of ultimate restoration. Nearly at the time of Mr. Murray's arrival in this country, Adam Streeter, a minister of the Baptist Church, apostatized from that faith, and commenced preaching Restorationism. Caleb Rich, also, about 1771, after being expelled from the Baptist church in Warwick, Mass., commenced publishing the same doctrine; and his preaching soon after, in the town of Jaffrey, N. H., resulted in proselyting to the faith Thomas Barnes, who soon became himself a preacher of the same gospel. Mr. Rich was ordained by Mr. Streeter about 1780. Of the ordination of Mr. Barnes we have no account. These men, though they came into the field *after* Mr. Murray, were not indebted to him for their doctrine, as the two former, at least, had not heard of him when they began their public labors.

Another principal pillar in the edifice was Elhanan Winchester. He was, at first, a free-will Baptist, and preached their doctrine in Brookline, Mass. In the autumn of 1774, he went to South Carolina, and did not visit New-England again until 1779. During his residence in South Carolina he procured and read Seigvolk's *Everlasting Gospel*, which so far undermined his orthodoxy as to lead him to a partial faith in the doctrine of the author. He does not appear to have been fully converted, however, until the latter part of January, 1781, when, after having read "Stonehouse on the Restitution of All Things," and spent a month in secret research, he declared himself to his friends a confirmed believer in the universal salvation of men.

It will be remarked that this avowal was made in Philadelphia, to which place he returned, after visiting the north, in the year 1780. There is one thing of which Mr. Winchester was guilty, which is inexcusable in any man; the designed conversion of others to a sentiment which the speculator dares not venture himself upon, either because he lacks confidence in its truth, or fears the loss of reputation or wealth by a full and frank avowal. The author of the *Modern History of Universalism*, in relation to this affair, thus significantly expresses himself:—"Thus converting others, and half a convert himself, he arrived at Philadelphia on the 7th of October," (p. 341.) For a man to convert others with design, when he himself is but *half a convert*, is not only a strong indication of an imbecile mind, but it proves too fully that the guilty man places but slight value on the truth, and cares but little whether men are deceived by his efforts or not. Indeed, there is good evidence, (*Mod. Hist. Univer.*, p. 343,) that after Mr. Winchester was fully convinced of the truth of the tenet that all will be saved, he wished to keep it close, and not to have it mentioned to his disadvantage; and

even then he pledged himself not to preach what he believed to be the gospel, nor to introduce it in private conversation, unless he was attacked or requested. Valiant defender of the truth, who, for the sake of a support and influence, would cloak his real sentiments, and not even mention them to his friends! Such a man deserves the scorn of every honest spirit!

Notwithstanding the care of Mr. Winchester and his friends, the thing was noised abroad; and, despite of his attempts at concealment, in April, 1781, he was obliged by the popular voice to avow his real sentiments, and he was, in consequence, excluded from the house he had possessed or retained by his duplicity. On the 22d of the same month he preached his doctrine "*plainly for the first time,*" in the hall of the Pennsylvania University; and he soon gathered round him a society somewhat respectable, as to its numbers and character. (Mod. Hist. Univers., pp. 348-9.) He remained with this congregation until 1787, when he sailed for England, where he remained until 1794. He fled from England to avoid the tyranny of his wife, who declared, both in word and practice, that "she must be a devil and govern." This needless and shameful flight only gives farther evidence of the weakness of the man's mind, and of an indecision of character which marked, but too legibly, his whole course. Mr. Winchester, on his arrival in this country from England, commenced his public labors again principally in New-England, and continued to preach in various places for some time, though not with that success which had formerly marked his course. He closed his career, and his body was committed to the dust, in Hartford, Conn., in 1797.

In the year 1785 a Convention of Universalists was called. It met at Oxford, Mass., on the 14th of September of that year.* (Mod. Hist. Univers., p. 364.) Mr. Winchester was chosen moderator, and Daniel Fisk clerk. This convention decided that their sect should be called the "Independent Christian Universalists." They also adopted certain articles of agreement, styled the "Charter of Compact." In this charter they agree to receive Christ as their master, and his word and spirit as their guide; and after various other provisions and declarations, we find the following:—"We will, as much as possible, avoid vain jangling and unnecessary disputation." How fully and constantly the sect have adhered to this article, let the files of their Trumpet and Magazine, their Star in the East, their Religious Inquirer, and other papers, as well as the record of their endless controversies, testify. All will prove that there is no sect in the United States so entirely given up to "jangling" and "disputation" as these same Universalists.

The meeting at Oxford resulted in the establishment of the "General Convention of Universalists," which, since that time, has held

* It is a fact somewhat interesting, that while the Universalists were holding their jubilee in New-Haven, just fifty years after the convention at Oxford, the Methodists were occupying the Universalist church in Oxford with almost constant meetings. A great revival, at that time, spread through the town; and many, who had long been Universalists, experienced religion, and became members of the church of Christ. Thus, like the new verdure, fresher and more vigorous, God causes the truth to spring up upon the very soil which the fires of error have desolated.

an annual session. This convention appears to have the general oversight of the societies, and provides for the prosperity of the cause; while each society retains, within itself, all authority in its own special affairs. At the meeting of the convention, in 1803, the following profession of faith was adopted, viz.:—

"Art. 1. We believe that the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, contain a revelation of the character of God; and of the duty, interest, and final destination of all mankind.

"Art. 2. We believe that there is one God, whose nature is love, revealed in one Lord Jesus Christ, by one Holy Spirit of grace, who will finally restore the whole human family to holiness and happiness.

"Art. 3. We believe that holiness and true happiness are inseparably connected, and that believers ought to be careful to maintain order and practise good works; for these things are good and profitable unto all men."*

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to particularize in this sketch the various doings of the convention from year to year, as they bear but very little relation to Universalism as a system of theology.

The next movement of considerable importance was the formation of the "Massachusetts Association of Universal Restorationists," which took place in the year 1831, on the 16th of August, at Mendon, Mass. The convention was attended by Rev. Paul Dean, David Pickering, Charles Hudson, Adin Ballou, Lyman Maynard, Nathaniel Wright, Philemon R. Russel, Seth Chandler, and several laymen; and they unanimously adopted the following preamble and resolutions, viz.:—

"Forasmuch as there has been, of late years, a GREAT departure from the sentiments of the first Universalist preachers in this country by a majority of the General Convention, the leaders of which do now arrogate to themselves the name of Universalists; and whereas we believe with Murray, Winchester, Chauncey, and the ancient authors who have written upon this subject, that REGENERATION, A GENERAL JUDGMENT, FUTURE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, to be followed by the final restoration of all mankind to holiness and happiness, are fundamental articles of Christian faith, and that the modern sentiments of No Future accountability, connected with Materialism, are unfriendly to pure religion and subversive of the best interest of society; and whereas our adherence to the doctrines on which the General Convention was first established, instead of producing fair, manly controversy, has procured for us contumely, exclusion from ecclesiastical councils, and final expulsion, and this without proof of any offence on our part against the rules of the order or laws of Christ: it is therefore—

"*Resolved*, That we hereby form ourselves into a religious community for the defence and promulgation of the doctrines of revelation in their original purity, and the promotion of our own improvement,—to be known by the name of the Massachusetts Association of Universal Restorationists.

* These articles of faith were drafted by Rev. Walter Ferris, who was a firm believer in the doctrine of limited future punishment. This fact is sufficiently indicative of the intention of the articles, and shows, most conclusively, that they who afterward denied the doctrine of limited future punishment, departed from the system agreed to by the General Convention of 1803.

"Resolved, That the annual meetings of this body be holden in Boston on the first Wednesday and following Thursday in January.

Signed, *"CHAS. HUDSON, President.*

"NATH. WRIGHT, Secretary."

On the 17th of September, 1831, the Trumpet, the organ of the Ultra-Universalists, as they now very properly began to be denominated, came out with an article entitled "The New Sect," in which sophistry and evasion were mingled with the bitterest reproaches against the Restoration Convention and the gentlemen composing it. This was replied to by Rev. Adin Ballou, in two articles of nearly seven columns of the Independent Messenger, a paper then printed at Mendon, and in the interest of the Restoration party. The warfare was carried on for some time with considerable zeal and skill, and with no little acrimony; until, tired of contention, the parties desisted from farther attempts upon each other's reputation.*

The Restorationists, doubtless, had all of justice and right upon their side, and were perfectly consistent and praiseworthy in the formation of their association; while the members of the General Convention cannot be too much censured for their attempts to crush the system which they themselves formerly advocated, while, at the same time, they professed not to have departed from the principles of the Convention of 1803. At the present time the Universalist body is divided into two principal parties, viz.: the Ultra-Universalists, who, following Hosea Ballou, deny the doctrine of punishment after death, &c.; and the Universal Restorationists, who hold to a general judgment, and a limited punishment beyond the grave. The former class is much the most numerous, and includes the larger part of all the societies in America.

The latter community can lay claim to a morality and respectability in their communion of which the other class is generally devoid. It is a fact, too, somewhat interesting, that between the Restorationists and New-England Unitarians there is but a slight difference of sentiment; and both these bodies may, without any great revolution, in the course of a few years be made one.

Universalism has increased considerably in this country since its introduction by Murray. There is not, however, probably a very general organization of churches by this sect. The friends of the system, with some exceptions, are gathered into legal societies, in which the ordinances of baptism and the Lord's supper are not administered, nor any thing like church discipline executed. There are, however, in some of the principal towns and cities, churches organized, and the ordinances of the church are attended to.

Under such circumstances it is very difficult to determine the num-

* It is to this controversy that we are indebted for the means of determining who are Universalists, a question that has sometimes been difficult to solve. The General Convention held its annual session for 1831 in September, one month after the movement at Mendon. Hosea Ballou presided. The Convention was holden at Barre, Vt. Among other proceedings, the following resolution, drafted by Thos. Whittemore, was adopted:—

"Resolved, That we consider all persons to be Universalists who believe in the final reconciliation of all men to holiness and happiness."

This was, doubtless, designed to conciliate the Restorationists, while it legitimized Ultraism. Whatever it might have been designed for, it is invaluable; as it marks so legibly, and distinguishes so clearly, Universalists from all others.

ber of Universalists with exactness. They state that they have six hundred and fifty-three societies, two hundred and forty-four meeting-houses, and three hundred and seventeen preachers. In this they are, doubtless, correct. They claim, in addition, that the number of persons connected with them amounts to five hundred thousand. This may be a fair estimate, and it may not. There are, doubtless, many who attend worship among them who are not Universalists in sentiment; and we think it unfair for them to class all persons in their congregations with themselves, while all other sects claim only those who are within the pale of the church, and enjoy its privileges as actual members.

Having thus sketched the secular history of Universalism, we proceed to notice the several treatises on the subject which have appeared in this country. The first, as we have before said, was Seigvolk's *Everlasting Gospel*, which appeared in 1753, at Germantown, Pa.

The works, also, of Stonehouse have been read in this country somewhat extensively, though, it is believed, in an English edition.

The writings of Elhanan Winchester, particularly his "*Dialogues on Universal Restoration*," and his "*Lectures on the Prophecies*," were, at one time, widely circulated, and assisted much toward establishing the sentiments he entertained in the United States; but they have long since ceased to be text-books, and the mantle of oblivion will soon cover them.

Of American productions in favor of this system, the work of Dr. Joseph Young, of New-York, who, in 1793, published a treatise entitled "*Calvinism and Universalism Contrasted*," claims precedence in the order of time. This same author also wrote a treatise, in which he attempted to refute the physical system of Sir Isaac Newton. Probably one work was written with as much wisdom, and proved quite as successful, as the other. Indeed it would seem, from the statements of the *Modern History of Universalism*, (page 381,) that the warmth with which the first work was written was its principal recommendation.

The next book claiming our notice is a posthumous publication from the pen of the Rev. Dr. Joseph Huntington, of Coventry, Conn., which was issued from the press of Samuel Green in New-London, in 1796. It was entitled "*Calvinism Improved, or the Gospel Illustrated as a System of Real Grace, issuing in the Salvation of All Men*." The precise time when this work was written is not known. The author, as appears from the Introduction, intended to publish it soon after its composition, but finally, as the date of the publication shows, he concluded to defer it; and, in the latter part of his days, as those who knew him assure me, he preached the same Calvinistic doctrine which had marked his earlier ministration. He was not even suspected of holding the tenets of his book until after his death, when, in the examination of his papers, the manuscript was found. A Restorationist in the neighborhood earnestly besought the privilege of publishing the book. For a time he was refused, until Mrs. Huntington, overcome by his representations, at last consented; but such was her view of the dangerous tendency of the work, that, with the assistance of her friends, she afterward collected and burned all the copies she could possibly obtain. The design of

Dr. Huntington probably was, that the work should never appear; but his name, by the importunity of a misguided man, has been branded with the effects of his work. He attempts to show in his book simply this: that the decree of election embraces all men, and, consequently, all will be saved. The book probably never had a great influence, and will never be called from its resting-place into use. It is a dry work, wearying us by its prolixity, as well as by its uninteresting style.

The book of Dr. Huntington was reviewed, in a short time after its publication, by Rev. Nathan Strong, of Hartford, Conn., in a treatise entitled, "The Doctrine of Eternal Misery reconcileable with the Benevolence of God, and a Truth plainly asserted in the Scriptures."

This was, in its turn, subjected to the ordeal of criticism by Rev. Dan Foster, A. M., of Charlestown, N. H. His book bore the name of "A Critical and Candid Examination of a late publication, entitled, The Doctrine of Eternal Misery reconcileable with the Infinite Benevolence of God."

From what can be learned of the review and reply, they are neither of them of high merit. Both have long since gone out of notice.

Another author, more eminent than those above named, has also contributed his mite to the support of the system. Dr. Charles Chauncey, at the time pastor of the First Congregational Church in Boston, about the year 1757, wrote a work in defence of the doctrine of Universal Restoration. He did not dare to publish it, however, for some time. Like Murray before him, he felt the weight of the motive which a good salary, an easy situation, and a large circle of friends afforded; and these he would not sacrifice for the truth. He published, however, in 1782, a pamphlet, the object of which was to sound the public on the subject, so as to ascertain whether it would be prudent to affix his name to his larger work.

Dr. Samuel Mather, of Boston, and Dr. Gordon, of Roxbury, both attacked the pamphlet, and the whole tide of public feeling turned against it. This settled the question in the mind of Chauncey, and he determined not to send out his work in his own name, nor from an American press. But still, the loss of so great a literary labor seemed too much, and, accordingly, the doctor sent his work to London, where it appeared anonymously in 1784. The younger President Edwards came out with a reply, entitled, "The Salvation of All Men Strictly Examined," &c. This is the ablest of all the early works against Universalism. It is unanswered and unanswerable, and forms a most valuable addition to the library of the theological student.

There seems to have been a period of some years, just subsequent to 1786, in which few if any authors favored the world with the result of their lucubrations upon this subject. In latter times, however, many books have been published on all sides of the question, and the doctrine is undergoing, with many, a most thorough investigation.

Hosea Ballou stands at the head of modern Universalist authors by general consent. He has written a "Treatise on the Atonement," several volumes of sermons, and, lately, "An Examination of the

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Doctrine of Future Retribution." These, with many fugitive pieces and some smaller works, form the sum of his productions.

As a writer, Mr. Ballou cannot lay claim to even ordinary merit. There is a looseness and want of depth and chasteness about his style, an appearance of sophistry and evasion in his arguments, and a tedious and even disgusting repetition of the same illustrations, especially those of the family relation and the history of Joseph, which will secure for all his productions a place in oblivion almost as soon as his head is pillowed in death; and it is a matter of astonishment that even now works of so little merit in any view can exert so great an influence.

Thomas Whittemore, principal editor of the *Trumpet* and *Universalist Magazine*, stands next on the list of Universalist writers. His principal works are, "The Ancient and Modern Histories of Universalism," and "Notes on the Parables." Neither of these works ranks high. The first is doubtless the best; and even this does not attract a very general notice.

"Balfour's Inquiries," perhaps, claim attention next. These, as well as his answer to Hudson, seem, of late, to have gone into disrepute. They are, among books, what Wat Tyler and Jack Straw, heroes of the time of Richard II., were among generals: powerful without strength, influential without merit; and, in their illiteracy, the guiding spirits of a blinded host.

The before-named are Ultra-Universalist authors. The Universal Restorationist sentiment has found lately, in Charles Hudson, its principal defender. He wrote, a few years since, the treatise to which Mr. Balfour replied. Of the character of this work we are not able to speak definitely, having had no opportunity of perusing it.

Besides the books already named which have been published against this system, there are others of modern date. Rev. Bernard Whitman has given to the world a treatise, entitled, "Letters to a Universalist," which is well written; and presents the argument against Ultra-Universalism in such a form, and with such force, as to render it truly valuable. Mr. Whitman was probably a Restorationist, though a clergyman of the Unitarian Church; but he has, nevertheless, struck a blow at Ultraism from which it cannot soon recover. The principal treatises, however, against this error, as well as the strongest arguments in its favor, are to be found in the records of the public controversies which have taken place. Of these there have been several. One was carried on about ten years since, in the *Trumpet* and *Universalist Magazine*, between Rev. O. Scott, of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and Thomas Whittemore, editor of the *Trumpet*. This was kept up until the columns were unceremoniously closed against Mr. Scott, and it, of course, was broken off before the parties had finished their work. Mr. Whittemore afterward had an oral discussion with Rev. Mr. Braman, of Danvers. This took place in 1833. The report does no honor to either party. The speeches on both sides were full of the most contemptible nonsense and quibbling; and well was it for common sense, so beleaguered by these clerical wranglers, when the sun went down and the discussion ended.

In the autumn of 1827 a public disputation took place in the town of Springfield, Mass., between Rev. T. Merritt, of the Methodist

Episcopal Church, and Lucius R. Paige. Their discussion was carried on by lectures and rejoinders, which were read in the Methodist Episcopal Church. It was on all hands acknowledged that Universalism was worsted in this contest. Indeed, it has never since then been able to sustain itself in that region until within a short time. Of late one weak society has been formed, a few miles from the place of dispute.

Between Rev. Luther Lee, of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and Rev. Mr. Morse, a Universalist, another discussion took place in the state of New-York, a year or two since. The whole has since been published by Mr. Lee.

Rev. Ezra Styles Ely has engaged with Rev. Abel C. Thomas, and Rev. Mr. Breckenridge with the same person. The matter of these various disputations given to the world, forms the most valuable resource from which the oppugners or the defenders of Universalism can draw their arguments. They remain, too, and ever will remain, imperishable records of the weakness of error, and of the power of truth and the triumph of sound theology, over sophistry, bigotry, and delusion.

Of course Universalists do not, and will not, admit all this. Even as they fly from the field, they raise on the lance's point the armor of a fallen foe, whose dead body they stripped in their retreat, and triumphantly point to it as the most indubitable evidence that they have come off conquerors, and more than conquerors, from the field of strife. But let them, we say, substantiate their claim by remaining upon that field, and showing themselves able to keep it; not by shouting victory in the confusion of retreat.

Our next work is to look into the history of Universalism as a system of theology, and to ascertain what changes have taken place in it, if any; and how those changes stand related to Christian theology.

Four different theories have been advanced and defended since the introduction of Universalism into this country. These, in the hands of different persons, have been subjected to a thousand modifications and modes of defence, the history of which cannot be given in this short essay. We confine ourselves, therefore, to the principal features of the heresy.

Murray, the father of American Restorationism, held to the proper divinity of Christ, the doctrine of atonement, spiritual regeneration, a general judgment, and the existence of both happiness and misery after death. But, while Mr. Murray admitted these doctrines, he connected with them some most singular tenets. A follower of Rely, like him, he contended, not that Christ suffered *instead* of us, but that we were so *united* with Christ as actually to be punished for our sins in his sufferings—that we suffered in his sufferings, or that his sufferings were ours.

He claimed, that if we were so connected with the first Adam as to sin in him, so we were so united with the second Adam as to suffer in him the penal consequences of our guilt. In establishing the fact of this union, the following, among other passages of Scripture, were relied on, viz.: "For we are members of his body, and of his flesh, and of his bones;" Eph. v, 3. "For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being

many, are one body, so also is Christ;" 1 Cor. xii, 12. "So we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another;" Rom. xii, 5. "I am crucified with Christ," &c.; Gal. ii, 20. As he claimed that the penalty of the law for all sin had been inflicted on us in the person of Christ, so he maintained that there could be, henceforward, no penal suffering for sin, but that all the evils coming upon the sinner are the natural effects of his acts, and are not at all measured by the moral nature of those acts. The misery, therefore, which he believed the wicked would suffer in the next world would not be a punishment, but rather the natural effect of their blindness and unbelief; so that, as soon as they believed, they would be received into heaven. The other doctrines named as helping to compose Mr. Murray's system, it is believed, he held as they are generally taught and understood.

Mr. Winchester, who had learned his Universalism from Seigvolk and Stonehouse instead of Rely, did not receive this doctrine of union and its consequences, but in all other particulars he agreed with Murray. Winchester believed that sinners might receive the penal consequences of their sins even now; that they would thus be punished in the coming world; and that the duration and measure of their pain would be in exact proportion to the demerit of the transgression. This penalty he believed to be inflicted by the will of God on account of sins already committed, and he held, in consequence, that the suffering would terminate, not when the sinner repented or believed, but when he had been punished during the period claimed by justice.

The difference, then, between Murray and Winchester, was this: Murray held that we were so united with Christ as to be punished in him; Winchester denied such a union. Murray taught that sin procures no punishment, but only some natural evils following upon that kind of action; Winchester believed that sin has its proper punishment in this and the future world. Murray limited misery in the future state by the blindness of the sufferer, and claimed that the pain ceased when the creature willed; Winchester limited it by the desert of the sinner, and insisted that it ended when God willed. Such were the points of their disagreement. It never caused, however, as we can learn, any disruption of feeling or effort, though it must be acknowledged that the systems differ very materially from each other.

These distinctions were the only ones known in the early days of Universalism in this country. But change, which sweeps over all, was to make its influence visible on these systems of doctrine; and Universalists, ceasing to be distinguished as followers of Winchester on the one hand, or of Murray on the other, were to assume new denominations and sentiments.

A heresy which has one principle fundamental to the system, may always be known by the constant changes which take place in the defence, the explanation, or the illustration of that principle. Truth is unchanging; and though there may be additions to the means of defence, and sometimes, perhaps, a slight difference in the arguments, in general all the reasons and facts which sustain the true assumption will remain the same—as changeless as the truth they establish. The argument once formed, and applied aright, is

incapable of refutation, and of course will need no new fashioning. But no valid argument can be brought to defend an error, and, therefore, one after another as they are brought they will be exploded; and unless the principle be given up, others must be created to supply the vacancy.

So it has been with Universalism. Its own friends were not satisfied with either the system of Murray or of Winchester. The arguments did not convince them, or, evidently, they would still be urged; and, in fine, there seemed, after years of examination, but a small portion of either theory which was worthy the name of truth. The principle that all will finally be holy and happy was not given up. This, to those who believed it, seemed a doctrine too glorious and heart-cheering to renounce; and it was still retained as a cherished idol.

What might have been anticipated took place. One by one the doctrines taught by the fathers of Universalism were consigned to the record of exploded propositions, and new hypotheses took their place.

The doctrines of the Trinity, the Atonement, Depravity, and Regeneration, as they are generally understood, ceased to be taught, and soon to be believed; and the whole body of Universalists became Unitarians. All this, however, was not the work of a moment. Years were spent in bringing about the change; but the work, though slowly, was effectually performed, and the old systems silently sunk into general disrepute, from which, among Universalists, they were never to rise again.

Here, then, we find the third system. It differs from the theories of Murray and Winchester by denying the doctrines of the Trinity, the Atonement, Regeneration, and others depending on these, and by maintaining the Unitarian notions upon these several points. It agrees with the old theories in asserting the doctrine of a general judgment and limited future punishment.

Of this last class are the modern Restorationists, in connection with the Massachusetts Universal Restorationist Association. There are also, it is believed, a considerable number of this faith in the fellowship of the General Convention of Universalists; and it is probable that the larger part of the Unitarian body in New-England are likewise strongly tinctured by the doctrine, if not entirely satisfied with it.

But the most considerable departure from ancient opinions remains to be noticed.

About the year 1818, Hosea Ballou, of Boston, and Edward Turner, of Charlestown, published, by agreement, a series of letters in the "Gospel Visitant," on the subject of future punishment. Turner defended the doctrine of the Restorationists; and Ballou, in opposition to him, maintained that there would be no suffering of any kind for any man after death.

This was a new sentiment, which the world never heard soberly defended until then, and its novelty excited attention. It was just the thing desired; and before it could be known if the doctrine was defensible, multitudes had staked their every eternal hope upon it.

There were some singular features about this controversy which deserve notice. Mr. Ballou declares, that when he sat down to

defend his proposition he was *not satisfied that it was true*. He had some thought that it might be, but he was not sure. He claims, that when he wrote his "Notes on the Parables" and the "Treatise on the Atonement," he had left entirely the doctrine of penal suffering; and was convinced that if suffering should take place in the future world it would be because men would be sinful there.

This he gave up during the discussion, and "became entirely satisfied that the Scriptures begin and end the history of sin in flesh and blood, and that, beyond this mortal existence, the Bible teaches no other sentient state but that which is called by the blessed name of life and immortality." (Mod. Hist. Univers., p. 337.)

How long this system had been in preparation we are unable to say. Probably, however, not long, as Mr. Ballou (who, doubtless, was the first man in the world who ever thought of it) tells us that he himself was not confirmed in the sentiment until this controversy took place. But whatever was the date of its origin, it is certain that in a few years after the discussion the great majority of the Universalists had become Ultra. So congenial was it with the feelings of unsanctified nature, that hundreds readily embraced it who before had believed in future punishment; and very many who had professed to be infidels, as well as those who neither professed nor believed any thing, also ranged themselves under its banners and became its defenders.

The system of Ultra-Universalism differs very materially from Universal Restorationism, and it may be proper to mark out more definitely the points of disagreement.

Ultra-Universalists teach that the first moment of consciousness after death will be one of supreme holiness and happiness, which will be without end.

Restorationists, on the contrary, hold that, in the case of millions, the first moment of consciousness will be one of suffering, and that this will continue for an unknown limited period.

Ultraists claim that the resurrection is but the putting on of immortality and blessedness upon the souls of all men. Restorationists that it is the bestowment of unsexual, indestructible, and immortal bodies, perfectly adapted to that state of existence, which bodies are to be the instruments of souls, as our bodies are here, and that these bodies will be given alike to the just and the unjust.

Ultraists teach that there will be no judgment after death. Restorationists that there will be a most strict and impartial judgment passed upon all men, in which the righteous will be justified and the wicked condemned.

The former class maintain that there is no connection between this and the future existence; that neither will vice, virtue, suffering, nor enjoyment in this state benefit or injure us in that; but that we shall be in that state in every respect as though this had not been.

The latter claim that there is a direct and sensible connection of the two states; that the virtue and suffering of this state procure their actual reward, and the vice its positive punishment, in the eternal world.

Ultraists hold that the benefits of Christ's mission are all confined to this present world. Restorationists believe that the effects of that mediation will be experienced in an incomprehensible importance

in the world to come; that, in the unknown ages of futurity, Christ shall be the great deliverer of perishing spirits.

The former teach, that *sin is its own immediate adequate punishment*. The latter avow that it is not, but that its heaviest punishment is often very remote, and forms no part of the sin.

All sin, say the first, proceeds from the body, or is caused by the animal propensities, which alone are depraved and unholy. All sin, say the latter, proceeds from the soul or heart, and is the product of the will, in which the depravity of our natures inheres.

Ultraists believe that man never sins, except when the animal overcomes the spiritual man; so that the sinner is more unfortunate than guilty. Restorationists claim, that under such conditions, man never sins, as it cannot be wrong to do what cannot be avoided; but that he always sins voluntarily, knowing the act to be wrong, and being able to abstain from the specific wickedness of which he is guilty.

Ultraists believe, farther, that man can attain to perfect moral virtue only in the absence of temptation. Restorationists, that temptation may call forth and strengthen the moral virtues, so as to be made a means of attaining to holiness. The former class hold that faith, repentance, and moral discipline, appertain only to the present state. The latter, that they are extended to the next. Lastly, Ultra-Universalists believe that man, considered as a rational soul, is *essentially divine*, being the offspring of God by direct generative emanation. While Restorationists teach that man's nature, so far from being divine, is inferior to that of angels, and that instead of proceeding from God by generative emanation, it is a creation by the power of his word, in the same sense as is the human body.

Such, then, are the differences between these two classes of modern Universalists, and such are the doctrines they hold and teach.

This is not the place to discuss the merits of the theories which have passed before us, or to reason for or against them; but a few reflections in conclusion may be, perhaps, admissible.

The first difficulty which meets us is this: Universalism does not appear to have been received by the founder of Christianity. The earliest date which the Restorationism of the present time can show, is 1800. And under *any* form, it did not exist until the days of Origen, in the third century. If the *present* system of Restorationism, therefore, be the true doctrine of the Bible, we are under the necessity of believing that the world never had the truth until 37 years ago; or if the *oldest* form of the doctrine be admitted as the proper one, not only must the moderns acknowledge that their present views are incorrect, but they must admit also, that for more than two hundred years after Christ, the whole world was wrapped in heathenish darkness and ignorance. But if these difficulties make against Restorationism, what will be said of Ultraism? There has been, indeed, an attempt made, to show that the doctrine of no future punishment was held by the Gnostics, who, the writer said, were "the immediate successors of the apostles," and, as he probably supposed, were therefore possessed of the true doctrine, (Univer. Mag. of May 28, 1831.) But the idea that Ultra-Universalism is a Scripture doctrine, and yet that its first adherents were the Gnostics, is about as absurd as to talk of an episcopal succession through Pope Joan.

If the system cannot be suspended upon this peg of antiquity, it must fall into the year 1818, or thereabouts, and claim Hosea Ballou for its author; and then how gracefully will it stand out to receive our homage as the doctrine of the apostles, and, more than all, of Jesus Christ; and with what strict propriety Mr. Ballou can claim more honor from us and from posterity than Martin Luther himself, since he only substituted one error for another, while Mr. Ballou has dug out of the ruins of eighteen centuries the lost truth, and restored it again to a deceived and suffering world, saving them thereby from their delusion and misery, and bringing to light before them life and immortality. The very modern style of this system is evidence against it; for though we are not disposed to plead prescription, it can hardly be supposed that God, ever good and watchful over the interests of his creatures, would have allowed them to remain in ignorance of the truth so universally and so long.

There is another fact which has already been alluded to, which ought not to be forgotten. It is the vast multiplicity of changes in the systems founded on this one proposition, All men will finally be holy and happy. Origen, the German Anabaptists, the Libertines of Holland, the English Unitarians, the Rellian and the Winchesterian Restorationists, the Modern Restorationists, and the Ultra-Universalists, who have as bodies, or in part, embraced the doctrine, have all done so on different grounds, and defended themselves by different arguments.

We certainly may be allowed to ask, why is this? Does the truth require such change? or is this rather an error, which can never be successfully defended, and therefore constantly calls for new experiments? We certainly incline to the latter opinion, and see not how we can do otherwise. A difficulty growing out of these changes, turns much to the account of Universalism. One never knows what to refute. He may begin with a theory which has had volumes written to illustrate and defend it; but, before his refutation is completed, the system may undergo some new metamorphosis, and his labor is lost.

The time, however, we think is coming, when all possible changes will have been passed through, and when each having received a proper condemnation, the whole system of absurdity and error will go into merited oblivion.

But this will not take place as yet. For a little season this heresy will lift up itself on high. For a season its friends will rejoice in the midst of their triumph. Perhaps the flood of fire will roll over all the churches, withering and destroying every green thing. But other days shall follow those of trial. Humbled before God by the prevalence of error, hardened for the warfare by the miseries of persecution, having a piety purified from every corruption by the necessity of the times, and armed by Heaven for the holy work, the children of the Lord shall bestir themselves—shall put on strength—and the truth shall be made glorious in the eyes of all men; while error, hurled from the throne of its power, shall sink into the pit from whence it came up, and men shall rejoice together, that the destroyer of the Lord's heritage has perished for ever.

ART. III.—*The Elements of Political Economy.* By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D. President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. New-York: Leavitt, Lord, and Co., 1837. 1 vol., 8vo., pp. 472.

By Professor HOLDICH, of the Wesleyan University.

OUR design in this article is to draw the attention of our readers to this important branch of science. Into mere matters of abstract science, it is not the intention of this work very extensively to enter. Its department is of rather a different character. But there are some sciences so intimately connected with the happiness and with the morals of mankind; so closely allied to the interests of religion, and the advancement of the divine purposes on earth, that we should be justly chargeable with criminal neglect as public journalists, should we pass over them in silence. Such we conceive to be the case in regard to the science of Political Economy; and if we can only succeed in conveying to our reader the impressions on our own mind in relation to it, he will admit that it is every way worthy of his attention. Let it be remembered, therefore, that our object is only to excite inquiry, and lead to investigation: we write for the uninitiated, not for the adept. If the latter find but little in this article to interest or entertain him, our expectations will not be disappointed.

But what is Political Economy? The word *economy* is compounded of two Greek words, *οἶκος*, a house, and *νομος*, law, and therefore signifies the law of the household, or domestic management. It is used altogether in reference to the production, consumption, and distribution of wealth. The epithet, *political*, extends the application of economy to the entire body politic—the whole community. Political economy, therefore, is the science of public wealth, and treats upon the production, consumption, and distribution of wealth, among the entire community.

But what is wealth? We answer, every thing material that has exchangeable value; every thing that contributes to the comfort, the happiness, the improvement, or convenience of human beings, and for which men are willing to give value in return. It has been the mistake of some, to consider wealth as consisting only of money. But money is only an item of wealth, and is valuable just in proportion to its utility. The farmer knows that his horses and ploughs are a part of his wealth, as much as the money in his bureau; and the merchant knows that the cash in his till, and the goods upon his shelves, are alike parts of his wealth. This will prepare us in part to appreciate the assertion, that Political Economy is connected with human happiness; since, upon its being correctly understood, and followed out in practice, depend, in a great degree, the elements of our physical happiness, and the means of our intellectual and moral improvement. How it affects our religious interests, we shall see more clearly hereafter.

From what has been already said, we may see, to some extent, the immense importance of this science to the statesman. Statesmen are the guardians of the public prosperity, and they generally assume more or less the office of directing and encouraging public production. If, then, they do not understand the laws of production, if they be ignorant of the true sources and means of creating wealth,

or, in other words, if they be ignorant of the principles of Political Economy, how shall they know what measures to adopt? How can they understand the true interests of the country? How shall they know when to encourage, or when to repress, any peculiar modes of production; whether it would be safe to do either; or, if it would, what are the most effectual means for gaining the end? A statesman, ignorant of Political Economy, is like an empiric in medicine, who knows nothing of the science of physiology. If he prescribe remedies for his patient, he does it altogether in the dark, and at hazard. Ignorant of the laws of our animal constitution, he may administer stimulants, where we need sedatives; or he may prescribe depletion, when we need a tonic; and at the very time when he designs to restore the health of the patient, he may be dealing death-blows to his constitution. Such is precisely the relation of the incompetent statesman to the economic* condition of the country. And yet, I greatly fear, that if every statesman who is defective in this matter were to resign his seat, we should have no small number of vacancies to fill.

Hence we see again, that Political Economy is a science which ought to be generally diffused throughout the land. We have no civil officers by hereditary right. They must be found among the people at large. And as every man is eligible to office, every one ought to furnish himself with the requisite qualifications, or else renounce all claim to such privileges. The man who suffers himself to be put in office who is destitute of the knowledge proper to his station, sacrifices the interests of his country to a criminal selfishness. If this be not *knavery*, we leave others to find a better name for it.

But farther, civil officers are but the selected agents of the people: the people, therefore, in respect to them, are the principal. Now, in all such relations, it is requisite that the principal have at least some general knowledge of the subject on which he requires the assistance of an agent. If he have not, he can neither trust his own judgment in the selection of his agent, nor exercise a judicious supervision of his doings. This is the case in civil affairs more than in any other department of agencies. The skill and knowledge of the lawyer and the physician are more within reach of our examination. The mode of treatment is submitted directly to our personal scrutiny; prescription and result are more obviously connected; cause and effect are open to investigation. In legislation it is not so. Here, causes and effects are wider apart; there are more intervening agencies; the effects of a certain measure are so blended with other measures, and certain results so liable to be assigned to false causes, that it requires much greater stretch of thought, and breadth of survey, to take in and comprehend the whole. Hence arise the ridiculous notions about legislative capacity to encourage domestic industry; the constant harpings upon the balance of trade; the uses and value of money; all of which, and many other points, are so frequently the subjects of demagogue declamation, and which have so imposing an appearance to the

* I must beg indulgence for using this word in an unauthorized sense. But I know no other that conveys the precise meaning.

minds of the ignorant. Were the knowledge of this science more widely diffused, we should not see men so often elevated to office for merely popular blandishments, for a certain glare and tinsel of character, nor yet for the possession of mere military or professional talents. Nor would our truly competent statesmen so often feel themselves compelled to truckle to popular prejudice and clamour, and enact laws at variance with the true interests of the nation, because the people will have them. Ignorance is the bane of a republic, and the fruitful mother of all commotions and disasters.

But what has the science of national wealth to do with our moral and religious condition? "Much every way." It is universally admitted, I believe, that comfort in life, and easy circumstances, are favorable to good morals. That in proportion to the facilities of subsistence, and the multiplication of the comforts of domestic life, and the improvement of the social state, the temptations to certain kinds of vice are diminished. Hence we generally, not to say invariably, see a thriving community in a healthful moral condition, and comparatively ready to attend to the claims of piety. On the other hand, poverty, wretchedness, and vice, generally go together; and a community of such persons is almost inaccessible to religious influence. It is perfectly natural to draw our conclusion as to the moral state of a village or hamlet, from its external appearance. Where every thing seems to smile in prosperity, where neatness, comfort, and good taste prevail, we expect to find a virtuous and happy people. Where we see much physical misery, we expect a proportionate moral and social degradation. Such is the established connection in our thoughts; and it is founded as well on principles of sound philosophy, as on the basis of Christian truth. I do not deny that there may be occasional exceptions; but this would not overturn a general law, nor disprove the general tendencies of which we speak. The exceptions may be always otherwise accounted for.

The connection between national wealth and national religion is not less obvious and intimate. We have already said that competency is favorable to morality; and, by withdrawing temptations to vice, and leaving the mind free from many distressing anxieties, it lays the heart more open to religious truth; and the mind is more at liberty to reflect upon a future world, when the claims of the present become less urgent. It was the judicious prayer of the wise son of Jakeh, "Give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with food convenient for me; lest I be full and deny thee, and say, who is the Lord? Or lest I be poor, and steal, and take the name of my God in vain;" Prov. xxx, 8, 9. Now, Political Economy has for its object the general diffusion of competency and comfort. It directs us in the most profitable employment of industry and capital, and natural agencies. It teaches how to render the labor of the operative most productive, and it tends to make the wealth of the capitalist the encouragement and the reward of the industrious. Its tendency is to equalize the blessings of fortune, or at least to multiply the means of human comfort, happiness, and improvement, and more generally to diffuse them.

Again, it shows the connection which exists among the various

classes of society; the dependance and influence of each upon the other; the appropriate spheres of action and particular utility of the several branches of industry, agriculture, commerce, and manufactures; and the necessity of the several compartments into which these are subdivided, as, the science or theory, the use or application, and the labor or execution. Thus it loosens the prejudices with which the different classes view each other; it multiplies the human sympathies; it tightens the bands of the social compact. Now all this has an indirect connection with religion. It encourages the social influences which are most favorable to piety, and fosters those dispositions of the heart, in which no small share of piety consists. Thus we have additional evidence that Christianity is in accordance with man's temporal welfare, and that the laws of our physical and of our spiritual happiness are the emanations of the same benevolent mind.

How this subject is connected with the operation and extension of the Christian church, may be easily seen. According to the provisions of the gospel, the diffusion of religion is to be by human instrumentality; this demands human means, commensurate with the extent of the undertaking; and these means are the product of human industry and capital. The support of religious and benevolent societies, the publication of Bibles, tracts, and other books, the sending abroad of missionaries, and the employment of the various religious or benevolent agencies at home; in short, the whole material machinery of Christianity, are the result of a right application of these principles. In proportion as a nation is more abundant in the production of these materials, or of the means whereby to acquire them, in the same proportion she will be able to do more for the cause of Christ. For it is very clear that a nation may go to the extent of her means in these undertakings, but can never go beyond them. Great Britain and the United States are prolific in the works of piety and benevolence, because they are abundantly productive in the means. Enlarge their productive agency, or give it a better direction, and make it more available, and with the same force of religious principle, they will make still greater exertions in the cause of truth.

Political Economy, moreover, corrects many of the errors into which we are apt to fall in regard to missionary and other religious operations.

For instance, the enemies of religion say, that "by collecting so much money for these purposes, and sending it abroad, you help to impoverish our own land:" and this the Christian, perhaps, admits, but regards it as a sacrifice on our part to be submitted to for the sake of piety. The principle of the Christian shows his benevolence; but it is altogether gratuitous, and founded in error. Of all the money collected by the Christian churches for religious purposes, how much of it goes out of the country? Certainly a very small part. How then is it employed? Why, in printing books at home, making paper, founding type, building offices for agencies, paying the salaries and supporting the families of home agents, printers, clerks, porters, and laborers of various descriptions. How many hundreds, might I not say thousands, of persons are, directly or indirectly, supported in whole or in part by the Ame-

rican Bible Society, Sunday School Union, and by the Book Concern of the Methodist Episcopal Church? Very little of the money goes out of the country, except the mere salaries of the missionaries; and possibly these are not paid in money, but in drafts on some foreign house; or, it may be, a considerable portion of it is paid in articles of our own manufacture, which serve to encourage our own industry.

But, says the objector, "if you do not send the money, you send its value in something else, and this amounts to the same thing." Observe, the Christian religion necessarily embraces all the elements of civilization, teaches the arts, and provides for the wants of civilized life. It has been long ago demonstrated, that Christianity and civilization are inseparable. Now let us hear what the celebrated Political Economist, M. Say, teaches, though without any intended reference to this subject. "The position of a nation, in respect of its neighbors, is analogous to the relation of one of its provinces to the others, or of a country to the town; *it has an interest in its prosperity, being sure to profit by their opulence.* The government of the United States, therefore, acted most wisely in their attempt, about the year 1802, to civilize their savage neighbors, the Creek Indians. The design was to introduce habits of industry among them, and make them producers, capable of carrying on a barter with the States of the Union; for there is nothing to be got by dealing with a people that have nothing to pay." (*Say's Political Economy*, p. 82. Philadelphia, 1832.) Now, it is no matter whether he was correct or not, as to the "*design*" of the United States in civilizing the Indians; since it is the *result* that we are looking at. And as little does it matter, whether the nations civilized be beyond the Rocky Mountains or the Atlantic Ocean; since the effect of opening a trade with them amounts to the same thing. If a nation can raise what we want, and we can raise what they want, the advantage of trading together is mutual; but the advantage to us of trading with them becomes greater as they become more wealthy, i. e., in proportion as they raise more products, and have more means to purchase our materials. The advantage is twofold: they yield us a larger supply of what we want, and thus multiply our comforts; and they take a larger quantity of our products, and thereby encourage our industry.

Now Christianity necessarily produces civilization, increases the wants and physical happiness of men, and enlarges their productive agency. If, therefore, in sending the gospel to a pagan country we do all this, we create a market, a vent, for our own commodities. We send them books, missionaries, schools, clothing, utensils, machinery; and we receive in return, tea, coffee, sugar, ivory, logwood, mahogany, furs, yams, or whatever else may be the productions of the country. All know that the immense trade in silk had its origin in missionary labor; and the facilities for obtaining African products are greater, through the Christian colonies on her coasts, than they ever were before.

But the objector says again, "may we not make greater gains out of these people in their savage state?" Not unless wrong and injustice, cheating and knavery, are good policy. If we are satisfied with fair trade, we shall find it more profitable to trade with them when civilized, than while savage, for the reason before given; they will

have, on the one hand, more wants; and, on the other, more to buy with. Moreover, there is no risk in asserting, that to trade fairly with a civilized nation, is vastly more profitable than all the cheating or overreaching that can be practised on barbarians. The trade with Great Britain is a source of greater profit, and supplies us with more comforts, than all the trade carried on with all savage nations put together.

It will be understood, I hope, that I am not urging a motive to missionary exertion, but only removing an objection frequently brought against it. It shows, that while immense good is done abroad, no serious injury is felt at home.

It has been common among a certain class to defend luxury and profusion, on the ground that they contribute to the support of the poor. Nay, we have sometimes known clerical dignitaries, of whose intelligence we should have expected better things, assume the same ground.

Let us again hear the teachings of the Political Economist already quoted, and whose voice may, perhaps, have the greater force with some, because it was not from any religious predilection that he advanced these sentiments.

"Vanity may take pride in idle expense, but will ever be held in no less contempt by the wise, on account of its pernicious effects, than it has been all along for the motives by which it is actuated.

"These conclusions of theory have been confirmed by experience. Misery is the inseparable companion of luxury. The man of wealth and ostentation squanders upon costly trinkets, sumptuous repasts, magnificent mansions, dogs, horses, and mistresses, a portion of value, which, vested in productive occupation, would enable a multitude of willing laborers, whom his extravagance now consigns to idleness and misery, to provide themselves with warm clothing, nourishing food, and household conveniences. The gold buckles of the rich man leave the poor one without shoes to his feet; and the laborer will want a shirt to his back, while his rich neighbor glitters in velvet and embroidery." (*Say's Political Economy*, pages 369, 370. Philadelphia, 1832.)

The truth is, that whatever we expend upon one kind of production, takes from us just so much means of encouraging another kind; and the demand for any class of articles turns labor to their production. The man who spends his money in fine houses, furniture, equipage, and jewellery, has so much the less to spend on really useful and improving objects. If the demand for the latter were increased, and the demand for the former lessened, they who make a livelihood by the one, must devote themselves to the production of the other. It would, therefore, only be a change of employments. Instead of gaining a livelihood by fabricating articles which do no one any good, he would accomplish the end, by making such as add to the convenience, the comfort, or improvement of society.

Nor is this all. The larger the portion of labor devoted to any kind of production, the greater will be the quantity produced, and then the price is proportionably lowered. Hence a greater amount of them will be brought within reach of a larger portion of society, and in the same ratio, the means of happiness and improvement will be multiplied and extended. Hence we see the truth of Say's observation, "the

gold buckles of the rich man leave the poor one without shoes to his feet." For the more there is made of superfluities, the less will be made of other things; the higher will be the price, and the farther will they be from the reach of the poorer classes. If all those things which are of no service to mankind were discontinued, who can estimate the advantages that would result? The necessities, the conveniences, the comforts, and improvements of life, would be multiplied in number, increased in quantity, and reduced in price. Living would be cheaper, labor more available, books more plentiful, the arts and sciences more accessible, education more thorough and more general, and virtue, happiness, and religion, proportionably more advanced.

Thus we have an additional fact, that the inductions of Political Economy, and the teachings of Christianity, though proceeding by different routes, arrive eventually at the same end.

There is another point in Political Economy, bearing an intimate relation to the diffusion of Christianity, which is now exciting much attention among the devotees of the science. We allude to the freedom of international commerce. There is something, it seems to us, on a *primâ facie* view of this subject, that strikes the mind with a good deal of force. When we observe how admirably the wise Author of nature, and benevolent Parent of man, has adjusted the interests of the human family; how he has made the abundance of one portion to supply the deficiency of another; how one part of the globe is dependant on another: when we see how freedom of intercourse between nations promotes national friendship and good understanding, expands the human sympathies, and facilitates the extension of science, and, above all, of the means of salvation; I say, when we see all this, who would not regret that the interests of nations should abridge this intercourse by shackles on trade? Who would not desire that trade should be free as the winds, and expansive as the ocean? How, then, does this science respond to the philanthropy of the Christian heart, and to the apparent indications of nature's arrangements?

When the world was a little more short-sighted than it is now, the principle was adopted, that what one nation gains another loses, and that the enriching of one was the empoverishment of the other. Hence the different nations set their wits to work to turn the balance always in their own favor, not perceiving that if all nations were to act on this principle, there could be no trade at all. This was the occasion of protective duties, bounties, drawbacks, and the various other modes by which commerce has been fettered and restricted. To this same policy, in its direct or indirect bearings, is to be referred most of the international wars which have deluged Europe and America with blood, and squandered immense treasures, for the last hundred years. But a more ample induction of facts, and a more thorough investigation of the subject, have now demonstrated that this whole system was founded in error; that free trade is equally for the advantage of all nations, and that governments have performed the ridiculous part of wasting blood, and treasure, and life, for the sake of upholding a system at variance with their own interests, as well as the interests of all mankind. This view was incontrovertibly established by Adam Smith, in his *Wealth of Nations*, and by all the most celebrated Economists since, particularly by M. Say, the most popular and powerful writer

on this science which Europe has produced. Such, too, are the views now taken by the majority of the most distinguished European statesmen, and which are gaining daily accessions of strength both in Europe and in America.

Here, then, we have another proof of the harmony which exists among all the laws of the universe, and we see how clearly every thing seems to be a part of one great whole, bearing the most certain indications of unity of design, and all signifying their emanation from one glorious, all-pervading Intelligence.

This much we have written, in order to show the bearing of this science upon the interests of mankind. And surely, if it be found to have so intimate a connection with human virtue, intelligence, and happiness; if it exercise so great an influence on the condition and prospects of Christianity, and upon the eternal destiny of nations; if it so clearly exhibit the harmony of the divine economy, and the consenting voice of the laws of man's physical, intellectual, social, and spiritual nature; then is it not well deserving the attention of the pious mind, and must not a correct pursuit of it tend to improve alike the understanding and the heart? We wonder, therefore, that it has hitherto received so little attention from Christians, and especially from Christian ministers; a class of men remarkable for their benevolence and for their interest in every thing tributary to human welfare. Perhaps, however, this has been owing in part to the fact, that the science has too often been treated without any reference to its religious bearings, and the pious mind would not discover its religious or moral tendencies, because their attention was not specifically turned to them. If such be the fact, it only shows the necessity of having the sciences taught by religious men, in order to the full effect of either religion or science upon the world. How much, then, should we rejoice in the present prospects of education! Religion is becoming more and more familiar with our seats of literature; the voice of piety is now heard in our halls of instruction; God speaks to us in Revelation, and the consenting echo of all nature is gathered in reply; science becomes in reality the handmaid of piety, and both unite their influences to dignify and bless the family of man.

A statement of a few of the opinions which very generally prevailed even among intelligent persons, before the principles of political economy were developed and established, will confirm our assertions as to the importance of this science. For instance, it was the custom of Henry IV., of France, to grant edicts to his courtiers, favorites, and mistresses, laying tolls upon particular branches of trade for their exclusive benefit. To the count of Soissons he made a grant of fifteen pence a pound upon every bale of goods exported; though it was prevented from going into execution by the wisdom and energy of the duke of Sully. The king's defence of these modes of supporting his friends was, that *it cost him nothing!* (Memoirs of Sully, book 16, vol. 3, p. 162. Philadelphia, 1817.) M. Say tells us, that when Louis XIV. was advised to be more liberal in his charities, he replied, that royalty dispenses charity by profuse expenditure; a principle, by the way, that others besides kings have been ridiculous enough to maintain. The same author tells us, that Voltaire justified the expenses of the same extravagant monarch, on the ground that they served only to circulate money

in the community. And it is an argument frequently urged in England, that the taxes drawn from the people to pay the interest of the national debt, and supply the prodigality of the government, are no loss to the nation, because it all goes back again into the pockets of the people. Among ourselves there are errors not less glaring and absurd. Such is the notion that money alone is wealth, and that the wealth of a nation depends upon the amount of specie it contains. Hence also the notion that Congress can prevent the efflux, and encourage the influx of specie, merely by protective or prohibitory duties. We often hear it said, that if protective duties raise the prices of articles upon the consumer, those whose products are not so protected must raise their prices in proportion to the increased expense of living, and that then they gain in one way what they lose in another. Thus, if the farmer must pay more for his dry goods, groceries, and utensils, that he must sell his produce at a price proportionate; just as if the relative intensity of supply and demand had nothing to do with the fixing of the price; that is, as if it were a matter altogether at his own option. It is perfectly obvious, that by forcing industry and capital into channels to which we are not adapted, we can produce less of those things to whose production we are adapted. Of course, as the amount produced is lessened, the price will rise. Now, whenever the price rises beyond a certain mark, other nations will begin to supply us cheaper than we can produce. This has been the case the past year with bread-stuffs. So we have been paying an exorbitant price for our cloths and calicoes, just for the privilege of paying an exorbitant price for our bread! But we do not wish to anticipate what properly belongs to another part of this review: we only wished to point out some of the errors into which the nation is betrayed by an ignorance of the science in question, and to demonstrate the necessity of a more general attention to its doctrines.

From what has been said, it is no wonder that Political Economy should become a subject of investigation and inquiry in this country. Our attention has been drawn to it by the prominence it has gained in Europe; by the imposing and illustrious names arrayed in its cause; by its introduction into the most distinguished of their colleges and universities; and by the changes of theory it has produced among many, if not most of her leading statesmen. It has been *forced* upon our attention by the peculiar situation in which we have found our own country placed. We have recently had, and still have, some singular contradictions among us; an abundant supply of circulating medium, and yet all things raised to the highest prices; a country of immense territory and thin population, admirably adapted to the production of all kinds of agricultural produce, importing grain from the little island of England; the fuel of our own country requiring protective duties, to prevent competition from abroad; and now the whole country in a state of bankruptcy; while it is boastingly said, there never was as much money in the country before! "These are," indeed, "the days for the study of Political Economy." For such contradictions could never have taken place, had there not been some where, and in some way, a palpable violation of the laws of this science.

Political Economy can hardly be considered as past its infancy in the United States. Our most distinguished writers have only within

a few years begun to turn their attention to it. The first paper on the subject in the *North American Review*, appeared, I believe, in 1821; and is a review of a work on Political Economy published the previous year by David Raymond, Esq., counsellor at law, Baltimore. The author tells us it was written because he had nothing else to do, a fact which we might have gathered from some parts of the work without being told it; though in other parts, particularly on the balance of trade, we find some remarks worthy of attention. In 1826, Dr. Cooper, of Columbia College, Georgia, published a work on this science; and this was followed by another in Boston, in 1828, by Willard Phillips. In 1835, Professor Newman, of Bowdoin College, gave to the public the lectures which he had delivered on this subject to his classes. These works all possess their respective merits, but none of them seemed so far to come up to the views and wants of the American public as to be adopted as the basis of the science in our several collegiate institutions who have introduced this into their list of studies. For the want of a suitable American work we have been dependant on foreigners, and the works of Smith and Say have generally been in use. The inconvenience that would arise from this any one may perceive. Their works are adapted to foreign and older countries; their illustrations are not always familiar, and, therefore, want palpability; they treat upon many subjects in which we have little or no interest; and they omit others of primary importance to our country. Hence, an American text-book on Political Economy has always been a desideratum. This want, we think, has been well supplied by the work now before us, from the justly celebrated Dr. Wayland, President of Brown University.

Dr. Wayland's work, we think, will be found decidedly preferable, as a class-book in our country, to any other now extant. In his doctrines he is substantially the same as Smith, the father of the science; adopting, however, the improvements of Say. But he has the advantage over them both, to an American student, in the superior adaptation of his work to the condition and wants of our nation, and in the greater simplicity and clearness of his arrangement, and familiarity of his illustrations. His reasoning is lucid and forcible, and his style perspicuous and compact, well adapted to the purpose of a class-book; though, to the general reader, it may seem rather dry and uninteresting. We do not, however, consider the work without its defects; and of these, in the proper places, we may take a passing notice.

Our author divides his subject into four parts, viz.: Production, Exchange, Distribution, and Consumption. In making Exchange the subject of a distinct division, instead of including it, as is generally done, under Production, we think he has shown his wisdom; for exchange, although it increases the value of products, does not actually produce any thing, and therefore cannot, with propriety, be included under the head of Production. Besides, it is so important a process in economic affairs, and embraces such a variety of topics and principles, as justly to entitle it to a place by itself. The announcement of this division is preceded by some introductory remarks, explanatory of certain terms employed in the work.

On the subject of Production, Dr. Wayland treats, in the first

chapter, on capital:—its nature and forms; its changes and increase; productive and unproductive capital, fixed and circulating; and of money as an item of capital.

The second chapter treats on Industry:—the objects and forms of industry; the modes by which its productiveness is increased, viz., by the use of natural agents and by the division of labor; and the effects of the increased productiveness of industry.

On the different forms of human industry, we submit to the consideration of the reader the following extract from the work:—

“From what has been said, it is evident that the industry of which man is susceptible is capable of assuming three different forms, namely: Industry of *discovery or investigation*; Industry of *application or invention*; and Industry of *operation*.

“1. *Industry of Discovery or Investigation*. Under this class of laborers are to be comprehended those who discover the laws of nature, and those who make them known to mankind after they have been discovered. Newton labored in this department when he discovered the laws of gravitation, optics, and of the motions of the heavenly bodies; Franklin when he discovered the laws of electricity; and Sir Humphrey Davy when he discovered the alkaline bases, and the laws of their combination. The labor of each of these men is also of the same kind, when they made known these laws to the public. The labor of those who are called *philosophers* belongs to this class.

“2. *Industry of Invention or Application*. It is very rarely that a simple law can be of any use, without some adjustment by which we may avail ourselves of its advantages. Hence, a very important department of human industry is that which teaches us how to make the application of the principle so as to accomplish a particular purpose. Newton performed this labor when he invented the telescope; Hadley when, by means of the quadrant, he applied the laws of light to the measurement of angles; Franklin when he invented the conductor, or lightning-rod; Sir Humphrey Davy when he invented the safety-lamp; and Fulton when he invented that modification of the steam engine by which vessels may be propelled through the water.

“Under this class, I think, may also be comprehended professional labor, generally. The business of the clergyman is to teach us in what manner we may avail ourselves of the *moral laws* of the Creator. The lawyer teaches us how to avail ourselves of the laws of that *civil society* of which we are the members. The physician teaches us how to obey the *physiological laws* under which we are created, so that we may be relieved from sickness or preserved in health.

“3. To the third class of human industry belong all those who *put forth the physical effort* necessary, in order to create the values desired. They are the laborers who produce those changes, either in elementary form, in aggregate form, or in place, of which we have already spoken, and they compose by far the most numerous class of society.

“It may here be remarked, that two of these forms of labor are frequently performed by the same person. For instance, he who discovers a law sometimes also teaches us how to apply it. Thus,

as we have already shown, Sir Isaac Newton, Franklin, and Sir Humphrey Davy, were all of them both discoverers and inventors; that is, they performed both the first and the second kinds of industry. Thus, the second and third are also frequently united; that is, the individual who labors at a particular operation also invents some machine by which a particular process in that operation is improved. Thus, Sir Richard Arkwright, a mechanic, invented the spinning machinery now in common use; and, in general, many of our most important inventions have been made by operative laborers. And there can be no doubt that, if a knowledge of the laws of nature were more generally diffused throughout this class of society, the progress of invention would be inconceivably more rapid. I know of nothing which would promise more for the general improvement of the useful arts, than a wider diffusion of the knowledge of principles among those whose business it is to employ those principles in their daily practice."

en The above extract will serve to show the pertinacity and familiarity of our author's illustrations. It may also convey an impression of the beautiful harmony which exists in the social fabric, and the dependance of the several departments of human industry on each other. The farmer cannot say to the philosopher, "I have no need of thee," nor the philosopher to the farmer, "I have no need of thee." Without the labors of the one the farmer could not plough; and without the labors of the other the philosopher could not eat. True, the labor of the philosopher is not *directly* productive; but its productiveness is not less important because it is indirect. In fact, if all mankind were direct producers, i. e., operatives, we should be no better off than if all were philosophers; i. e., indirect producers. For, from the want of science to give direction to human industry, it would not be half as productive, and, consequently, the earth would not maintain more than half its present number of inhabitants, and that half would be miserably provided for. Or, to speak more accurately, without science men would be mere savages; having for tools and machinery nothing but our teeth and finger nails, and for our provision the spontaneous gifts of nature. All beyond these are the results of science. To what extent, therefore, the sciences ought to be cultivated, depends precisely on how far it is desirable to elevate society above the savage state. We admit that some branches of science are not as obviously tributary to production as others, as, for instance, the languages and belles lettres; but the proper office of these is to expand and discipline the mind, and thus to assist, first in acquiring, and then in imparting the others. If these, therefore, were abandoned, the others would fall into decay, and all would deteriorate together. Thus, polite literature adds not only to the refined enjoyments of society, but deserves to hold a place among the useful branches, as the more directly productive are sometimes called.

Hence, we conclude that every member of the community is adapted to some particular purpose; and he is most useful to society who diligently applies himself to that purpose to which he is best adapted, and most successfully pursues it.

We should be glad to transfer to our pages the remarks on the effects on industry of natural agents, the employment of machinery,

and the division of labor; not, however, because there is any thing new on these points, for they have all been exhausted by previous writers; but because they present the subjects in a clear and distinct form, and would be entertaining to our readers. We must, however, refer them to the work itself. Meantime we cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of quoting a paragraph from the chapter on the effects of the increased productiveness of human labor:—

“The result of *industry* applied to *capital* is *product, value, or the means of gratifying human desire*. The result of *increased productiveness* of human industry is, with the same labor, *increased product, value, or means of gratifying human desire*. That is, in general, increased productiveness is equivalent to increased means of human happiness. This simple statement would seem sufficient to explain the whole subject. In order, however, to obviate any objections that may arise, we will proceed to show its practical operation by several illustrations.

“Take the case of a single individual. Suppose a man, by the same amount of labor that he spent last year, to be able this year to create twice as much value. Suppose that a farmer has twice as large a harvest; that is, that his instrument is twice as good this year as it was last year. The result is, he will be able to satisfy the desire which that product gratifies twice as abundantly as he did last year. He will have more to exchange with other producers, and hence he will be able to gratify other desires more abundantly. He will be able to make exchanges which were before out of his power; hence, he will be able to add to his mode of living new means of happiness. And, on the other hand, as he is able to make exchanges with others with whom it was before impossible, others, in return, are able to avail themselves of his product, or means of happiness, who were before unable to do so. Hence, he is not only happier himself, but the very means by which he becomes so renders him the instrument of greater happiness to others. Hence, it is a benefit to a whole neighborhood for a single member of it to become rich. In other words, increased productiveness in one branch of labor increases productiveness in every branch of labor.”

Chapter the third treats on the laws which govern the application of labor to capital. The following principles are here laid down:—
1. Industry will be applied to capital as every man enjoys the advantages of his labor and capital; i. e., as every man may gain all he can, and as every man may use his own as he will. 2. Labor will be applied to capital as every man suffers the inconveniences of idleness. 3. The greater the ratio of capital to labor, the greater the stimulus to labor. 4. Industry will be applied to capital in proportion to the intellectual condition of a people.

On the second of these heads our author shows the effects of poor laws, in which his conclusions are in accordance with the most enlightened policy of the present day. He proves that they are inconsistent with the economy of the Creator, with the interests of the beneficiary, and the wealth of society; and that the only correct principles are, that “if a man be reduced, by indolence or prodigality, to such extreme penury that he is in danger of perishing, *he be relieved through the medium of labor*; that is, that he be furnished with work and be remunerated with the proceeds;” and “that those

who are able only in part to earn their subsistence, be provided for to the amount of that deficiency only :” and “that there should be no common funds for the support of the poor.”

We believe that a deviation from these principles must do mischief, and that most of the pauper systems are liable to this charge. They take away the motives to industry and frugality ; they destroy a generous and manly spirit of independence ; they breed an unwholesome state of feeling between the rich and poor ; the rich give grudgingly, and the poor receive without gratitude ; they are adverse to the right of property. They offer a premium to indolence and prodigality, and necessarily multiply the number of unproductive claimants. Such have been the effects of the Poor Laws of Great Britain ; and such, it is to be feared, is the tendency of many of our own charitable societies. It is notorious that multitudes are idle and thriftless in summer because they believe these societies will support them in winter. Many, too, devote themselves to employments already overstocked with labor, and scarcely affording a sufficient, or perhaps only an uncertain subsistence, rather than betake themselves to such as would be a real benefit to the community ; and when their means fail, call upon those to support them who were before suffering for the want of their service in some other form. Of this we had an instance in New-York last winter, when the seamstresses and tailoresses called upon the public for charity. The stopping of the factories during the existing pressure will furnish a multitude of similar cases. If the individuals thus thrown out of employment had been satisfied to receive, with their board, from a dollar to a dollar and a half per week in respectable private families, they would not only have been in a better condition, but they would be a great blessing to the community. So we had to pay an enormous price for domestic assistance or go without it, just for the pleasure of paying more for the support of those whose pride or indolence induced them to seek a precarious or inadequate subsistence elsewhere.

These remarks, however, do not apply to the support of the aged and the infirm, or to widows and orphans who cannot maintain themselves. They only apply to that injudicious administration of charitable societies which relieves all, merely because they are poor, without discrimination, and without any application of stimulus to industry and frugality.

The last section of this chapter, on the laws which govern the application of labor to capital, is on the effect of protective duties ; a subject deeply interesting to the United States. Our author here goes with Smith and Say, or, rather, goes beyond them ; for, while they admit the propriety of protection in certain cases, Dr. Wayland denies it without qualification. In this we think he is more consistent than they ; for the exceptions they make cover, in fact, the whole ground, and effectually overturn their entire theory. On this point our author's views are clear and comprehensive, and his reasoning direct, cogent, and, in our estimation, unanswerable.

He has succeeded fully, we think, in establishing the following points :—

1. Protection is only needed in behalf of such articles as could not be made without protection. That is, labor and capital would be better remunerated by some other mode of investment. Hence,—

2. Protective duties draw off labor and capital from more profitable investments, and cause them to take a direction that is less profitable.

3. Every cent paid in the form of protective duties, is so much drawn from the pockets of the consumers, while it is a greater loss to the country than if the same amount were paid as a direct bounty to the producer of the protected articles.

4. That this can be no addition to a nation's wealth, because what one party gains, another loses; and by how much industry is stimulated in one form, by just so much it is depressed in other forms.

5. That, as protective duties raise the price of articles, there will be a smaller quantity demanded, and consequently produced. Hence there will be a more scanty provision for human wants.

6. That urging production in those branches to which we are not adapted, lessens the amount produced in those branches to which we are adapted.

7. That protective duties necessarily raise the prices of every thing, and thereby serve to injure our foreign market. Consequently, we shall have less wherewith to purchase from abroad such things as we require.

8. That so far from encouraging our own industry, protective duties have just the opposite effect: because, while they encourage it in only one form, they depress it in many forms.

9. That as the increase of profit by protective duties draws capital and industry into these branches, so competition tends to lower the profits; and as increased expenses of living raise the prices of other things not protected, this still farther tends to bring the profits of protected and unprotected branches to an equality. Hence the protective duties must be increased, or else a reaction, stagnation, consequent bankruptcies, and derangements will follow.

These are the principal points established by our author. We rather regret, however, that he has not given them all the illustration and support of which they are susceptible. For instance, it can be shown, that from the time an undue portion of industry and capital were devoted to manufactures, agriculture has been less productive. Let any one take the trouble to examine, and he will find, that from the year 1806 to 1816, the average amount of flour annually exported was 930,240 barrels, and of wheat 120,854 bushels. From 1820 to 1830, the average amount of the former was only 909,877 barrels, and of the latter 19,838 bushels; making a decrease of 20,363 barrels of flour, and of wheat 101,016 bushels annually. But it should be remembered, that as the population, i. e., the industry, had increased nearly two-thirds in that period, there ought to have been a proportionate increase of exportation; instead of which the exportation of flour was greatly diminished; and that of wheat almost annihilated. Moreover, during the past year, the United States did not produce wheat enough for her own consumption! It is in vain to tell us, that the failure of the crops made importation necessary. That, it is true, was the proximate, but not the original cause. Did our agricultural production now bear the same proportion to the population that it did previously, we should have had only to suspend exportation. These facts serve to illustrate several of the foregoing positions, particularly the fourth, sixth, and eighth.

The remainder of this section is devoted to the consideration of some of the arguments urged in favor of the protective system. Here we cannot follow him minutely. Yet we feel compelled to state one of his positions, because it is a reply to the most popular view of the case, and because it is the point in which Dr. Wayland goes beyond his precursors in this theory. The argument is that of the necessity of protecting certain kinds of manufactures in their infancy, which promise a handsome remuneration after they shall have become sufficiently established to do without protection.

In answer to this it is shown,—

1. That protection cannot hasten the period at which such manufactures can be profitably established, since *this must depend on the accumulation of capital and labor*, by which we may successfully compete with foreign production.

2. That as protective duties, instead of increasing, really retard the accumulation of capital, so they postpone the period at which such branches could be profitably undertaken.

3. That unless things are left to their natural course, it can never be known at what period any branch can be profitably undertaken, or whether at all or not.

We have now followed Dr. Wayland through his principal arguments in favor of the liberal system. So far as he has gone, we think him, in the main, satisfactory and conclusive. Yet we cannot but regret that he has omitted several points of no small importance. He has said nothing in reply to the argument founded on the balance of trade; nor has he once named this subject in his work. He has said nothing in reply to the supposed necessity of protecting manufactures in order to be prepared for war; nor on the crude notions about the importation and exportation of specie. True, some of these points are adverted to in other parts of the work. But as they are all closely connected with the protective system, it was necessary to notice them in this place; nor can we help considering their omission as a serious defect in a text-book, where we expect to find every thing of importance, whether of argument or objection.

Moreover, it seems to us that it would have been well to be more particular in guarding the theory against misapprehension. There are several particulars not sufficiently taken into view generally by writers on political economy; or, at least, on which the defenders of the restrictive system are in error.

For instance, it is important to keep in mind, that opposing protective duties is not opposing manufactures; but only such manufactures as cannot be carried on without protection. It, of course, leaves out of view a great variety of manufacturing branches, which may be pursued alike to the advantage of individuals and of the nation; and would, in fact, leave untouched many others that now enjoy protection; or only require them to be conducted on more economical principles. So that we should still have as many manufactures as would occupy profitably our capital and industry.

Again, it should be remembered, that, after all, the only sound principle in public economy, as well as in private, is to buy what can be bought cheaper than made; and make what can be made cheaper than bought. It is on this principle that the hatter buys his coats,

and the tailor his hats; that the shoemaker buys wheat, and the farmer shoes. If each were to undertake to make all he wanted, they would all be ruined. By a division of labor, their industry and capital are more productive, and their wealth is increased. It is precisely the same in regard to nations. The true policy, therefore, is for each nation to buy or to make only as it can do either to best advantage. The cost will always indicate when it would be profitable for a nation to do either the one or the other.

Again, it is important to keep in view that the protection of one class is equally adverse to the interests of *all* classes that do not enjoy the same privilege. Now, it has been the error of Political Economists to consider the Protective System as opposed only, or chiefly, to the agricultural interest. But this is a narrow view of the case. Protective duties are equally against all who enjoy no protection: it raises the profits of the protected branches above the profit of *all* branches *not* protected. For the makers of unprotected goods have to contend in the market for labor with those who, of course, can outbid them, because their profits are raised unnaturally high by the duties, and yet they have not the same opportunity of raising their prices; since, before their profits are raised to an equality with the profits of the protected articles, they must, infallibly, from the nature of things, be undersold by foreigners. Of this we have had an illustration the past year, in the importation of foreign grain. The next thing we shall hear of, probably, will be, that our farmers and unprotected mechanics will claim protection too. Indeed, it has already commenced. In the state of Maine the legislature have recently granted a bounty on the production of wheat; and it is gravely suggested to do the same thing in other states. So Congress forces industry and capital into manufacturing investments, by duties, and the states force it back again to agriculture by bounties; the interpretation of which is, that we pay ten dollars a yard for cloth that we might get for five, for the special privilege of paying twelve dollars a barrel for flour, that we might get for six.

We have spent more time upon this part of our subject than we at first intended. But these views are important, because they accord with other principles on which our objections to the excessive encouragement of manufactures are founded. And, moreover, it was necessary to see the ground on which the liberal system is sustained, in order to discover the harmony that prevails among all the diversified interests of the nation. If it be proved that the excessive encouragement of manufactures is actually injurious to national wealth and industry, it will readily occur to the mind of the reader, that it is not less opposed to all her other interests. The nature of manufacturing pursuits must be deleterious to a community. They tend to injure the morals, the health, and the domestic qualifications of the operatives. They produce a roving, unsettled disposition, and are thus injurious to good habits. The females are unfitted by physical condition, as well as by ignorance of domestic affairs, to be either wives, mothers, or housekeepers. It interferes most deplorably with the comfort, happiness, and improvement of society at large. By the scarcity of domestic assistance it occasions, our domestic wants are but half supplied; our wives obliged to spend their time in the kitchen,

when their services are wanted elsewhere; our children are left to themselves, their minds and manners, as well as persons, neglected, or they are sent to incompetent schools, where they learn more evil than good, because their mothers cannot attend to them; and the fathers are obliged to perform various trivial offices, by which time is consumed that might be much more profitably employed both to themselves and others. The scarcity of labor is the constant cry of the country; and the serious distress it occasions is felt by all, but appreciated in its extensive bearings only by a few. It is felt universally in the manufacturing states, and it exerts a disastrous influence upon the whole routine of domestic and social life, and upon the mental, moral, and religious interests of the community.

We have dwelt so long on this part of our subject, on account of its great importance, its extensive relations, and especially the attention it has excited in this country. Instead of saying less, we should be inclined to say much more, did we think the present occasion would justify it. We fear, however, that we should exhaust the patience of the reader. Meanwhile the remainder of the volume claims our notice, for at least a few passing remarks.

In book second, the author treats on Exchange. He exhibits the laws of the social state which render exchange necessary; and sets forth the general doctrines of exchange. In this book, too, is naturally included the interesting subject of money as a medium of exchange. On this branch there is, I believe, nothing new. It is only a repetition of what we find in Say and others on the same subject. In fact, no addition was necessary, and it was susceptible of no improvement.

But the chapter on banks and paper currency the reader will find worthy of serious attention. Of the several works on banking which we have seen, none can be compared with this. For perspicuity and simplicity of language and arrangement; for soundness of thought; and, we may add, for candor in his statements; we think Dr. Wayland has no rival in this point. He has curtailed the facts, indeed, of Smith and Say; but he has supplied their place by more valuable matter. He has given whatever was important from other writers, and super-added much that is original, and especially valuable; because it enables the mere tyro to understand the subject as he never could by the most laborious study of our former text-books. We have here clearly set forth the necessity, the nature, and utility of banks; the sources of their profits; the advantages and disadvantages of a paper circulation; and the agency of government in respect to the currency. This whole subject is treated coolly and practically; and we think, to all who are not biased by some favorite theory, it will be found altogether satisfactory.

As, however, banking is of such general interest and of such great importance, it may not be uninteresting to take a brief view of the nature of its operations. In this we shall only lay down some of the principal features, and refer those to our author who desire to obtain a more intimate acquaintance with the subject.

1. Banks make the specie go farther. For every hard dollar in its vaults a bank can issue two, three, or perhaps four dollars in notes. Hence, with specie in the country amounting to some thirty-

three millions, we have a circulation amounting to upwards of one hundred millions. The solvency of a bank does not depend upon the amount of specie it contains, but on its general capital.

2. The currency furnished by banks is more economical and convenient than specie.

1. It is more economical, because there is less loss of value by the destruction of bank paper than by the destruction of gold and silver; and by substituting paper, the precious metals may be used in values of another form.

2. It is more convenient, because it is more portable, less liable to robbery and destruction in transportation, and much less expensive.

3. Banks afford a convenient medium through which merchants may collect their distant debts. What would be the risk, loss of time, and cost, of receiving debts by the transmission of specie; and how much specie would be kept out of circulation by the act of transportation, or in various ways lost or destroyed? Now the whole business of exchange can be done through the banks "by a dash of the pen," and almost without risk or expense.

4. Banks afford a convenient place in which merchants and others can deposit their surplus funds without withdrawing their money from circulation. If there were no banks, every person must keep on hand as much specie as would meet his current demands; and this would render it dead stock, and so much loss to the community, beside increasing the temptation to robbery and house-breaking. Now he can place it in the bank, where provision is made for its security. Besides, while in the bank it can be kept in trade by the directors; and it is not dead stock, as it would be in private hands.

5. Banks afford great facilities to industry by discounting notes and making loans. A person has on hand a note for a thousand dollars, due in three months. Meanwhile he is in immediate want of funds. He takes his note to the bank and gets the cash, *minus* the interest for the time it has to run; viz., three months. Or, a mechanic or merchant has skill and industry, but wants capital. The bank, on his furnishing adequate security, will advance the capital on loan. The bank, therefore, performs the functions of a loan-office.

6. The advantage of banks as loan-offices over individuals is, that they collect into one place the scattered surplus funds of the community, and, by doing business on a larger scale, can do it with less expense; i. e., with less consumption of time and labor. And, moreover, as the bank directors are selected for their skill in financial affairs, and their knowledge of the pecuniary condition of their neighborhood, they generally know whom to trust and what security to demand. Many private persons place their surplus funds in the banks to be loaned by the directors, whereby the community is benefited, who would be afraid to loan it on their own judgment. Thus widows and minors, and persons unskilled in finances, can buy bank stock, who would be incompetent to manage their own loans.

7. Banks save a great deal of time, and labor, and friction of coin, by the facilities they afford in making payments between individuals. If payments had to be made in specie, how much would it cost a merchant, in time and labor, to count over and minutely examine

fifty thousand dollars? And suppose all the payments in a large commercial city had to go through this process, how much dead loss would it occasion? Now, a merchant gives a check upon his banker, and the specified amount is transferred from one to the other by an entry in the books of the bank, while not a dollar of the money is fingered.

Thus, banks come under the general and important principle of the division of labor. A hundred persons find it cheaper to employ a bank to transact their money affairs for them than to do it themselves, and it costs the nation less. The individuals profit by the knowledge and skill which are acquired by those who devote themselves to a single branch of business, just as in all other cases.

These are some of the leading advantages of the banking system. By applying them and looking at their bearings, the reader will see how it is that the system has such an influence on national prosperity. Every one will see that they adjust the amount of the currency to a nation's demands; they economize capital; they collect the idle funds together and turn them to profitable account; they save time and labor; they furnish facilities to industry by loans and discounting; and, in all these ways, stimulate national production.

Hence, it is not surprising that nations enjoying great commercial prosperity should have early felt the need of those facilities which banks afford. The ancients, as we are informed, found some accommodation in bills of exchange; but only a very small part of that supplied by banks. In that period, however, they could be more easily dispensed with, on account of the greater proportion which the amount of precious metals in use bore to the demands of trade. That the proportion was greater than now is evident from the fact, that while the quantity of silver and gold in the world is now ten times greater, its value is only three times depreciated. Were there no greater demands for it now than then, it would have sunk to one-tenth of its former value; but the wonderful expansion of trade has prevented its sinking lower than to one-third. The demand, therefore, has increased faster than the supply, in the ratio of ten to three. Now there was no method, as far as we see, of meeting this increased demand but by the institution of banks. Hence, in all countries distinguished for commerce, opulence, and general comfort and enjoyment, banks have been instituted and paper money used. They seem to be inseparably connected with a high degree of commercial prosperity, and great productiveness of human industry. We may cite as evidences, on the one hand, England, Scotland, and the United States, who use a paper currency; and, on the other, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, who have only a specie circulation, and are proverbially poor and degraded. France seems to occupy a middle ground; for the institution of her bank gave a wonderful impulse to trade and industry,* which are now fettered and restricted, if our information be correct, by the want of a sufficient circulation.

The consequences of abolishing paper money may be very easily gathered from what has been said. Its first effect would be to raise the value of money just in proportion as it would diminish the quan-

* See Stoddard on the Banking Institutions of Europe and America.

tity. Suppose our specie to be one-third the amount of our circulation: let bank notes be banished, and the value of money will rise, or the prices of all other things will fall, just two-thirds. The effect on existing contracts would be deplorable. If a person had paid two-thirds of the purchase money on any property, it would then only sell for the remainder. Of course he would lose what was already paid. If a person had previously borrowed a thousand dollars, he would have to pay what would be equivalent to three thousand; since one thousand would go as far, and be as difficult to procure, as three thousand were at the time of the loan.

But what would be the effect of limiting bank notes to a given sum, say of twenty dollars? This measure evidently could not create silver and gold. It could only draw from the banks the specie necessary to replace the notes that would be called in. Now, to substitute specie for all the notes under twenty dollars, would require more specie than the country contains. Thus the banks, being bereft of their specie, which forms the basis of their circulation, would be obliged to close business. The result, therefore, so far as I can see, would be the same as prohibiting bank notes altogether. The same objection, however, would not exist, I apprehend, against prohibiting notes under three, or perhaps five dollars. True, it might create a little inconvenience at first, but it would be more than repaid by the advantages resulting. The principal of these would be the greater steadiness it would give to money prices, by an increase of the amount of specie in circulation. The fluctuations in the money market could not be as sudden or as violent if there were such an addition made to the permanent currency.

"But banks," we are told, "have been abused." And so has every other human advantage. But it is worthy of observation, that the benefits of banking are necessary and inevitable; the evils and abuses are only contingent and avoidable. Let them, therefore, be placed under such legislative restriction as shall guard, as far as possible, against the evils; and for the rest we must trust to the capacity and integrity of the directors, just as we confide in men in all other kinds of business.

"But banks," says another, "should be on the credit of the government." Then they will most assuredly be abused. When did governments ever conduct pecuniary affairs with as much economy and security as individuals? All government transactions are necessarily expensive; and as the risk encountered would not affect the rulers individually and personally, the security would be thereby diminished. It is well known, that as long as the Bank of France was in private hands, it continued to prosper. In 1718 the king took the bank into his own hands, and it was thenceforward carried on by government. In two years it exploded, and came near overwhelming the throne in its ruin. Such was the issue of governmental banking. On the contrary, the Bank of England, which has always been managed by a company under a charter from the king, has remained, notwithstanding the vicissitudes and embarrassments through which it has passed, and the burdens thrown upon it by a government immensely in debt, in successful operation to this day, and is likely to continue so while the government itself shall endure.

But we hasten to a conclusion. The third book is devoted to the

subject of Distribution. It exhibits the mode in which the profits of production are distributed among the several producers.

Book IV. treats on Consumption, including that of individuals and that of the public. Individual consumption is a most important part of the subject, since all are consumers, though all may not be producers. Besides, on the proper regulation and direction of this matter among individuals depend the accumulation of wealth and increase of comfort in the nation. It is to little purpose that production be in a flourishing condition, if there be a wasteful and prodigal consumption universally prevalent. For it is much easier to consume value than to create it; and one man may destroy more than ten can produce.

But do not let us mistake on this point. Economy does not consist in consuming as little as possible, any more than in consuming recklessly and to no purpose. If the former were economy, savages would be the most economical people in the world. One essential distinction between the savage and the civilized state is, that the latter has more wants, together with greater means of satisfying them. We hear, indeed, a great many changes rung upon the hackneyed phrase, "Man wants but little here below;" but, for the most part, this is little better than mawkish sentimentalism. This is not the way the Scriptures teach. They urge contentment with our lot, and patient submission to privation; not on the ground that privation is no evil, but because the will of God is supreme, and we must acquiesce in his appointments. Contentment on any other ground is not a Christian virtue. That is the best human condition in which there is the largest amount of *rational* wants, with the highest capacity wisely to gratify them.

What, then, is economy? It is simply the judicious regulation of consumption, or extracting the largest amount of advantage and enjoyment out of a given amount of expenditure. It does not consist in the amount spent, but in the manner of spending it. It consists in making a given sum go as far as possible.

The rules of economy have reference to two branches of the subject; viz., productive consumption and unproductive. In the former, value is destroyed in one shape, and reproduced with increase in another. Thus, value in the shape of horns is destroyed by the comb-maker, and reproduced in the shape of combs. In the latter the object is only the gratification of desire, or the satisfaction of human wants. This includes all domestic and personal expenses of every kind.

Economy in either of these modes of consumption is to be governed by substantially the same rules. It is to be remembered in both cases that the expenditure is always to be proportioned to our means, and is to be so disposed of as to bring the largest return of utility. Upon this subject Dr. Wayland has some very important observations, to which we cordially direct the attention of our readers.

It is surprising that there should be so much lack of wisdom in a matter of such every day and universal necessity as that of individual and domestic expenditure. For instance, it is a sound rule in economy that the value of every object be fully extracted; or, in other words, that nothing be wasted. Now, let a person walk along

the streets of our cities on a winter's morning, and observe the coal-ashes that are placed on the pavement for the carts; and he will find that nearly one-fifth, or perhaps more, of what was paid for fuel is thrown away. A coal-sieve that would cost a dollar would save, in one year, perhaps several times its value in cinders. Again, in families that burn candles, the last inch of candle is almost uniformly wasted. In England, I suppose, a *save-all* is as essential an article of domestic use as a fire-shovel. By this means the candle ends are burned in the kitchen. No less indispensable is the *soap-box*, in which all the fragments too small to be used are deposited, until they become numerous enough to make, when boiled together, a large lump. And who can tell how much value is destroyed simply by the habit of taking on the plate more than is eaten? The remnants are, generally, thrown away. If it be a private family, the owner loses it; if it be a public house, the boarders pay for it; because the price of boarding is in proportion to the consumption. Small as this may seem to some, it is, in reality, a detestable and wicked practice. No family that are guilty of such criminal waste can be called economical, even if they go without shoes to their feet, and dress in coats of homespun; or send their children to cheap schools, or employ cheap physicians.

Another important principle, and especially to persons of small means, is to buy nothing that is not necessary. Every thing unnecessary is dear, whatever the price may be. We are to take necessity, however, in a liberal sense, to include what possesses solid advantage in enjoyment or improvement. There are many persons and families who deny themselves household conveniences and important benefits on account of the expense, who yet spend more than their cost in things unnecessary; it may be in mere trifles and knick-knacks. Such people cannot enjoy the comforts and decencies proper to their circumstances, merely because they cannot keep in mind that a hundred cents make a dollar. It is, after all, the little outlays that make great holes in small incomes. If every penny were spent to the best advantage, it would make, in the course of a year, a vast difference in the amount of domestic or personal enjoyment, comfort, and happiness.

We shall mention but one more rule: it is, that articles of the best quality are usually most economical in the end. Many persons do not know how it is that they spend so much, when they buy the cheapest things they can get, and yet are neither as decent nor comfortable as their neighbors in the same circumstances. They make a great mistake. Parsimony is not economy. Dr. Wayland observes, "It is a given amount of utility we want, and not the mere form in which it happens to reside. It is cheaper to purchase a dollar's worth of utility for a dollar, than half a dollar's worth for seventy-five cents." If a cloth, at four dollars the yard, wear eight months, and one at six wear twelve, the latter is the more economical; for, though the wear of the cloth is the same, you save in the making and trimmings.

We may, however, notice one exception to the rule above given. It is, when an article of the best quality is in the newest fashion. In this case you must distinguish between what you pay for the quality and what you pay for the fashion. Fashion must, necessa-

rily, be very expensive; for, on account of its capriciousness, its demands could not be supplied but at a high rate of remuneration. An article in great demand this week may, next week, become dead stock. The patrons of fashion must, of course, pay a price that will cover these risks and losses. Hence we often pay more for the fashion of an article than for its quality; and hence, also, the difference in the prices of articles after the fashion has changed. Things of the best quality are cheapest, therefore, only when you pay for the quality alone; and the cheapest of all are those of the best quality when gone out of fashion; for the maker probably realized his profit on them while in the fashion, and he can often afford to sell them afterward for less than the cost.

On the employment of domestic labor Dr. Wayland observes,—

“Economy directs, that in a household we should purchase as much labor as we need, and of the kind that we need, but no more than we need.”

The same principle applies here as in the other case, viz., that the best kind is usually cheapest in the end. It would be a great mistake to refuse five dollars a month to an economical and capable domestic, and then give four to one who would waste, and break, and spoil more than would pay the difference; to say nothing of the vexation and disagreements that would follow. We are always to compare the price with the utility, and remember that that is most economical which gives us the best return for our money.

Again, as it is poor economy to hire more labor than we need, it is about equally so to hire less; for, in the latter case, the work must be left undone or we must do it ourselves. The question, then, to be decided is, whether it be worth doing; and if so, *is our own labor as valuable in that form as in any other?* It would certainly be great folly to leave undone what is worth a dollar and a half for the sake of doing what we might hire another to do for a dollar. Men generally have sagacity enough to perceive this, and hence a man's employment is considered an indication of the value he sets upon his time. Yet there are some people who are too penurious to be economical.

But it is time for us to point out what we conceive to be defects in this treatise.

Dr. Wayland has omitted a doctrine of no small importance in this science, which, we believe, the elder Say was the first to point out; viz., the distinction between the real and the relative variation of price. Real variation is occasioned by a saving in the costs of production; relative is that variation which takes place while the costs of production continue the same. Thus, if ten men could make five pairs of boots in a day, and sell them at six dollars a pair, if any means were invented by which the same cost would produce ten pairs, the price might fall to three dollars. The effect would be, that while the boot-maker would be just as well off as he was before, the community would be much better provided for. The article, being cheaper, would be brought within reach of a larger portion of society; more would be consumed, and comfort would be extended. In this case, therefore, while the producer is not injured, the community is benefited to the full extent of the saving in productive agency. This is real variation. But, as in relative

variation, if the boot-maker have one hundred pairs on hand, which fall, without any saving in the cost of production, from six dollars to three, he will sustain a heavy loss. Again, if a farmer can raise thirty bushels of wheat to the acre, and sell it at seventy-five cents a bushel, if the same land and labor will produce only fifteen, it will occasion a real increase of price. He ought, in that case, to get one dollar and fifty cents, in order to be as well off as before. The country, therefore, would be all this the poorer and worse provided for. But it is found that a falling off of production never remunerates the producer by an *equivalent* rise of price; i. e., when the quantity produced is diminished by one half, though the price must rise, yet it never doubles. The producer, therefore, must lose, first, by a diminution of his receipts; and, secondly, by the rise of other prices, occasioned by the increased expenses of living. The community, also, will be injured, by a diminution in the quantity and an increase of price.

We look upon these principles as of great importance, as they serve to exhibit the mischievous effects of raising the prices upon consumers. These effects are, to diminish the amount of consumption, to abridge the means of comfort, and, perhaps, even of subsistence, and by this means to bring some to premature death. For as, in the best state of things, there must be some who can only just make out to live, and others only just live comfortably, when the means are removed farther off by one degree, the former class must die, and the latter fall into their place. Thus the tendency of society will be downwards. On the other hand, when prices fall through increased productiveness, the effects are just opposite. Those who barely lived before are made comfortable; the merely comfortable begin to possess conveniences and superfluities; the resources of the rich are increased, by which they can extend greater aid to the indigent and industrious; and the whole face of society wears a thriving and happy aspect.

But where the fall of price is but relatively to other products, without any saving in the costs of production, these benefits do not follow; because the producer loses, by the fall of the price, all that the consumer gains. Thus the one balances the other, and the community, therefore, are no gainers.

We did wish to supply some remarks which our author has omitted, in relation to the balance of trade. For instance, it is often said that, "if our importations be greater than our exportations, we must become poorer." This is about as wise as to say that if, for eight hundred dollars, I purchase what is worth, to me, twelve hundred, I suffer loss. Evidently, if a nation can, with exports worth forty millions, import to the amount of fifty millions, she has made a profit to the extent of the difference. "But, perhaps, she has to send out specie to pay for it." If so, it is because that is the most profitable way of paying for it. The specie must have been made or earned, I suppose, before it could be sent out, and so we have its value left in some other form. "But the country will be drained of specie." Well, then, the interest of money will rise, and that, *provided trade be not crippled, nor public confidence shaken*, will cause an influx from abroad. Men will not keep money in Europe at five per cent. interest if they can invest it here at seven. But, then, the

influx of specie will not depend on its scarcity alone, but chiefly on the facilities and profits of investment. "But we shall be in the pay of foreigners." Just as much as you are in the rich man's pay, of whom you borrow a thousand dollars to carry on business. "But if the nation pay more than it receives, it will certainly become impoverished." Not always; for the improvement made by the excess may more than counterbalance the outlay. Thus a person may lay out several hundred dollars upon his house or farm more than his income, and be all the richer for it. But having already extended our remarks so far, we must forbear.

But the greatest objection we feel to Dr. Wayland's work, is the little prominence which it gives to agriculture. We, of course, did not look for an agricultural treatise; but, then, a source of production so important, and so peculiarly adapted to our country, deserved to hold a very prominent place in an American text-book on Political Economy. Yet Dr. Wayland says almost nothing on it; and some things which he has said do not indicate the most profound acquaintance with the subject. Thus, for instance, he observes, "the produce of a soil, when new, is generally greater than ever afterwards." But this is true only where agriculture is in a bad condition. The old lands of England are as productive as the new lands of Michigan or Illinois. Again, "the soil (of rich new lands) never needing manure, requires but small investments of capital." There is no land which never needs manure. Constant exhaustion without renovation, must, in the course of time, destroy the productive power of any soil, however rich at first. As illustrations of both positions, there are lands in England, originally of great fertility, so perfectly exhausted, that they were thrown out into common as useless; and yet, by scientific culture, they have been reclaimed, and rendered more productive than ever, yielding of wheat, of the best quality, fifty bushels to the acre. Such is the case on Mr. Coke's estate, at Holkham Hall, in Norfolk. It is observed, also, in our own country, that where the farmers have access to fish manure, the poorest soil is made equal to the richest. This is thought by some an extraordinary fact. But the same effect may be produced on any land, by applying a manure adapted to the soil. But it requires skill and science to discover such manures and their application. Hence the importance of science, as well as capital, in agriculture.

It seems strange to us, that a subject possessing so many claims to notice as this, should receive so little attention in our country. When we consider the nature of its employments, with their influence upon the health, morals, and intelligence of a people; the importance of the products it furnishes; the peculiar adaptation of this source of wealth to our country, arising from our extent of surface, variety of soil, climate, and productions, thin population, and, compared with many other nations, deficiency of capital for manufacturing purposes;—when we consider these things, it seems strange that it should have been so much neglected by those who control the minds of the nation, and, by influencing opinion, direct their conduct. It seems really to be the object of the nation—for what are the acts of government but an expression of the nation's will?—to direct science, capital, and industry, into any channels rather than those of agriculture. Congress

protects manufactures by duties, and makes appropriations for exploring expeditions, to extend and facilitate commerce; meanwhile, what is done for agriculture? Our mother earth seems abandoned of her ungrateful children, and is almost left to throw out her bounty spontaneously, or, afflicted by our neglect, withhold her accustomed favors. The consequence is, what we have more than once alluded to, a deficiency of agricultural productions. We have not, during the past year, raised grain enough in our immense territory for the use of our own population, small as it is, while the little island of Britain can raise enough for her teeming swarms, and spare some for her neighbors. There was something deeply sarcastic in the reply of Rothschild to his agent Joseph, in New-York. In the mania of last year's speculation, when the nation was to get suddenly rich without production, Joseph advised Rothschild to invest a considerable amount in real estate in this country, promising him a large return. The reply was short and pithy: "I don't think much of a country that has to import her bread." The banker had sagacity enough to divine the result.

Now, it seems to us, an American text-book on Political Economy ought to make this subject decidedly conspicuous. True, it could not exhibit the different modes of tillage; but still it might throw a good deal of light upon the resources of agriculture. It might exhibit its capabilities; the necessity and application of science to agriculture; the value of its products compared with other products; it might even suggest the most profitable kinds of products; it could exhibit the modes in which government might foster agriculture; not, indeed, by duties or bounties, but by premiums for new inventions and discoveries; by the institution of pattern or model farms;* and by the diffusion of information and science on rural affairs. Moreover, by drawing his illustrations copiously from this department, he might contrive to convey, indirectly, a great deal of useful knowledge concerning it. A text-book on Political Economy, presenting agriculture with due prominence and in its proper bearings, is, in our view, still a desideratum among us.

Notwithstanding these defects, however, we consider Dr. Wayland's work decidedly superior to any other; and as such, we can cheerfully recommend it to the readers of this magazine. If they feel inclined to make themselves acquainted with a science whose principles are

* The suggestion of a pattern farm seems never to have received the attention which it deserves. The project is simply this: that government shall institute a farm under the management of a competent agent, a well-educated and scientific agriculturist, on which experiments shall be made to ascertain the most successful modes of tillage. Here all kinds of agricultural implements, new inventions, discoveries, different kinds of manures, modes of culture, breeds of cattle, qualities of soil, products of every kind, and all other matters belonging to agriculture on a liberal scale would be tested, and exhibited for the benefit of the public. Such an establishment should possess every possible convenience and utility, and be in every respect, as far as possible, "a pattern farm." For ourselves, we know of no measure by which government could give such a stimulus to the national agriculture, nor any mode in which it could more profitably or judiciously employ a portion of its surplus funds. It is in this way that the agriculture of Great Britain has been raised to such a pitch of excellence, with this difference, that there such experiments have been made by individuals. In this country, where agricultural capital is so limited in individuals, it must be done by government if it be done at all.

at the foundation of national prosperity and individual comfort; a science so closely connected with religion, morals, intelligence, and happiness; a science which tends, as much as any other, to illustrate the wisdom, benevolence, and unity of the divine administration, they will have cause to rejoice in the facilities afforded them by Dr. Wayland.

For the Methodist Magazine and Quarterly Review.

ART. IV.—SUPERIORITY OF REVEALED TO NATURAL RELIGION.

BY REV. R. W. ALLEN, OF THE NEW-ENGLAND CONFERENCE.

REVELATION is, unquestionably, of paramount importance. Nor is its importance superseded by any production of man's invention. Whenever man, with all his wisdom, aided by the light of science and the erudition and literature of preceding ages, has attempted to devise a plan by which a fallen world might be saved, he has made an entire failure. Human reason proved inadequate to the task. Revelation, whose author is God, can alone furnish man with all that information necessary for fallen beings to know in order to be saved. A revelation replete with such information, should be held in high estimation by every son and daughter of Adam. We design, in the following pages, to give a summary view of the superiority of that system so clearly unfolded in the Scriptures, to what is generally denominated "natural religion." As this term is commonly used equivocally, it becomes necessary to define before we proceed.

Some understand by the term, natural religion, those truths revealed in the Scriptures which, when once discovered and understood, may be clearly shown to have a foundation in the nature and relations of things, and which unprejudiced reason will approve when fairly presented to the mind; and accordingly very fair schemes of natural religion have been drawn up by Paley, and other Christian philosophers, embracing nearly the whole of revelation. In this view, natural religion is not so called because it was originally discovered by reason merely, but because, when once understood, it is what the reason of mankind properly exercised approves as based in truth and nature. Others take the term in a more limited sense, to signify that knowledge of God, his attributes and perfections, which, with the light of revelation, may be obtained from the works of nature. Others, again, take natural religion to mean, that religion which is discoverable by the exercise of reason without any higher assistance. This last definition we consider correct. The two preceding define not what is obtained from reason, but from revelation.

Having then defined natural religion to be that system which is discovered by unassisted reason, we are now led to inquire to what extent this religion has prevailed? History, as well as observation, teaches the melancholy fact, that its prevalence has not been circumscribed to one nation or country. Its abettors have not been few. Sages of antiquity, and renowned philosophers of former times, have not only embraced it as the way of salvation, but it has found ad-

herents in modern times. But are the unassisted faculties of man adequate to lead him to a proper knowledge of the will and law of God, of true happiness, and of his future destination? We answer unhesitatingly, No! This is evident to every individual who will reflect on the endless differences and inconsistencies which prevailed among the most celebrated heathen philosophers, some of whom taught gross immoralities, which aided very little in rectifying the notions, and reforming the lives of mankind.

This fact is farther corroborated in the gross ignorance which extensively prevailed at the time of which we are now speaking, respecting the most important truths of revelation. Respecting the nature and worship of God, the creation of the world, the origin of evil, and the cause of the depravity and misery which actually exist among mankind, any method by which a reconciliation could be effected between God and man,—the supreme felicity of man, the certainty of future rewards and punishments, and the resurrection of the body;—of all these they were either profoundly ignorant, or their notions were confused and imperfect. Indeed, how could it have been otherwise, while they were ignorant or destitute of divine revelation? It may be asserted, as undeniably true, that, aside from the word of God, sufficient light on the above points cannot be obtained. It is the Bible alone which reveals the sublime truths so essential to man's salvation. Of these, to give due credit, human reason could have but a very inadequate conception.

Who that has taken but a cursory view of the history of the world, has not been forcibly impressed with the unremitting efforts which have been made to exalt and eulogize human reason? The days of polite literature, so called, seem to have been replete with panegyrics and encomiums on this faculty of man, while entire ignorance prevailed respecting its power and province. No wonder the most distinguished sages of antiquity frankly acknowledged and confessed the uncertainty of its researches. Natural religion was prevalent in the days of Christ; and, during the scholastic ages, it seems nearly to have taken the place of all other religions. Its multifarious and bewildering speculations have reached our times, and men of talents and erudition have set aside the light of revelation for its glimmerings and uncertainties. But, that we may more clearly discover the superiority of revealed to natural religion, we will examine some points in which their dissimilarity is strikingly manifested. Truth will shine increasingly bright when contrasted with error. The lustre and utility of revelation will more forcibly impress our minds when contrasted with the impotency of human reason.

1. The first point we shall adduce to elucidate the subject is, that revelation gives us clear and correct views of the being and perfections of God; while unassisted reason, whenever it has attempted it, has not only failed, but exhibited its entire weakness and incompetency to do it. As it respects the proofs of the genuineness, authenticity, credibility, and inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, we shall say but little directly; though it is apparent to every candid inquirer that we have every evidence of their truth and divinity which can be reasonably expected or desired. We shall proceed,

then, on the supposition that the Bible is what it purports to be, viz.: *a revelation of God's will to man.*

To possess correct knowledge of the Supreme Being, so far as he has been pleased to reveal himself to us, is of paramount importance. This has generally been acknowledged in ancient as well as modern times. The question, then, is this, viz.: Is the Bible the only source of correct information on the subject? We answer, It is. We need no farther proof of this than the fact that all, in whatever nation, country, or period, who have labored to obtain this knowledge by rational induction, whether drawn from the works of nature or metaphysical principles, have utterly failed. But it may be inquired, Cannot the being and attributes of God be demonstrated from the works of creation, which are so impressively spread out before us? We answer in the negative, aside from revelation. It is true, with the light of revelation shining upon them they speak forth their divine Original; but without it, in this respect they would leave us in awful darkness. We admit that all nations have been disposed to have their gods of veneration and worship; and, rather than to have no gods, no objects were considered too mean or insignificant to be worshipped. On this account some have chosen to define man a *religious*, rather than a *rational* animal. But the character of the "only true God" has never been understood but where the Bible has made it known.

Many of the most learned heathen philosophers entertained the most confused notions of the true character of God, while others rejected the idea of a Supreme Being altogether. Hiero, the tyrant of Syracuse, once asked the philosopher and poet, Simonides, that important question, What is God? The prudent philosopher required a day's time to consider it; the next day he asked two; and so on increasing in the same proportion. Hiero, weary of procrastination, required the reason of this delay. "Because," said the philosopher, "the more I reflect on it the farther the subject appears from my comprehension." Socrates, who was properly denominated the hero of the pagan world, in regard to moral virtues, though he expresses a belief in the one only God, eternal, invisible Creator of the universe, and Supreme Director and Arbiter of all events, yet he dare not give public testimony to these great truths. At times he expresses doubts of the existence of such a Being. All the true light received on this important doctrine, in this distinguished age of philosophy, was unquestionably received from traditional notices, handed down from previous ages. The Greek philosophy rejected the idea of a God as Creator of all things. The Ionic, Pythagoric, Platonic, and Stoic schools all agree in asserting the eternity of matter. They taught that matter was eternally coexistent with God. That matter was created out of nothing seems never to have entered their minds. *Reason* never informed them that *God created all things.*

Suppose a person, whose powers of ratiocination are improved to the utmost pitch of human capacity, but who has received no idea of the existence or attributes of God from revelation, tradition, or inspiration; how is he to convince himself that God is? and whence is he to learn what God is? That of which, as yet, he knows nothing cannot be a subject of his thoughts, his reasonings, or his con-

versation. He could get no idea of immateriality from matter, neither could one's self suggest the idea of spirit. For what knowledge the heathens had of a Supreme Intelligence, they were not indebted to unassisted reason, but to revelation, though unwilling to acknowledge it. Cicero declares that "a pure mind, thinking, intelligent, and pure from body, was altogether inconceivable." We may say, with another celebrated author, "Every thing about us being finite, we could have none but finite ideas; and it would be an act of omnipotence to stretch them to infinite."

The above facts undeniably show the insufficiency of human reason in tracing the existence and attributes of God. But there is, as we have already intimated, a higher source from whence we may obtain this information. The doctrine of one supreme, all-wise, and uncontrollable Providence, shines from the sacred pages with unexampled lustre. It may be traced on every page. Thus the superiority of that religion unfolded in the Scriptures is discoverable to reason with all its boastings.

2. As human reason is not sufficient to trace the existence and attributes of God, so it is not adequate to ascertain the true character of man,—the provisions of the gospel for his final restoration to the divine image,—his true and proper immortality. That man is a fallen, unholy, and depraved being, seems never to have been a part of those creeds so justly entitled the productions of reason. And, strange as it may appear, the doctrine of human depravity was not only discarded by philosophers and moralists during the dark ages, and when science was in its incipency, but most of the moral systems of modern times have failed in recognising this important truth. They are based on the hypothesis that man, though fallen, is capable, without relying exclusively on revelation, of ascertaining the true standard of moral rectitude, and the only rule by which mankind are to be governed in their duties to God and man. Among the numerous systems which may be enumerated are those of Cudworth, Clark, and Price, who labored to resolve virtue into agreement with eternal fitnesses of things;—of Adam Smith, Dr. Brown, Dr. Hutcheson, Dr. Dwight, and Bishop Butler, who, notwithstanding the penetration of a discriminative intellect, a superfluous refinement of metaphysical abstraction, and with the elegance of a scholar's erudition and a poet's fancy, have erred in substituting human nature in its present state in the place of revelation, as a standard of moral rectitude. Dr. Wardlaw, in his valuable work entitled "*Christian Ethics*," has ably reviewed these systems with others, to which my readers are referred.

But while reason, with all its boastings, fails in unfolding the true character of fallen beings, revelation is very explicit on this point. The inspired penmen seem to have dipped their pens in "color's native well" while portraying the true character of man. Here man is "painted to the life."

But, admitting the fact that man is what the Scriptures represent him to be, how could reason have made a development of a sure way by which he might be reconciled to God? How God could be "just, and yet the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus," could never be ascertained only by the light of revelation. Here the mystery is explained. Here the provisions of the gospel are clearly unfolded.

"We think we can show you, that without the revelations of Scripture, the goodness of God would have been very doubtfully adumbrated or shadowed forth in nature; and that, without those revelations of his mercy to guilty man, we should have known nothing." It is true, indeed, that many who have acquired instruction from the book of God, guided by its light, can go to nature and providence and find in them many proofs both of his goodness and mercy. But consider how partially they view the subjects presented to them. They take only one single class of the phenomena on which they profess to construct their system. They look, for instance, only at what are obviously the beauties of nature, and do not regard its apparent deformities. They look upon the shining sun, but they forget to look upon the devastating storm. They look at life in its enjoyments, but they forget to look at its miseries. They consider man in his pleasures, but they overlook him in agony, and disease, and death. They look at certain wonderful provisions by which God supplies the wants of his creatures, but they dwell not on those seeming contradictions which the administration of the affairs of the world is continually presenting. Now we, with our Scriptures, can account for all this. We can harmonize all these phenomena, reconcile their existence with the divine character, and rejoice that the Lord is good; but, without revelation, this could not be done. But if, without revelation, our views of the divine goodness in exercising mercy, which implies pity for those who have reduced themselves to a state of misery by sin, would have been thus obscured and doubtful—then of mercy, which implies pardon for the guilty, we should have known nothing. Without this book, where should we go to find a single word to support the hope that God would forgive the sins of his creatures? Certain it is that nature, so called, indicates nothing of this in any of her works. Nor is it indicated by that course of human events which passes before us. If God be favorable to the guilty, he must either waive his just rights altogether, or find some means to satisfy them without the actual punishment of the offender. In either case it is a matter to be determined by himself, and can only be known by us when he is pleased to reveal it. We should, therefore, untaught by this sacred volume, be so unacquainted with the things of God as to be ignorant of what he would do with the guilty. Take the question, "What must I do to be saved?" Universal nature furnishes no reply; the oracle is completely silent; nor can our trembling spirits hear a single accent of mercy, encouraging grace, till revelation directs us to Calvary, and calls on us to "behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world."*

If, therefore, reason is insufficient to discover the grand scheme of salvation so unequivocally unfolded in the Scriptures, so it is equally inadequate to ascertain other important truths of which the Bible furnishes an account; as, how we became sinners, and how we can cease to be such; that our spirits are immortal, and that there is a state of existence for the soul when separated from the body; that there will be a resurrection of the dead, a final judgment, and a state of eternal rewards and punishments; on all these points

* See Rev. Richard Watson's sermon entitled "Divinity of Christianity."

reason could furnish no satisfactory information whatever; and, without revelation, we must remain entirely ignorant of them.

Who, by studying the philosophy of Epicurus, Plato, Zeno, and Aristotle, has ever become acquainted with the great truths of the Bible? Indeed, their subtle disquisitions, their blending physics, metaphysics, and ethics together, and treating them dialectically, their absurd subtleties, and endless distinctions without differences, only served to perplex the mind without leading it nearer the great fountain of truth. Dr. Samuel Clark, though a great advocate for natural religion, when speaking of the heathen philosophers, says, "Some professed open immorality; others, by subtle distinctions, patronized particular vices. The better sort of them, who were the most celebrated, discoursed with the greater reason, yet with much uncertainty and doubtfulness, concerning things of the highest importance;—*the providence of God in governing the world, the immortality of the soul, and a future judgment.*" Many modern philosophers were no better. Just so far as they rejected revelation they became sensual and immoral. The Bible, then, teaches us what reason has never been able to do. Here its superiority is clearly demonstrated.

3. Again, the superior claims of the Christian religion are strikingly manifest in its admirable adaptation to the capacities of men. The various schemes of religion which have no higher authority than human reason seem to be wanting in *simplicity* and *adaptation*. They seem better suited to another race of beings than for sinful man. The Platonists held that all things happened according to the divine providence; and yet they inform us that "God, fortune, and opportunity govern all the affairs of men." The followers of Aristotle, who formed the peripatetic school, held that virtue consisted, in the mean, between two extremes; but what these extremes exactly were was undefinable. The Stoical school inculcated the principle, that the best rule of life consisted in living according to nature; but what they always meant by following nature is not easy to conceive. The doctrines of those contentious sects, the Realists and Nominalists, were equally absurd and inexplicable. Indeed, the whole of the scholastic ages, a period of a thousand years, seem to have been devoted to idle theories, vain speculations, and hair-splitting subtleties. What a religion for fallen man! But, with the dark ages, the absurd speculations of reason did not pass away. Subsequently, and even in our own times, men have been found who make religion consist in the vagaries of a distorted brain, and in the absurdities of a false philosophy. But, conceding the fact that the learned had a clear understanding of the mystical and sophisticated theories, yet they were far from the comprehension of the illiterate. In heathen countries the philosophers always derided the religion of the vulgar, while the vulgar understood nothing of the religion of the philosophers. Among those systems now extant which set aside revelation for reason, may be reckoned that of Socinus, denominated the Socinian system.* The true features of this system may be seen in a work entitled,

* It is true, Socinians do not reject the Bible nominally, but they reject all that it reveals as essential to man's salvation.

"Errors of Socinianism," which my readers may peruse with much profit. But how unlike every other system, in this respect, is that revealed in the Scriptures? Here the doctrine of the unity of God; a distinction of persons in the Godhead; the creation and conservation of all things by God; a general and particular providence; a divine law fixing the distinctions of right and wrong; the fall and corruption, the guilt and danger of man; the doctrine of atonement through the voluntary and vicarious sufferings of the seed of the woman; the necessity of penitence and faith in that atonement, in order to forgiveness; the accountability of man; the obligation and efficacy of prayer; the doctrine of direct influence; practical righteousness; the immortality of the soul; the resurrection of the body, and a heavenly and unfading inheritance;—are clearly unfolded and brought down to the capacity of all.

That there are mysteries connected with revealed religion we admit; but this concession detracts nothing from its simplicity. "We cannot comprehend the common operations of nature; and if we ascend to higher departments of science—even to science of demonstration itself, the mathematics—we shall find that mysteries exist there."

"Mysteries in the Christian religion, instead of being suspected, should rather be regarded as a proof of its divine origin; for, if nothing more were contained in the New Testament than we previously knew, or nothing more than we could easily comprehend, we might justly doubt if it came from God, and whether it was not rather a work of man's device."

"Though some of the truths revealed in the Scriptures are mysterious, yet the tendency of the most exalted of its mysteries is practical. If, for instance, we cannot explain the influence of the Spirit, happy will it be for us, nevertheless, if we *experience* that the 'fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance.'"^{*}

In the Bible we are taught that God has revealed the most sublime truths "even unto babes"—to those, not the "wise and prudent" of this world, who are willing to learn at the feet of their Master. Indeed, all that is essential to man's salvation may be comprehended by the weakest intellect. Who, then, will set aside this heavenly light for the glimmerings of reason?

4. Revealed religion exhibits clearly its superiority in the spirituality of its worship. The worship of other religions is extremely gross and sensual. To say nothing of the worship of those ignorant nations given to the grossest idolatry and superstition, let us, for a moment, examine the worship of those who, though unenlightened by revelation, have stood high in intellectual refinement and erudition.

The most enlightened of the heathen and philosophic world were extremely ignorant of divine worship. "They worshipped they knew not what." It is true, they had their temples, their altars, and their images. Their temples were filled with splendid decorations and embellishments. Some of them had stated seasons of worshipping at the shrines of their imaginary deities. But their worship

* See "Horne's Introduction," p. 53.

consisted, chiefly, in symbolical pageantry and lifeless ceremonies. There was nothing *spiritual* in it; nothing that was calculated to elevate or tranquilize the mind. It was a mere exterior parade, empty and powerless. Under such worship their minds became more sensual, and their moral natures exhibited a constant deterioration. This will not appear strange, when we consider that their gods were of the most profligate and demoralizing character.

It is said, by good authority, that some of the most enlightened heathen philosophers "worshipped" a class of spirits which were thought superior to the soul of man, but inferior to those intelligences which animated the sun, the moon, and the planets; and to whom were committed the government of the world, particular nations, &c. Though they were generally invisible, they were not supposed to be pure, disembodied spirits, but to have some kind of ethereal vehicle. They were of various orders, and, according to the situation over which they presided, had different names. Hence, the Greek and Roman poets talk of satyrs, dryads, nymphs, fawns, &c. These different orders of intelligences, which, though worshipped as gods or demigods, were yet believed to partake of human passions and appetites, led to the deification of departed heroes and other eminent benefactors of the human race; and from this latter probably arose the belief of natural and tutelar gods, as well as the practice of worshipping these gods through the medium of statues cut into a human figure.*

Nor is this ignorance of true worship to be attributed to a want of intellectual cultivation. During a large proportion of the period of the oriental and Grecian philosophy, science had, in many respects, attained to as high a state of perfection as it had at any subsequent age. Rhetoric, eloquence, poetry, and some of the other branches, were studied with a success which has scarcely since been surpassed. But, with all their erudition, their faculties, aside from revelation, have never taught them the nature and object of true worship. There was nothing in any system of heathen mythology from which they could obtain this information. And, whenever reason has taken the place of revelation, the proper knowledge of true worship has been wanting.†

The Bible, alone, unfolds to us the character of divine worship. Said the Saviour to the woman of Samaria, "God is a spirit; and they who worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth." Here the Divine Being is presented, not a god in human form, but the maker and upholder of all things; the only being worthy of man's affections. Here we are taught to worship and adore this Being "in spirit and in truth." It is true, we do not here behold the trappings and ostentation of heathen worship, but we can mark the simplicity and *spirituality of that* in which thousands have taken sweet delight. With the sacred volume before us, unfolding the glories of immortality, we will continue to contemplate the character of our Infinite Preserver and Benefactor; our feet shall tread His "holy courts," and our private meditations of Him shall be

* See "Warburton's Divine Legation."

† We are informed by Hesiod and Varro that the Greeks and Romans, though they made high claims to literature, and eulogized unassisted reason, yet worshipped no less than *thirty thousand deities*. How awfully corrupting to the mind!

sweet; so, by these delightful exercises, our minds shall become tranquilized, devout, and spiritual, and ultimately prepared to join the "blood-washed company" in the "better land."

5. The superiority of revealed religion is again observable in its universal tendency to inspire and promote a spirit of benevolence. Here Christianity stands forth in its unrivalled glory. Where shall we look for the fountain of those streams of benevolence which are now pouring forth their healthful and resuscitating influences, and which are destined to renew and fertilize the moral world, except in Christianity? Benevolence is the very genius of the Christian religion. This is the soil in which it "lives, moves, and has its being." Look at the first abettors of the gospel. They were feeble, yet *holy* men. In their public addresses we do not discover the charms of eloquence, or the refinement of erudition. Abundant labors and extensive philanthropy were their prominent characteristics. They were content with nothing but the salvation of the world. In their hands the "heavenly treasure," though in "earthen vessels," triumphed over all opposition. It went forth from "conquering to conquer." This treasure is still committed to the hands of a few undaunted and energetic men, who are resolved on conquering the world to Christ. This host of fearless sentinels, stationed on the outposts of the moral world, will soon witness the last contest, and hear the victory shout, "Alleluia, the Lord God omnipotent reigneth!"

But where, and when, has the religion of reason created in the heart the spirit and feelings of benevolence? When has it taught man the duties he owes to God and his fellow-creatures? When has it produced in the heart a lively interest in those benevolent enterprises designed for the melioration of our race? When has it inspired that burning desire in the soul for the salvation of the world? We answer, Never! Examine the history of heathen philosophy, and what do you behold? Do you there find the characters of those philanthropic men,—such as Howard, Wilberforce, &c., whose labors were indefatigable in promoting the welfare and happiness of their species? Socrates, it is true, labored to benefit the youth of Athens, but his object seemed to be rather to correct certain errors of life, than to change and renew the heart. But whatever genuine benevolence he possessed, he was unquestionably indebted to revelation* for it, and *not* to reason. But how few of the philosophers felt *any* interest in the reformation of their pupils? Indeed, many of them taught the grossest inconsistencies, while their conduct was strikingly immoral. Such a man as Howard will stand like an imperishable monument as the benefactor of his race when renowned sages of antiquity, whose names throw a lustre around the history of philosophy, shall have been consigned to oblivion.

No sooner did the benign influence of Christianity begin to move the hearts of men, than the spirit of benevolence was manifest. Such were the feelings of those under its influence at the day of pentecost, that they "sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all *men* as every man had need." St. Paul gave orders that the poor be remembered, and that collections be made for them, &c. (1 Cor. xvi, 1.)

* He may have received some traditional notices of revelation.

Relinquishing the delights and splendor of vanity, they voluntarily renounced their possessions for the relief of their indigent brethren; but the renunciations, unlike those of the heathen philosophers, were not sacrifices of sensuality at the shrine of pride; they proceeded from the purest motives, and were performed with the sublimest views. Thus has the gospel taught men to feel for suffering humanity and human woe. Every country where the gospel is not known and its principles diffused, the poor are neglected and forgotten. All travellers who have visited the ruins of the celebrated cities of Greece and Rome, have been greatly solicitous to copy the inscriptions found on fragments of columns, and other relics of public buildings. They have found among the ruins the remains of amphitheatres, temples, palaces, mausoleums, and triumphal arches; but no fragments have yet been found, with an inscription, telling us that that relic belonged to a hospital, or to any institution for the supply of human want, or the removal of human misery. The Christian religion, like its Author, speaks in tones of tenderness and mercy. It stands ready to supply the wants of men, and to alleviate human suffering and misery in all its forms.

6. Lastly, its superiority is demonstrated in the effects it has produced in changing and subduing the heart, and in restoring the moral world to its original purity. Every system of man's invention, however powerful and admirable its adaptation, has proved utterly inadequate to subdue the obdurate will, and curb the violent passions of men. Genius, learning, philosophy, and wit have been resorted to in vain. In the Grecian schools, where the sciences were cultivated, and philosophy attained to the summit of its glory, men lived in the indulgence of unbridled passions, corrupt propensities, and in the commission of almost all imaginable crimes. There was nothing in the philosophy of the schools that was calculated to destroy the spirit of avarice, rancor, ostentation, and pride. Men seemed to be propelled forward by the natural impulses of a corrupt nature in their plans and enterprises. Hence we find bickerings, strife, injustice, litigations, &c., existing among the most virtuous and refined. But, if we turn our attention from the Grecian schools, where shall we look to behold man, by human efforts, brought under a proper discipline; his heart changed and renewed, and brought to feel his responsibilities as an intellectual, social, and immortal being? Such a view in the nature of the case cannot be expected. "There is no other name given under heaven among men, whereby we can be saved."

The gospel is the divine method for man's recovery; and, whatever the wise men of this world, in the plenitude of their philosophical loftiness, may think or say respecting it, it has been found hitherto, and it will be found henceforward, that "the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God stronger than men." "After that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God, by the 'foolishness of preaching,' to save them that believe." In the moral revolutions which it effected on characters of all descriptions, the gospel proved itself, before the eyes of all men, to be "the power of God unto salvation." The salvation wrought by it was not a thing secret and future; it was present and visible. The preachers of the cross could point to the many trophies of its power; and, enumerating

all the varieties of unrighteous, impure, and profligate character, could say—"Such were some of you; but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of God." "Ye were once darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord."

And the "foolishness" of the cross is still the destined means by which the progressive regeneration of the world is to be effected. What has philosophy done? Where her triumphs? Where her trophies? Where the hearts she has renewed? Where the characters that have experienced her converting and transforming power? Where are the tribes which she has "turned from darkness unto light, and from the power of Satan unto God?" Her conquests are all prospective; her triumphs all promissory; her vauntings all of what is yet to be done. To no one thing more appropriately and emphatically than to the boastings of human philosophy, is the poet's line applicable:—

"Man never is, but always *to be bless'd*."

But the gospel can point to the past as well as to the future. It has done much: and it is not to its shame, but to the shame of its professed believers, that its achievements have as yet been so limited. Had Christians felt as they ought their obligations to the God of grace, they would have done more, and given more, and prayed more: yes, much more; and "the word of the Lord would have run" faster and farther, and been more abundantly "glorified." Even as it is,—wherever the gospel makes its way,—wherever the word of the Lord takes effect, it shows itself as it did of old, to be still "the power of God unto salvation." It can still point everywhere to the subjects of its subduing and regenerating influence. It can point to hearts of which the enmity has been slain, and which have been devoted in holy consecration to God,—"*hearts of stone*" that have become "*hearts of flesh*;" it can point to the licentious, whose vileness has been purified; to the cruel, whose ferocity has been tamed; to blasphemers, that have learned to pray; to drunkards, noted for sobriety; to liars, that are men of truth; and thieves, that "*restore fourfold*;" to the proud, humbled to the "*meekness and gentleness of Christ*;" to oppressors, that have laid aside their "*rod of iron*," and "*broken every yoke*;" to extortioners, that have ceased to "*grind the faces of the poor*," and are distinguished for justice and generosity; to sinners of every description and of every grade, that have relinquished the ways of evil, and are "*living soberly, righteously, and godly*." In the heathen world, idolatry, with all its attendant fooleries, impurities, atrocities, and bacchanalian revelries, gives way before it; and "*the gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, perish from off the earth and from under those heavens*."* Thus has the gospel triumphed!

This heavenly catholicon is destined to restore the moral world to its original purity, if the predictions of ancient prophets are to be fulfilled. According to those predictions, "the benevolent purposes of the Almighty, in relation to our world, are to be accomplished; war is to cease its desolating ravages, and its instruments to be trans-

* See Wardlaw's *Christian Ethics*, page 307.

formed into ploughshares and pruning-hooks; selfishness, avarice, injustice, oppression, slavery, and revenge are to be extirpated from the earth; the tribes of mankind are to be united in the bonds of affection and righteousness, and praise spring forth before all nations; the various ranks of society are to be brought into harmonious association, and united in the bond of universal love; the heathen world is to be enlightened, and the Christian world cemented in one grand and harmonious union; the landscape of the earth is to be adorned with new beauties, and the 'wilderness made to bud and blossom as the rose;' 'the kingdoms of this world are to become the kingdoms of our Lord and his Messiah,' 'the whole earth filled with his glory,' and his sceptre swayed over the nations throughout all succeeding ages." If such a work is to be wrought, surely nothing but the Christian religion can effect it. Human reason would fail here. Lord, hasten the universal triumph of the cross!

For the Methodist Magazine and Quarterly Review.

ART. V.—OUR COUNTRY.

THERE is a feature in Christianity which seems to have been overlooked by most writers on morals and religion. That it is a *remedial* system is admitted on all hands. But what is it to remedy? Manifestly, human nature. They are not the works of God which it proposes to remedy. These are all perfect. It is not the state of the physical world which Christianity proposes to remedy—unless it be by that awful and sublime process which is to produce a new material universe, after the general conflagration, for the future residence of the saints.

It is, then, the moral nature of man that Christianity proposes to remedy. It finds this disordered, and prescribes a remedy for the disorder. It does not, indeed, profess to create new faculties, either of body or mind; but it finds the understanding dark, and proposes to enlighten it; it finds the conscience asleep, and arouses it to action, that it may do its office. The affections of the heart, the desires of the soul, are fixed on wrong objects, or thrown out to the blast of every wind. These are taken in hand by this kind restorer of human nature, purified from their grossness and defilement, drawn off from forbidden objects, and placed where they may repose with tranquillity, and perform their functions without either remorse or distraction. All this is done by the remedial influence of that Christianity which has come down from heaven to renovate man, and to "make all this new."

This is no new thought. It has been proclaimed a thousand times; and would to God that it might be more generally realized by those *for* whom the provision has been made.

It was said that this divine remedy is for man. It is designed to fit him for his station; to qualify him to "act well his part" in that relation he sustains in the creation, whether as a lord over inferior animals, as a cultivator of the soil, a merchant or a mechanic, as a subject of the government of God, as a citizen of the world, as a

subject or citizen of a particular country, as a husband, father, or son, as a magistrate, or as one who is bound to obey the laws. In whatever respect he is unfitted to sustain himself in any of these relations, or to discharge the duties arising out of them, Christianity comes in as a restorer, proposing a remedy for his defects, and imparting, by means of its internal energies and its external instructions, capabilities and qualifications to enable man to fulfil his high destiny.

We mean to apply these remarks to the subject indicated at the head of this article, and thereby bring into view that feature of this religion which seems to have been, in some measure, overlooked by Christian moralists. Christianity, then, does not propose what form of civil government shall exist among men. It has existed and flourished under all possible forms. When it first made its entrance into our world, embodied in the person of its adorable Author, it found mankind under a monarchy of the most absolute character. It did not make war upon this monarchy. The structure of the civil government, whether as displayed in the person of Herod, whose jurisdiction was confined to the land of Judea, or in the person of Cesar, whose jurisdiction was of almost unlimited extent, it left to itself, simply teaching the people to "render to God the things that are God's, and to Cesar the things that are Cesar's." This divine maxim, which fell from the lips of the Founder of Christianity, comprehended every thing; every duty, civil and religious. It found a government existing, and commanded its disciples to conform to its requisitions, so far as they could without abridging the rights of God; which, indeed, always have had, and always must have, a prior claim upon the homage of mankind.

The apostles, who were the authorized expounders of the doctrines and precepts of Christianity, living under a similar government, but in the hands of a tyrant of the most atrocious character, inculcated obedience "to the powers that be." They did not intermeddle with the civil powers any farther than to exact obedience from their followers to the constituted authorities of the land. Read over the Evangelists, the Acts, and the apostolic Epistles, and if you can find any officious intermeddling with the affairs of state, we will then allow that we have but imperfectly understood this divine system of religion.

But, while it left all these things to be regulated and managed by those to whom they belonged, they did not fail to attack the *vices* of all, whether high or low, whether in or out of office; whether the delinquent wielded a sceptre, wore the ermine, brandished a sword, or occupied a less conspicuous station, or mingled with those in the more humble walks of life. Here Christianity knew no compromise, took no bribes, held no parley; but openly, boldly, and with an honesty of purpose which would not be turned aside for any earthly consideration, rebuked, entreated, and instructed all.

We see, therefore, that in this respect, also, the system presented its *remedial* character to the consideration of mankind. It did not, indeed, propose to alter or modify the civil government of the country. It expressed no preference to a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a republic. It knew perfectly well that it could live and flourish under either the one or the other, provided the administration were in the hands of men who "feared God and gave glory to his name."

Instead, therefore, of undertaking to prescribe of what character the civil government should be, the public teachers of Christianity sought to bring all men, the ruler and the ruled, under the reforming influence of their religion; knowing, full well, that if its remedial effects were felt in the heart and expressed in the life, no unjust laws would emanate from the throne or the senate, nor would any cruel acts of administration issue from the bench of the magistrate. If all men were brought under the influence of a religion which teaches mankind to "do justly, love mercy, and to walk humbly with their God," there would be no tyranny exhibited in the conduct of civil magistrates, no unjust and oppressive laws enacted by the legislature, no more than there would be resistance or rebellion on the part of the subjects or citizens. All would be bound together as a band of brothers, and actuated in their several relations by the reciprocal laws of justice, truth, and equity. This is the *remedial* character of Christianity. While it teaches its disciples to "submit themselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake," to honor the magistrate as "God's minister, sent to them for good," and "to render honor to whom honor is due," it proclaims, in tones of thunder, the just judgments of God "against evil doers" of every description; rebuking sin, though in respectful language, whether in *high or low places*. To the obstinate violaters of God's law it denounces woe and death, in terms that cannot be misunderstood; declaring to one and all, that "except they repent, they shall all likewise perish." Nor is this all. It reveals and enforces, by the most solemn and awful sanctions, laws suited to all conditions and ranks of men. To these laws implicit obedience is demanded. Duty is thus inculcated upon all. "Fear God, honor the king,"—that is, the civil magistrate,—and "love the brotherhood," comprehends the whole duty it requires of man.

But suppose it finds mankind in a state of rebellion against God, against the laws of their country, and infringing upon the rights of each other, what does it propose to do? Does it propose to remodel the government? Not at all. Here it comes in its *remedial* character. Instead of seeking to change the laws of God, or to subvert the government of the country, or to annihilate the rights of individuals, it aims its blow at the rebellious *hearts* of men, seeks to change *them*, to subvert the false principles by which they are governed, and to restore them to the possession of their individual rights and privileges. This is its sovereign remedy, and it seeks none other. It knows, all its advocates who understand its principles know, that if this remedy can be applied to the heart and life, those other evils which arise solely out of this radical evil, this heart-sin, this hereditary disease, will be removed, just as naturally and as necessarily as the leaves will fade and die when the tree is plucked up by the roots. Let the governor and the governed thus feel the remedial influence of this sovereign antidote for the ills of human nature, and each one will "do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with God;" and when this is done, it is a matter of indifference who is the ruler, what the nominal character of the government, or by what party the administration is carried forward. Neither justice, mercy, nor humility can work any ill to our neighbor.

These general remarks admit of a particular application to our
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own government. This is *our* country, and *we love it*. We love it not only because we were born in it, and have, therefore, received it as an inheritance from our fathers, but we love it more especially because we think we have one of the most happy, just, and equitable forms of government in the world, or that the world ever saw. This may be prejudice. If it be, it is a prejudice of a pardonable character. It is a natural one. Is it not, in fact, commendable? Is not that man to be commended who loves his country—the country which gave him birth—nurtured him—and which now protects him in all his rights and privileges—natural, civil, and religious? We hope, at least, that this feeling of the heart, prompted as it is by those impulses which are coeval with our earliest recollections, will meet with a hearty response from every one who may read these pages.

Shall this government stand? Shall our institutions, civil and religious, under which we have so greatly prospered thus far, be handed down to posterity unimpaired? Shall that constitution, the noblest monument of human wisdom, withstand the shocks of its assailants? Shall it be preserved as the palladium of our liberties and as the great “landmark” for future statesmen; the polar star to guide the national ship in the midst of the storms and tempests which may arise out of the conflicts of parties, and the rushing of human passions and prejudices? These are questions which every American patriot ought to put to himself. Nor let the Christian think that he ought to love his country less because he is required to love his God more.

It has frequently been observed that this government is an *experiment*. It is, indeed, an experiment upon a large scale. The fate of millions is involved in the issue. Not merely of those now living in this country, enjoying all the untold blessings guaranteed to them under the constitution which binds, limits, and controls the action of the supreme legislature of the Union, but also of generations unborn in this and in other lands. And who can be indifferent in respect to the success of an experiment pregnant with good or evil of such an incalculable amount?

There are many reasons why it is called an *experiment*. It had no archetype; no precedent in the history of the world. The world, indeed, had seen the patriarchal, the monarchical, aristocratical, and the democratical forms of government alternately rise and fall; but until the American Revolution had effected the emancipation of these colonies from the dominion of the mother country, the world never saw a *representative* government in which the power of legislation was delegated by the mass to the hands of a few, chosen for that purpose by the united voice of the people. Rome, to be sure, had its senate; but this was neither checked in its legislative action by a constitution, nor were its proceedings balanced by an upper and lower house. Hence the almost perpetual vacillation from a republic to a monarchy; from military despotism to the anarchy of popular uproar and confusion. And what were the governments of Greece? Were they not so many petty, turbulent democracies, in the deliberations of which neither the voice of wisdom nor experience could be heard whenever the popular frenzy was wrought up by the harangues of artful demagogues? Those wild democracies,

often more tyrannical, and always more whimsical than an absolute monarchy, formed no fit precedent for the frame-work of the American confederacy. Here is an aristocracy of power, created, for the time being, by the people themselves; during which time the latter have agreed to surrender up a portion of their liberties into the hands of a few; reserving, however, to themselves the right of reclaiming this delegated power whenever they shall think it has been abused, and of putting it into the hands of others. This is the *experiment*.

Here are *wheels within the wheel*. Here are the several state governments, moving each in its own sphere, while the outer wheel of the general government throws itself around them all, and protects them without interfering with any. If these are so balanced and managed that each one can turn upon its own axis without interfering with its fellow, and at the same time keep within its destined sphere of action, so as not to clog the wheels of the general government, by the blessing of a munificent Providence the whole machinery may go on harmoniously, without interruption; and, if kept in proper order, may not wear out under the influence of its own friction. We say this is the *experiment*. The strength of the system is yet to be tested. Its durability must depend, not simply on the theory of the government, but upon the wisdom, the integrity, and devotedness to the interests of their fellow-citizens, of those who are appointed to manage the system.

For this we have some fears. And, though we do not wish to be set down as croakers, nor classed among the prophets of evil tidings, we cannot avoid the duty—so we feel it—of noticing some things which, we fear, forebode disastrous consequences. The mentioning of these is the chief object of this article; and, in doing this, we shall keep in view the principle with which we commenced, namely, that our Christianity—for we desire to sustain the character of Christian patriots, and not to take the hue of any political party—is a *remedial* system; that it intermeddles not with the forms of civil governments, but aims simply to make good citizens and subjects under every form where its disciples may dwell.

1. The first thing we would notice, as an evil to be deprecated, is the fatal influence of what has been called *Lynch law*. Ever since the scene of the Vicksburgh massacre, in which the majesty of law was set at defiance, and the honor of the magistrate merged in the virulent spirit of a mob, we have felt for the honor of our country and the safety of its inhabitants. Had, indeed, the civil authorities of the state frowned upon those deeds of atrocity, and expressed its voice of reprobation against the disgraceful acts of that inhuman butchery, we might hope that a repetition of such deeds of violence need not be feared. This, however, so far as we have heard, has never been done.

Let it not be thought that we offer a palliative, much less a plea of justification, for the desperate conduct of those villains on whom the vengeance of an offended people fell. By no means. If truth has been told of their character and doings, they justly deserved chastisement. But was there no civil process by which their deeds could have been brought to light, and the punishment due to their enormities inflicted upon them? If not, then the legislature of the state have been strangely unmindful of their duty.

Nor have we selected this as a solitary instance of popular violence. Others have followed, of a character equally exceptionable, and they, therefore, show the necessity of lifting up the voice against them. The mobs of Boston, New-York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and other places, have all been but an exhibition of the same spirit of insubordination—of the same disposition to usurp the powers of the magistrate, and set the laws at defiance. We know, indeed, that these violent movements are not peculiar to our country, nor to popular governments. Neither a monarchy nor an aristocracy is exempt from these tumultuous assemblages, and those excitements which lead to similar deeds of desperation. But where have we a similar example, on which the government of the country did not look with indignant disapprobation at such deeds of violence? Where else have we an example, where the people were encouraged to a repetition of their outrageous conduct, by the silence of the supreme power? Such a dangerous precedent will be pleaded in future, unless it shall have been frowned upon by those to whom the administration of the laws is committed. And even in those places where the authority of the magistrate was brought to bear upon the mob, and the military power of the country was called into action to enforce law and restore order, the slowness of their proceedings in some instances, and the manifest reluctance with which they discharged their duties in others, seemed but to add fuel to that destructive fire which was raging to such a fearful extent. We do not mean to question the purity or patriotism of the magistrates. They, doubtless, acted from the best of motives. They hoped that mild measures and remonstrances would have the effect to calm those turbulent spirits, and to bring them to a sense of their duty. They found, however, that this experiment failed; and after the mischief was done, and the deeds of violence were perpetrated, the mobs were dispersed by a show of authority. This we consider a mistaken policy. The law should be enforced with a promptness and energy which will teach the lawless that they cannot indulge in the violence of passion, in robbery, and murder, with impunity.

We need hardly stop here to say, that no man in the community is safe while this lawless spirit is permitted to vent itself: this is known to every one. Any citizen, however innocent, becoming obnoxious to the populace, is liable to be outraged in his person or property, whenever they shall see fit to indulge their splenetic disposition against him. This, therefore, is one of the evils to be deprecated. The lawless despotism of the mob must be destroyed, or the iron despotism of a military government will take its place. We must destroy *it*, or *it* will destroy *us*.

2. Another fearful evil which prevails to an alarming extent is, the *abuse* of the press. The *freedom* of the press, under proper regulations and restrictions, is one of the greatest blessings with which a free government can be favored: its abuse is one of its greatest curses; and unless checked and controlled, will, sooner or later, contribute to the destruction of that very freedom which is its safeguard.

It is not, therefore, the *freedom* of the press against which we speak; but it is that *abuse* of this freedom, which is exemplified in personal detraction and slander, and more especially in that rancor

which is manifested by one party against the other. The highest authority has said, "Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people." And one of the most comprehensive set of moral rules for the conduct of a religious community, has forbidden its members to "speak evil of ministers and magistrates." But such rules are no more heeded by the generality of our citizens, than if they had been written in the sand. On the contrary, the character of our magistrates is assailed uniformly by the adverse party with all the virulence of partisan madness; not chiefly because their conduct is morally or politically bad, but because they belong to the dominant party, and must therefore, if possible, be put down. And while the adverse party thus indiscriminately denounces its antagonist, the latter sets up its plea of justification, and manifests its sense of injury by retaliating upon its opponent in a similar strain of abuse and invective. Thus each party is immaculate in its own estimation, while its antagonist is every thing that is bad. Is this conduct likely to serve the interests of truth? to promote virtue? or to exalt the character of the nation?

The suffrages of a free people in the choice of their rulers is considered one of the safeguards of our liberties. But while partisan politicians are chiefly intent upon blackening the characters of each other, and as eagerly engaged in justifying their own party, what becomes of the freedom of elections? Instead of selecting the best man in the community to serve the public interests, *because* he is the best, or the most competent, the chief, if not indeed the *only* inquiry is, Does he belong to the party, and will he, therefore, serve its interests? Thus the interests of the party are sought to be promoted at the sacrifice of the interests of the country. Is this the wisest course to preserve our liberties, and to secure the peace, the prosperity, and permanency of our government? We do not say that bad motives always influence men in this partisan warfare. No doubt they often persuade themselves that their party is right and the most patriotic; and that if their measures can be adopted, it will secure the best interests of the country. Nor do we deprecate the existence of all difference of opinion on the subject of politics. These differences, were they stated and conducted in a suitable manner, free from those violent expressions of wholesale slander and personal recriminations, might produce a healthy action in the body politic, and serve to purify the political atmosphere. A perfect calm is as much to be dreaded as a violent storm. But what we condemn is, that spirit of blind zeal which sees nothing good and true in an antagonist, nor yet any fault in those of its own party. Do not those unqualified censures, this impugning of motives, and this mutual recrimination, tend to destroy confidence in our rulers? Who, if he believe what is said in these vehicles of abuse, is willing to confide his interests to their keeping?

We allow, that "great men are not always wise." We allow, that magistrates may err; that bad men may get into office; that when "the wicked bear rule, the people mourn." This is admitted. But how is the evil to be remedied? Is it by wholesale abuse and slander? Is it by a sweeping condemnation of the whole, merely because they dissent from us in political views? Does not every body see, that this unwise course of conduct goes to destroy all confidence in the accuser as well as the accused? For our part, we have become so ac-

customed to this sort of abuse, that when we look into a strong partisan paper, and read the violent strictures upon public men and measures, we do not allow ourselves to be influenced by it. So little confidence is reposed in what is retailed under the influence of this bitter spirit, that we immediately suspect the whole as the tricks of the party, resorted to for the purpose of securing patronage, and or sustaining some particular interests. This is the natural, the unavoidable effect of those measures of violence. If, then, the press would inspire confidence in its integrity, let it give evidence that its sole object is to promulgate the truth, and to seek, not the interests of a party, but the good of the country. Let it, in its animadversions upon public men and measures, discriminate "between the righteous and the wicked;" give due credit for every thing which is good, let it be found wherever it may; make suitable allowances for human weaknesses; and then its censures upon those who are at fault will be believed, and its warnings be heeded. We are no more in favor of wholesale and indiscriminate praise and mere partisan eulogy, than we are for those broad and sweeping accusations which pass sentence of condemnation upon all, because they happen to belong to a party. Discriminate between truth and error, between the good and the bad, right and wrong, and evince an honest intention to deal out equal justice to all, and the press shall become a faithful sentinel to warn the people of their danger, and at the same time a powerful prop in support of our liberties and our civil institutions. A love of country requires this: much more does Christianity sanction and command it.

But were this abuse of the freedom of the press confined to the political newspapers, there would not be so much reason to apprehend danger. Within a few years, religious periodicals, of various sorts and sizes, have been multiplied in our country. At the commencement of these, they were hailed by the Christian community as harbingers of peace and good will, and it was hoped that they would tend greatly to purify the moral atmosphere, and to present the rays of truth through a clearer medium to the minds of the people. Nor have we been altogether disappointed. Through this medium religious intelligence has been widely diffused, the benevolent enterprises of the day have been greatly aided, and many truths but partially known, have been announced and promulgated far and wide; and hence there can be no doubt, but that this sort of periodical literature and intelligence has been beneficially increased, carrying with it light and love to many hearts; nor would we say a word to limit its circulation, or to circumscribe its influence. Let it fly as "upon the wings of the morning," until it shall reach the utmost bounds of the habitable globe.

But we have, nevertheless, feared that even these papers have not always been free from the defects we have already noticed. Instead of manifesting that strict regard to truth, justice, and love, which should characterize a religious journal, the spirit of party, of denominational jealousies, and of personal recrimination, has too much predominated. We, doubtless, must come in for our full share of censure on this subject. With whatever care and cautiousness an editor may have watched against the demon of party, it is to be feared that he has not always been frowned into silence. Nor has this partisan warfare been confined to a difference between one denomination and another,

but brethren of the same family have lifted up the heel against each other, each one contending for his peculiarities and opinions with much of that asperity of feeling and biting sarcasm which mark the conduct of political journalists. This spirit and conduct, so far as they have prevailed, have been productive of animosity, strife, and envy. Hence some denominations are now bleeding at every pore, and are literally torn to pieces by factions. How much the injudicious management of the religious press has contributed to this unhappy result, it would be well for all concerned to examine, and be more guarded in future. Editors, like all others, are fallible men. They have, equally with their readers, prejudices to combat, peculiar opinions of their own either to be sustained or sacrificed for the public good, and are liable to be biased by the same influences, unless well fortified by a prudent regard to the good of the community, which move and determine the conduct of all other men; while their position gives them a command over the opinions and feelings of their numerous readers, which involves a fearful responsibility. They sacrifice, therefore, either for good or ill, to a vast amount. Should not this thought suggest the necessity of a cautious conduct on the part of those who have command of the public press, and more especially of the *religious* press?

Such, indeed, is the vitiated taste of the public mind, that a paper which deals in personal abuse and individual detraction is more likely to be extensively patronized than any other. Hence the avidity with which such are sought after and read—a melancholy proof this of the depravity of the human heart, and of the facility with which means can be furnished to feed and pamper its vitiated appetite.

The unrestrained freedom of the press, when wielded in the cause of truth and virtue, is one of the greatest safeguards to free institutions. But, like all other good things, it opens a door for the most flagrant abuses; and in the hands of raw and inexperienced men, is susceptible of incalculable mischief; and more especially so, when it is controlled by those who are destitute of moral principle, urged on, as they frequently are, by a malignant hatred to a wholesome restraint, and to that order and subordination, which are essential to the well-being of human society. In this state of things, no sooner does a man take it into his head that his own interest can be advanced by resorting to the press, than he hastily puts his thoughts to paper, and, if he can enlist a sufficient number in his favor to commence the publication of a daily or weekly sheet, he pours forth upon the community the effusions of his distempered and distorted brain, regardless of truth and honesty, reckless of the reputation of his neighbor, and equally indifferent to the interests of his country. And what is more astonishing still, if you presume to lift up your voice against this violent abuse of the press, you are denounced as an enemy to its freedom! These moral vampires, who feed themselves upon the characters of their countrymen, assume to themselves the right not only to dictate what shall be published, but they also seem to flatter themselves you are bound to read them, and pay them for their slanders. If you warn the people against their vituperations, and endeavor to guard the community from their contaminating influence, you are instantly stigmatized as an enemy to free discussion. Should not such men

consider that we have the same right to refuse to patronize and read as they have to publish? that we have the same right to condemn their vile trash as they have to pander it upon the public? Or, are they so blinded to the perceptions of equal rights that they have persuaded themselves that the freedom of the press consists altogether in the right to slander unmolestedly, to pour forth their political and moral heresies without opposition, and to poison the fountains of truth without censure!

Who will say that these things have not a deleterious influence upon us as a nation? Shall we become a nation of personal revilers? Shall we become distinguished for reciprocal recriminations? Will not such a course of conduct weaken the bonds of our civil compact, and ultimately drive us into that anarchy which is subversive of all order and good government? When mutual respect and confidence are destroyed, where can mutual safety be had? All those, therefore, who wish well to their country, should unite in frowning such principles and practices into silence. Let all such make the voice of reprobation be heard against this vile abuse of the freedom of speech and of the press, which leads to the indulgence of a licentiousness so hateful in its character, and so destructive to the tranquillity and prosperity of our beloved country. Let, indeed, the press itself take a bold, decided, and unflinching stand against such flagrant abuses of its freedom and independence. This it owes to its own character. What man, who values his reputation as an editor, is willing to identify himself with those hireling vassals who shout for the multitude, regardless of the rights of truth, probity, and honor, and who cater for the raven appetites of those who fatten themselves upon the spoils of such as are slain by those who delight in butchering the characters of their fellow-men!

We say, therefore, that every honest patriot who has any thing to do in controlling the press, owes it to himself and to his country to refrain from this merciless warfare upon human beings. And if such men would come forward fearlessly, and lift up their voice with that independent boldness which becomes men of truth and probity, in favor of morals and against that desecration of freedom we are now deprecating, the augean stable would soon be cleansed, the demon of discord would be compelled to confine himself to those only who are worthy of his society, while the virtuous and good would rally to the rescue, and seize on the golden moment to save our land and nation from the grasp of its hireling enemies.

3. Another evil, of no small magnitude, is the tendency which is manifested, in all our public men, to throw the government into the hands of the populace, and then to call their voice the voice of public sentiment. We confess that we have been no less disgusted than astonished at hearing our public speakers, apparently with a view to court popular applause, harp upon the "sovereignty of the people," and the "voice of their constituents," when they have been solicitous to carry some favorite measure; knowing, at the same time, that this sovereignty and constituency knew no more about the measure in question, until they heard it announced by their delegate, than they did of the secret movements of the caucus which nominated him to his office. And these men have rung the changes upon the "sovereignty of the people" so long, and with such a sick-

ening repetition, that the people have at length determined to let us know that they are indeed our sovereigns in the broadest sense of that word; that they are, in reality, above all law and order, superior to the magistrate, and have the right to act in their collective capacity without any reference to either law or justice. Hence the mobs which have disturbed and disgraced our country. Hence civil courts have been set at defiance, magistrates insulted, the regular process of justice impeded and outraged, while the echo from our halls of legislation, "the sovereignty of the people," has been made the basis of these riotous proceedings. Such are the perversions of truth! Such the abuses of those principles which lie at the foundation of our social and civil compact!

But we do not wish to be misunderstood upon this topic. We mean not to say that the people do not possess the original right of self-government, and that, therefore, the government did not emanate from them. This is admitted. But what we mean to say is, that having declared their preference for the form of government which they wish to "reign over them," they are bound to submit to it; to have it administered as the constitution of their own framing has directed; and to allow the laws to have their full "force, power, and virtue," according to their meaning and design; and to acknowledge that whenever an attempt is made, by a tumultuous assemblage of the people, to usurp the powers of government, to control the magistrate in the lawful exercise of his high trust, or to supersede his powers by the interference of a mob, and thus to trample the laws beneath their feet, they are rising against the government of their choice, and contributing most effectually to prostrate the liberties guaranteed to them by the constitutional compact. Against this evil, therefore, let every true man raise his voice.

4. We are not certain that crime increases in our country; but it is unquestionable that virtue is essential to the stability of our institutions. Read the history of the world, and you will find that the prevalence of wickedness, and the indulgence of luxury, idleness, and profaneness, have always been the precursors of the downfall of nations. It is easy to see how these things naturally work the destruction of good governments. Riches beget pride, and pride leads to the gratification of the senses, and this to all manner of licentiousness; and all these together produce that effeminacy of spirit and manners which incapacitates man for either self-government or for defence against the invasions of an enemy. As wealth, therefore, increases among us, habits of industry are laid aside, and indolence, self-indulgence, and licentiousness, with all their train of evils, will pour in upon us like an overflowing flood, and sweep our institutions from the face of the earth. In addition to the natural results of these vices, they provoke God to anger against us, and thereby expose us to that destruction which comes upon those against whom his wrath is kindled. The awful judgments which came upon the Israelites, at different times, as punishments for their defection from the laws of their God, should admonish us of the danger to be apprehended from similar provocations of his just indignation. He is not only *just*, but also *impartial* in the distribution of his rewards and punishments. And think you that He, who punished the old world for their shameful defection from his laws, their rebellion

against his government, and so often interposed his authority when the descendants of Abraham gave themselves up to their own hearts' lusts, will spare us if we provoke him to anger by similar acts of rebellion against his righteous government? The very thought that he will do so is an indication that his judgments linger not, because it is an impeachment of the holiness and justice of his character.

5. What tends to enhance our wickedness, and to hasten the day of retribution, is the introduction of a vicious foreign population. We have no objection to an increase of population. Were it of the right character,—intelligent, virtuous, and industrious,—it would augment our national strength, and thereby add to our capabilities to defend ourselves against foreign aggressions. But is this the character, generally, of that flood of immigration which is inundating our country? Very far from it. The greater proportion of those who come among us are an ignorant, vicious race of beings, who are encouraged by their own governments to people our shores because they are a nuisance at home. These bring their vices with them; and, however insignificant they may appear in the estimation of some, they are no sooner naturalized here, which, indeed, requires but a short probation, than they have as much weight at our polls, and thereby have as great a share in the government of the country, as the wisest and best among us. This, therefore, is an evil of almost an uncontrollable character. They corrupt our morals, and, uniting their suffrages with those of our own citizens, who are equally reckless of the character and interests of their country, they often exert a preponderating influence over our municipal and state authorities.

To say nothing of their religious principles, which, in general, are averse to that republican simplicity by which our nation should be distinguished, their very political breath has a contagious influence, breeding civil disease and death wherever it is inhaled. As to their religion, if we may judge of its character by its fruits, it has none of that purifying and hallowing influence which pure Christianity always carries with it, and which tends to exalt man to his true dignity, and secure to him his rights and privileges. Surely a foreign population of this character, unless proper means are adopted to purify its morals, to rectify its principles, and to correct its political biases, must exert a deleterious influence upon our republican institutions, and should, therefore, be guarded against with all that vigilance which true patriotism always inspires.

In the midst of these alarming evils which prevail in our land, and threaten to undermine our free institutions and prostrate our civil and religious liberties, the lover of his country anxiously inquires, *Is there no remedy?* To this important inquiry we answer, most emphatically, *There is.* CHRISTIANITY IS THAT REMEDY. Let its pure and hallowing principles be promulgated. Let its renovating power be felt in the hearts of our fellow-citizens, and its holy precepts exemplified in practical life, and all is well. This divine system of religion presents an invulnerable shield to the Christian patriot, which will ward off every blow of the adversary of his country's rights, and enable him to defend himself against every intruder into the fair fields of liberty and happiness. What does it inculcate? It makes the laws of eternal truth, justice, and

goodness, the basis of all human conduct; and though it finds man in possession of passions and propensities which lead him to war against these laws, yet it proposes a remedy even for these heart evils; and no sooner are its prescriptions taken and its injunctions obeyed, than the disease is removed, and the patient is restored to sound moral health. This is, therefore, the sovereign remedy for every evil we have mentioned. Do not all men see, that whenever the ruler and the ruled are governed by these laws all unrighteousness must cease? Let love, peace, and good will pervade all hearts, and actuate every man in his intercourse with his fellow, and where is there any room for rebellion against the laws of truth, justice, and goodness? This is so manifest in itself that it needs no argument to make it more so.

The conclusion, then, is this:—That it is the imperious duty of all who wish well to their country, to use their influence to propagate this religion far and near. Let the press aid the pulpit in this grand enterprise. Let those of its conductors who see and deplore the evils arising from the abuse of this powerful engine, lift up their voice in favor of just laws and civil and religious order. If all such were to unite their energies to suppress the licentiousness of those presses which pour forth their slanders, and propagate their political and moral heresies over our land, who can calculate the amount of good they might do?

What shall we say to the professedly *religious* press? We say, Let its conductors cease their bickerings one against another. Let these set an example to the others of their love of truth, of Christian moderation, of respect for the personal reputation of their fellow-men, their Scriptural regard for magistrates, for the laws of their country, and for that order and subordination which are essential to social existence, and they shall contribute mightily to advance their country's welfare. Let them all unite to inculcate a suitable reverence for the constitution of their country, a love for its civil and religious institutions, and a just regard for its enactments. Let all the secular and religious conductors of the press unite in frowning indignantly upon those editors who pollute their pages with personal abuse, with detraction of individual character, and with sentiments of immoral tendency, and which lead to insubordination and anarchy and to rebellion against the constituted authorities. If we can succeed so far as to make these vehicles of slander and abuse unpopular, we shall have rendered a service to the rights of humanity, to the interests of our country, and to the happiness of the present and future generations, of an untold amount. Let, then, the effort be made. The cause is worthy of a mighty effort. If we succeed, we shall have saved our country. If we fail, we shall have deserved success by the very effort we made in so noble a cause, and, therefore, our reward is no less certain.

We would call upon all men who value their country's welfare, and who have the smallest influence, to use that influence in a cause so deeply interesting as this. Let the presidents of our colleges, the principals of our academies, the teachers of our common schools, together with all that are concerned in the education of our youth, employ their great influence in teaching the fear of God, a reverence for Christianity, a love of justice, truth, and goodness, and

veneration for magistrates, and a just regard for law and order. Let them feel and fully realize that their individual interests are identified with the interests of their country, and that both are involved in the propagation of the pure principles of Christianity. Let all parents and guardians of youth enlist in the same cause, and the work shall be done.

If it be true that the people are the fountain of civil power, how indispensable is it that this fountain should be pure! How else can the government be in the hands of good men? If, then, we allow a foreign population, destitute of religious and political knowledge and principle, to infect us with their poisonous breath; if we allow our youth to riot with them in indolence, luxury, and wickedness; if we neglect to raise them to the dignity of intelligent and responsible beings, by the appliances of intellectual, moral, and religious culture; then may we expect the fair fields of our extensive and constantly extending republic to be speedily overrun with the briars and thorns of religious and political heresies, which will ultimately destroy those trees of liberty planted by our fathers, and which have been nurtured by our patriotic statesmen.

How shall this corrupt mass be purified? Can philosophy do it? In the ten thousand experiments which it has tried, it has been found a "physician of no value." Can mere mental culture do it? This is equally inefficient. Neither of these can reach the seat of the disease. They may, indeed, enlighten the understanding in political science and civil jurisprudence; but they cannot reach the *heart*, where is the chief seat of the disease. Here, therefore, to the *heart* the remedy must be applied; and Christianity alone can do the deed. This applies itself to the heart; and, if its remedies be taken, and its prescriptions followed, a radical cure is effected here; and if "the tree be made good, the fruit will be good also." Then, when the heart is changed from bad to good, if the understanding is enlightened, the judgment accurately informed on the principles of moral and political science, as well as on the great fundamentals of religion, the people will be prepared and qualified to discharge their duties with an enlightened patriotism, whether in or out of office. That magistrate who is under the influence of these principles, and is actuated by the motives inspired by love to God and man, can be guilty of no acts of cruelty, of sanctioning no oppressive measures, nor of neglecting those duties which are essential to the welfare of the state. And those citizens who are under the influence of the same judgment and motives, will most cordially co-operate with all such magistrates in seeking the peace and prosperity of the community at large.

Under these impressions, we once more call upon all who love their country, to use their best endeavors to diffuse this Christianity among all orders and ranks of men. Let the ignorant be instructed in its doctrines and precepts, the profligate reformed by its power, and all regulated in their social intercourse by its morals, and the state shall be safe, the country shall be blessed and happy, and our civil and religious institutions shall be preserved from deterioration, and be handed down to future generations in all their purity and integrity. Thus shall we bequeath to our posterity an inheritance more precious than gold, and more enduring in the blessings it confers upon mankind than the everlasting hills.

For the Methodist Magazine and Quarterly Review.

ART. VI.—LETTER TO THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR ON THE
WITNESS OF THE SPIRIT.

MR. SPECTATOR,—There is one truth which the discussion respecting the witness of the Spirit between you and ourselves is well calculated to evince. It is this: that controversy, unless carefully guarded from degenerating into a mere utterance of the spirit of strife, is a two-edged sword, cutting one way as well as another—injuring the right as well as the wrong. It is likely to produce this effect, particularly when carried on through the medium of works issued at regular intervals, perused by distinct classes of readers, who read what is sent them, not because they desire information on any particular subject, but seek information because they have already bought the vehicle which conveys it. In such a case each writer has every advantage with his own readers, and none with his adversary's. For the former, he is so deeply concerned as to seek their good opinion by any means in his power; for the latter, so little as to give himself no concern as to what they think or how they feel.

It is possible, in any controversy, for those who have the truth, to defend it by insufficient arguments, or by arguments which, though they go not the whole length of conviction, are yet of some force. It is quite possible, even for those who are in the right, to misplace a word, to distort an illustration, or having a complete view in their own minds, yet not to state it fully to others. It is possible (for there is no man that liveth and may not sin) that though generally courteous and fair, they may occasionally give rein to bitterness of feeling and expression.

Under such circumstances, as flies pass over all a man's sound parts to light on the sores, so the opposing party, all for himself and for the truth only as it serves himself, may feel as though it were his privilege to display in full proportion the unsound, giving his reader no hint that there is a sound argument which he cannot answer; to dilate upon and magnify the harshness of his opponent's spirit and expression, without any intimation that though that spirit is *occasionally* irregular, yet it is *generally* such as it should be. This is the trick of the trade; and that class of men who in all professions can understand nothing of a trade *but* its tricks, will not fail to resort to it.

In rigid fairness, the whole argument on both sides should be placed before all who read on either side. The necessity, however, of this (which cannot perhaps be expected in all cases) may be obviated in a great degree by a fair and ample statement, on each side, of the arguments, objections, and illustrations on the other.

But I am not about to inflict upon you any lengthened exhortation to duty in this respect. What I think of you, and of your manner of treating the present subject, will appear shortly. Only let me observe, that as in your first piece there was not any such quotation as the case required from Mr. Wesley, whose doctrine you professed to be examining, so in your last,—though there be a few curtailed extracts

from the opponents whom you *seem* to be answering,—yet there is *not* any quotation calculated to evince either the tenor of their arguments or the spirit in which they carry on the discussion. This is a suspicious circumstance, which you will no doubt account for in your own way.

What I wish chiefly is, to remind myself publicly of my own obligations, and to insinuate into the minds of the readers of this periodical, to consider whether the writer before them seems to deal with his opponent in the spirit of fairness. Perhaps the present series of remarks will not be found to be very regular or methodical; but if I have my wish, you will be able to understand, in each leading remark, precisely what I mean. Besides remarking generally upon the subject, and your manner of treating it, I shall endeavor to make good the following positions, though they will not be formally separated from the body of the remarks,—viz.: That you have misrepresented Mr. Wesley—that you have misrepresented us, the writers in the *Methodist Magazine*—that you have misrepresented, and even caricatured, the doctrine apart from its propagators; and finally, *proh pudor!* you have misrepresented yourself.

1. In the *first* place, I have a few remarks to make respecting the application of epithets by one to another. I shall make such remarks upon these in passing as may seem to be necessary to bring out their true character, though my prominent design is to let our readers know precisely how *you* designate *us*, and how we designate you.

You say on p. 171, vol. ix, of the *Spectator*, “Neither of the writers has attempted a defence of the real doctrine of Mr. Wesley, or replied to our remarks with a disposition to meet the question as it is. They signify their belief in the doctrine—do their utmost to evade and mystify the subject, and spend the chief of their strength in giving utterance to some very bitter railing against the *Christian Spectator*.” To this you add on page 174, “We repeat it, that neither Dr. Bangs nor his coadjutor argue to the real question, although both evince that they know what it is, and profess an entire coincidence with Mr. Wesley.”

Now what is the full import of these sentences? Do we indeed do our utmost to mystify and evade? Do we *indeed* spend the chief of our strength in giving utterance to some bitter railing? Unfortunately for *us*, *your* readers cannot judge of the truth or falsehood of that remark; but, as I lay it before *our* readers, *they* can. Let them determine for themselves. Your assertions are not worthy even of contradiction. I repeat them here, that others, and perchance you yourself, may be sensible of the nature and strength of the feelings with which you write.

“One or two of Dr. Bangs’ misrepresentations we feel called upon to notice. In one instance he so misrepresents our remarks upon Mr. Wesley’s character as to make us say he was at times absolutely insane,”—p. 171. In reference to this, it is conceded, and that too with gladness and singleness of heart, that Dr. B’s article presents your use of the epithet “insane,” in reference to Mr. Wesley, in too strong a light; nevertheless as the misrepresentation was occasioned by misapprehension, and consisted in an exaggeration of the strength, not in a misstatement of the essential import, of the expression, he feels his conscience no more oppressed by the memory of it, now that it is rec-

tified, than he feels of hesitancy in making an acknowledgment of his mistake. The readers of the Magazine are requested to judge for themselves. These were your words—"There we find the true expression of its peculiar elements," i. e., of Mr. Wesley's mind—"the insane as well as the sane." Let your language be compared by the reader with Dr. B.'s alleged misrepresentation of it. You proceed to say, "We are accustomed to regard dogmatical and vindictive partisanship as a *species* of insanity: how far Dr. Bangs was under its influence, in this instance, we will not take upon us to decide." That also must pass unanswered.

"There are some statements," you say on p. 173, "in the Methodist Quarterly that constrain us to prefer a more serious charge against Dr. Bangs." "He deliberately represents to his readers that we affirm that the Holy Spirit has no influence in the conversion of a sinner; and that we entirely exclude the divine agency from the work of cultivating human nature, and fitting it for heaven. *THIS IS NOT TRUE*; and if Dr. B. read our remarks he had the means of knowing that we expressly affirmed the contrary." I had intended to remark upon this passage somewhat extensively, but I perceive it were labor lost. I remark, 1. Dr. B. does not represent you as *affirming* that the Holy Spirit has no influence in the conversion of a sinner. He says, "After *thus* excluding the Holy Spirit, &c.," meaning that you inculcate such a *doctrine as leads* to his exclusion. If he anywhere represents you as *affirming* that the Holy Spirit has no influence, &c., his remark has escaped my notice. 2. You say, if Dr. B. had read your remarks he had the means of knowing that you affirmed the contrary. I find no such affirmation to the contrary, though I have read your piece, *word by word*, for the purpose of finding it. You do indeed use language which *implies* some agency of the Holy Spirit; but that does not falsify Dr. B.'s remark. Do you not know that the Pharisees rendered the commandments of God of none effect by their traditions? Yet they did not deny that God had commands. So Dr. B. did not mean that you in terms deny the Spirit's influence, but that your doctrine is such as to leave no place for him. What use shall I now make of that most *emphatic* sentence which you have so forcibly obtruded upon me, *This is not true*?

Speaking of Mr. Wesley you say, "whom Dr. Bangs pronounces the most cautious writer of his age." Dr. Bangs pronounces no such thing. He says, (Meth. Mag., vol. xvii, p. 245,) "who, perhaps, was *one* of the most cautious writers of his age."

There are other expressions of like character, tending to show the esteem in which you hold those who differ from you, which I had intended to present; but it is not very necessary, and the time fails.

It is not necessary that I should present, in full tale, our remarks which are personal to you. If the reader is curious he will find them where they can take no new coloring from my fancy, in the Methodist Magazine, already referred to. I solemnly declare, however, that there is nothing there at all equivalent to the language which I have quoted from you, and nothing to justify that language. You are styled a self-confident reviewer—you are said to be deceived by your own prepossessions—it is intimated (ironically) that you may have criticised Mr. Wesley, without having read him, &c. Dr. Bangs' arti-

cle is conceived in a tone of sarcasm, and the second article has something of the same character. This, I believe, is the head and front of our offending, our *argument against yours* excepted.

2. It is not possible for me to meet that assertion of yours, that we evade and mystify in such a way as to destroy its intended effect. Doubtless you intended it for *your* readers: I can only answer it for mine.

However, that there may be no doubt, I will briefly enumerate what Dr. Bangs and his coadjutor have said and done in those "annihilating strictures" of theirs. The two pieces differ in this, that while the one examines the doctrine chiefly, the other is more exclusively directed to your remarks upon the doctrine. Dr. B. first and at length gives Mr. Wesley's statement of the doctrine—a thing which should have been done by you. He then proceeds to defend it by an appeal to Scripture and by the experience of the saints of the Most High in all ages. He then confirms it by an appeal to the recorded experience of several eminent persons in the Calvinistic department of the church, thinking, no doubt, that the testimony of these men would be spurned, least of all by you. These are the prominent points of his piece, though he, in conjunction with his coworker, examines your remarks in detail, giving to each one all the attention which the most fastidious opponent could desire.

When you remark that, though we know what the real question is, we neither of us manifest a disposition to meet it, do you mean that we are knaves, or fools, or both? It is of no great importance to *me* what you mean. I would choose, in such a controversy, rather to be spoken of, than to speak in that way.

3. What you say of Mr. Wesley's character demands a passing notice. All you can desire respecting your use of the word "insane" has been cheerfully granted you. You intended to intimate, not that Mr. Wesley was an insane man, but that his mind contained certain insane elements. But if that were all you meant, why do you spend so much strength in proving him a mystic, after you had defined a mystic to be one destitute of that essential element of a Christian character termed by the apostle a sound mind? Did you there misrepresent Mr. Wesley or yourself? You dwell much upon Mr. Wesley's ghost stories, and upon his credulity. "During the last century," say you, "he has not a parallel in this respect, in any man who possessed a moiety of his claim to intelligence."

Did you never hear that Samuel Johnson and Robert Hall were strongly inclined to believe in the marvellous? Were not they of the last century? or had they no claim to a moiety of Mr. Wesley's intelligence? Mr. Wesley's intelligence ranks high for one destitute of a sound mind.

Touching the ghosts, however, there are a few remarks to be made. Credulity and incredulity, as I believe they rest upon one foundation, so they generally go together in the same person. Take the man who is credulous in one line of inquiry, and lead him in a new direction, and you will see his incredulity. The infidel, who denies the being or at least the revelation of God, can yet admit omens, and swallow the most prodigious stories, illustrative, not of the agency of unseen beings, but of eternal fate and invisible chance. Byron, the profligate

and skeptic, could rail at truth, revile religion, and stand in awe of the word *Friday*.

Credulity and incredulity have their basis in a disposition to take some great leading principle for granted upon the authority of others. When that principle is a negative, it forms incredulity; when affirmative, it is credulity. Yet one may be credulous or the contrary, under very different circumstances. If the principle admitted be universally received, it will scarcely pass under the name of credulity, though it be such in reality. How then are we to discern that credulity which consists in the passive reception of commonly received opinions? I answer by this: that the reception of such opinions by the wise man leans upon its proof—you can perceive his mind turning thitherward, like the needle to the pole. On the other hand, the credulous receiver of such opinions shrinks from the word *proof*—the idea that there is any necessity of such thing never crosses his mind. Watch him, and you will see that he at once sets down any man for a credulous fool who dares to ask for proof. It seems to him a point so plain, so much a matter of common sense, that he who doubts or waits for evidence is certainly destitute of a sound mind.

Upon these principles, what should be our estimate of Mr. Wesley? It is a currently received opinion—not that there *are* no ghosts or disembodied spirits—but that they never manifest themselves. Did Mr. Wesley affirm the contrary? No. But he did that which the credulity of fools can never pardon; he obstinately refused to receive this opinion at the dictation of the mass, and submitted it to the decision of fact. He gathered up facts from the lips of others, and these facts he boldly submitted to the inspection of others. Those who have their minds made up on these subjects so soon as they are born, or rather so soon as their friends and acquaintance choose to give sanction to one side or the other, can never understand how one should hesitate respecting them, unless it be either through credulity or incredulity.

As to the matter of ghostly appearances, it is sufficient to say that there is no proof against them, save the fact of their not having been witnessed. Yet that does not destroy the *possibility* of such things, nay, nor their reality. When therefore we hear a man depreciating another as credulous, because he looks around to see if there be not proof of the truth of some opinion which is not commonly received, the reflecting will soon determine to whom the attribute of credulity belongs. A man may indeed very properly accord in judgment with the mass of those about him; but when this acquiescence of his is accompanied by the spirit of bitterness and contempt against all who feel not the same assurance with himself, we may be sure that there is lack either of honesty or of sense—that he either pretends to believe more than he does believe, or that his faith rests upon the authority of other minds than his own.

Your quotation of Mr. Wesley's remark on the difference between the frame of the mind and the state of the soul, serves you nothing, even with the help of your own caricature. Besides the palpable reasonableness of his distinction, you will please observe the inquiry was respecting the then current use of certain terms—a matter which surely Mr. Wesley could determine better than you, without any mysticism. Your remarks on that quotation indicate two things, which I shall be

happy to show at length when opportunity serves. 1. That your false theology rests upon false metaphysics. 2. That you are very apt to misrepresent yourself.

4. I have now some remarks to make upon your method of arguing.

First, under this head let me tell you of some things which you ought to have done, but have left undone. 1. You should have given at full length, from the pen of Mr. W. himself, a statement of the doctrine. This you have not done. 2. You should have examined Mr. Wesley's Scriptural proofs. This you have not done. 3. If you chose to draw in Mr. Watson, you should also have given at least a glimpse at his proof and illustration. This you have not done. 4. Coming to the writers in the Methodist Magazine, as they give you various passages of holy writ, these you should have examined, and not have slipped them by with, "It means no such thing." 5. But, if you could not answer their Scripture arguments, yet, to save appearances, you might at least have attempted to account for the fact that the most eminent men in your own church profess to have experienced this very blessing.

I could wish you had seen fit to do all this, as this would have been the proper course of a negative argument. But as you have chosen both to conceive and to argue the subject in your own light, it becomes me to consider to what purpose you have done so. I do not, just now, examine your argument of the subject proper, but, in a general way, the prominent characteristics of that method of arguing which you pursue. The subject itself will be examined shortly.

I ask you, then, first, Is your confusion or amalgamation—if that term be not polluted by bad associations—of Mr. Watson's argument and illustration perfectly fair?

Strictly speaking, your controversy was with Mr. Wesley alone. Our defence was of him alone. Your article was entitled, "John Wesley on the Witness of the Spirit;" and though, all things considered, it was doubtful whether you intended through the doctrine to hit Mr. Wesley, or through Mr. W. to hit the doctrine, yet both title and article adhered well to this one topic, "John Wesley on the Witness of the Spirit."

In your second piece, both title and tenor are curiously changed. It is now, "*Wesleyan Methodism* on the Witness of the Spirit." I will not say the change was made for the purpose of mystification and evasion; but it seems to afford you great advantage for these things.

The doctrine of Mr. Wesley is not responsible for the illustration of any subsequent writer. He and the writer mentioned are by no means the same, as it is manifest you yourself have already discovered, inasmuch as while you object to Mr. Wesley's doctrine in general terms, yet when your objections become specific they are directed against statements made by Mr. Watson. Had you confined yourself to Mr. Wesley, you never would have conceived it as an objection to the doctrine, that it represents the witness of adoption as necessarily preceding justification and regeneration. Nevertheless, though the expressions you quote from Mr. Watson give some show of plausibility to the objection, had you considered all that he has said on the subject, you would have perceived that he could mean no such thing, as you have represented. Neither do any of those who at all understand the doc-

trine mean any such thing. He and we mean this, that the witness of our pardon must precede the exercise of the grace received in regeneration—must precede the fruits of regeneration. But here the sense of terms is confused by the New (metaphysics of) Divinity.* As in that system there is no soul, but only spiritual operations, and no basis of religious feeling, but certain passing voluntary exercises—as regeneration on that system consists in this or that exercise—of necessity, perhaps, when we speak of the *fruits* of regeneration, you understand *regeneration itself*.

It is to be lamented that the differences between the churches of Christ have latterly assumed such a character as to involve the very unseen elements of thought, and almost to preclude the possibility of mutual conviction by this, that each one, under the influence of some peculiar philosophic theory, attaches to terms certain almost invisible and yet important shades of meaning for which the other can make no allowance. This is a state of things for which there is no remedy, save in a rigorous adherence to Scripture terms, and to the Scripture sense of terms.

Let the conclusion of this observation be, that though you begin with Mr. Wesley, yet, lest you should refute nobody, you end with Mr. Watson, whom you refute only by misunderstanding him.

I remark, secondly, on the manner of your argumentation, that it is *tortuous* in the extreme.

What I mean is about this: Suppose that in your former piece you had (not affirmed, but) implied false philosophy, which is exposed by the respondents. How do you mend it in your second? I will tell you: By answering that false philosophy, as though it had been advanced by us. Is that a trick of the trade? or a slip of the pen? Is it a misrepresentation of us, or a misrepresentation of yourself?

Of this gyratory movement I will give you a specimen. In your former article you remarked—"Regeneration, the change wrought, evidences itself. It is a matter of consciousness. If regeneration takes place in our hearts, we are capable of perceiving it, just as we perceive any other change of character." "To talk of its evidences as something apart and distinct from its nature, is to use language without precision." See *Christian Spectator*, vol. viii, p. 358. This implies that the soul is a subject of direct inspection; so that its state and moral character, and any change in them, may be observed by the eye of consciousness. Now this is false philosophy, as was distinctly pointed out in the *Methodist Magazine* for 1836, page 283. Read then the following extracts from your own writings, and see how coolly you can, when permitted, beat people over the head with their own walking sticks. "The mind, the spiritual substance we call the soul, does not come under the cognizance of the senses, and it cannot be directly contemplated by consciousness. Therefore we cannot so inspect it as to perceive and be conscious of such an impression on the soul as Mr. Wesley describes." You here misrepresent *all* parties—Mr. Wesley,

* The above is the proper sense of Neology. The piece under examination abounds in error, resting upon a concealed substratum of metaphysics. It would be a service to the public if some competent hand would digest for it the three following points:—1. New Divinity theologically. 2. The Metaphysics of New Divinity. 3. Anti-New-Divinity Metaphysics.

the essential meaning, and to play with the image! The easiness, however, with which it can be done does away any obligation to give credit to the sophist for wisdom or penetration, even though his effort to darken counsel should prove successful.

The terms employed by Mr. Wesley, in his elucidation of our subject, partake necessarily of the defective character which has been mentioned, though there is an additional consideration in his case which, to the candid, will appear of some weight. It is, that he wrote for those whose honesty and love of truth would induce them to search out his real meaning from under the veil of obscuring imagery in which the poverty of language compelled him to envelope it.

The two prominent terms to be noticed are—"voice of God"—and, "impression on the soul." It is upon these that the friendly Spectator fastens his observing eye, and in them can see naught but deformity. These he understands as though they were meant to convey the notion of a visible impersonation of the invisible God; some sense of him operating and of ourselves operated upon. They are to be explained, however, into a very consistent sense:—1. By the nature of the subject. Of whose voice do we speak? Is it not the voice of God? And is it not well known that, literally, he has no voice? One would suppose candor might think of this. When one man communicates his mind to another, he does it by voice. Hence, by a very easy figure of speech, when God communicates to any being, in any way, we say he speaks—it is his voice. Who is it that hears? Manifestly, the soul of man, which hath neither eyes nor ears. As, by God's speaking, we mean his making communication, so, by our hearing, we mean simply our receiving the communication.

The other term—"impression"—is to be explained in the same way. Every body knows what is meant by it, in sensible operations; every body may know its meaning in the things of the Spirit. It is simply the being brought to a new state of mind or feeling.

Figurative terms are, of course, liable to some variety in signification. If there is any thing not already accounted for in Mr. Wesley's use of these phrases, it may be readily explained by a very common figure of speech. The Spectator knows well that we very frequently use a word which denotes an act to signify the result of that act. It is in that way these expressions may be sometimes used—the voice of God, signifying not God speaking, but the thing spoken; and yet not the thing, *as spoken*, but the mere thing;—impression denoting not the act of changing the mind, but the new state of assurance into which it is brought.

Weigh these things, and you will see that there is no ground for several of your objections. As, for instance, that we pretend by our doctrine to explain the *method* of the Spirit's operation, whereas we mean simply the *result* of it, in producing a certain assurance. Neither is there any ground for your supposing we represent the human soul, as matter of direct contemplation. We do not: but only that it is aware of the thing communicated—of the truth impressed upon it.

7. Perhaps, by all these remarks, we are prepared the more profitably to examine the doctrine itself.

We have, for our side of the question, two great points:—I. The attestation and the nature of it. II. The relation which that attestation bears to the testimony of our own conscience.

By reason of the peculiar character of the subject, it being about spiritual things, and that experience of the believer which is most emphatically *sui generis*, which, indeed, the world knows nothing of, it is very easy even for one who comprehends to misstate it, and even to appear a dunce to one who shares not in his experience. The attestation of which we speak is, all its circumstances considered, most exclusively solitary in its kind. Yet there are experiences—mental phenomena—which somewhat resemble it, and it is by that resemblance that I propose to illustrate the subject; only cautioning the reader that he is not to fancy me authorizing the supposition of any resemblance beyond that which I specify.

As far as I understand the subject, I have already conveyed as accurate a notion as is possible to me in the following paragraph:—“This is the spirit of adoption by which *he* cries: it is the spirit of Christ *itself crying*—in many cases, doubtless, a simple state of mind, like the child’s conviction of his own identity. Ask him (the child) if he is conscious of his own identity—he does not comprehend you. Perhaps, if you persist in explaining terms and asking proofs, you will make him doubt, at last, whether he be the same—the *very* same—he was yesterday. Nevertheless, he acts (not thinks, nor feels)—he acts that he is the same. So with the babe in Christ. He acts out, with his very heart, in his inmost soul, that God is his Father.” Meth. Mag., vol. xvii, p. 279.

The similarity above intimated between this experience and the primary laws of belief, I believe to hold good, and to form a very proper basis of illustration. Fix your mind upon any one of those laws, and you will perceive in them the following characteristics. They are not propositions believed, or reduced to shape as ideas in the mind, but they are truths acted upon. Suppose a man, who is perfect master of all his thoughts and feelings and actions, convinced by argument of his personal identity; this man would think and feel in all things as though he were unvaryingly one. Now, we are all so constituted by nature, that we think and feel just as such a man would; nature supplying the place of argumentative conviction. This is, if I may so speak, the frame-work of the soul. It is as though, having pre-existed, we had finished our former career by fixing in the mind this one proposition of our identity; nay, not by fixing in the mind the *conviction* that we are such, but the *habit* of acting and feeling as though it were so; which habit is all that remains, at present, of our pre-existent state. This is what I affirm to be the character of the Spirit’s witness. It is woven, as it were, into the very texture of the believer’s soul, that he is a child of God. Observe, it is not a proposition in his mind, *I am a child of God*. Perhaps the meaning of those words he does not understand; perhaps, if he did, he would be ashamed to apply them to himself. Nevertheless, watch his emotions; listen to his words; study his conduct; and you will perceive there is concealed under them the conviction that he is of God’s family. The idea of a pre-existent state can be very appropriately brought in here. The finale of the man’s sinful career has been the casting of him into this new mould

of feeling and action; and the habit supposed may be considered as standing in the place of regenerating grace. All these illustrations may be summed up in one. "Ye have put on the new man," says the apostle. And hath not this new man, in the midst of his new hopes and new fears, his new loves and new hates, also a new primary law of belief to guide his untutored thoughts? I fancy he has, and that law is the one before us.

I am not now arguing, but stating the doctrine. Yet I cannot resist the temptation to say, even here, that I do not see how any one who has ever witnessed, either in himself or another, the passage from death unto life, can doubt the truth of all this. Behold that singularly acting man. How happy he *looks*! how triumphingly he *talks*! how lovingly he *demeans* himself! Has not something new come upon him? Is not the fibre of his soul altered? Has not a new proposition seized upon his understanding? Undoubtedly there has. And what is it? It is this: I have found out that God loves me as a father loves his child. Nay, it is not a proposition. The *suddenness* and *universality* of the change forbid the supposition that he has only received some new truth, and is now setting himself to act upon it. It is manifest that God has re-adjusted his soul, so that as before he acted upon the supposition of his identity, so now he acts upon the supposition also of his adoption.

This conviction, however, is given under widely different circumstances. God does not deal with all men in the same way. Some men cannot fix their thoughts steadily upon any thing but an object of sense. To the varying constitutions of men God undoubtedly accommodates himself. It is contrary to the instinct of a son to suppose that he will not. In other cases the experience itself does undoubtedly create imaginary appearances, and give rise to hallucination, as may have happened in the case you mentioned. You perceive Mr. Wesley makes every provision for this variety of cases. "Meantime let it be observed," he says, "I do not mean hereby that the Spirit of God testifies this by any outward voice; no, nor always by an inward voice, although he may do this sometimes. Neither do I suppose that he always applies to the heart (though he often may) one or more texts of Scripture." The basis of the matter is that which I have described, though there is precisely that variety which Mr. Wesley hints, rather than describes, in the preceding passage. But observe, that in all this there is no sight of God or of the Holy Ghost operating. There is, indeed, about the enraptured spirit an atmosphere of heaven; it is as one might fancy it would be if God were there; but there is no sight nor sound of God. It is simply an *assurance*.

The difference between this and the primary laws of belief may be briefly specified. 1. Those are universal. Whoever is a man has them. 2. They are permanent, and continue while sanity continues. 3. They are natural. But this belongs only to the people of God; it belongs to them, not as men, but as Christians; and ceases when they cease to be such. It is not natural, though undoubtedly it would have been so had not man fallen. There is also a difference occasioned by the fact, that the old fabric of thought and feeling still exists, and may lift up itself against the new.

The analogy referred to, however, still holds in other respects.

The laws of belief, it was stated, are not written upon the understanding as formal propositions. Yet they do become such. By subsequent investigation we conclude that these are the voice of God, and will never lead us astray. Our faith in them seems to be twofold. 1. The instinctive, involuntary faith which all men have. 2. A faith arising from the operations of our own minds. Here, if anywhere, that awkward phrase is apt, we are judgmentally convinced.* So with that which we are endeavoring to illustrate. It does not stand out in the mind like the conclusion of an argument. Neither is it in the shape of a postulate, or self-evident truth. It is somewhat in the mind's structure, yet, by subsequent investigation, it becomes a proposition. Here, too, there is a twofold faith like that above described; and this duplex character of it may account for some curious phenomena. First, a man may sometimes be seen who both doubts, and yet firmly believes in his own adoption. He believes by this spontaneous impulse; he doubts by the impulse of his own thoughts. Not being sufficiently enlightened in the things of the Spirit—being perhaps a hypochondriac—he cannot in judgment acquiesce in the decision of that something within which tells him he is a child of God. *Secondly*, you will often see a man, who palpably is a child of the devil, yet go on unhesitatingly as though he were a Christian. It is very much *like* an instinct, but is not the thing. The old fabric of his *essential* nature, as before remarked, still remains; and among the array of its powers, is habit. He has a habit of feeling and acting like a child of God.

It is precisely in this, that a distinct assertion of the doctrine is necessary, that when men experience its truth they may know what to make of it. The untutored believer probably concludes more than once that it is mere delusion before he will yield to it; and this too, even though the Spirit should sit upon his tongue, and, seeing him too infantile to do it, cry for him, Abba, Father.

Suppose an individual, who is unguardedly impressed with the necessity of proving every proposition which he admits into his understanding, should come at length to know that those foundations of reasoning which we call the primary laws of belief rest upon naught but the dictate of nature—what would be the consequence? He would not cease to act upon them when acting spontaneously, but those processes of thought which depend upon the self-regulative will would be utterly confounded. So with this matter. An individual denying the doctrine, or uninstructed in it, finds himself insensibly led on by the assumption that he is a child of God, which he fancies he must first make good by a long process of self-observation and thought. What is the consequence here? Why, in spontaneous action and feeling he still goes on that assumption; but in those processes which depend upon a previous conviction of his own mind, he will do otherwise. The difficulty is heightened by that which I have already noted. The system of his old thoughts remains. There has been generated a *habit* of act-

* I could wish the intellectual philosophers had handled this subject as they should. With all humility I petition that one of them in his next will distinguish between these primary laws, and, 1. Self-evident truths. 2. Deeply rooted prejudices. 3. The fixed, immovable persuasions of hypochondriacs, maniacs, &c., &c.

ing without any such principle of belief as this—a habit of acting upon the contrary—and of believing nothing but what has been proved. If the man persist in resisting that which is within, the result will be an impervious darkness. And yet I believe there is room for the following remark. In the laws of mind, the strength of our persuasion does not depend upon our opinion of the Author of nature. The atheist is as undoubting as any body. So with this. The doubter of the fact whether there be a witness of the Spirit does not doubt the witness itself. All those who have passed from death unto life will be found relying at last upon this primary evidence.

8. It is a serious question, then, How shall I, who have received this assurance, know it to be from God?

Upon contemplating myself, I perceive a something singular. I talk and act as if I were a Christian—I pray as if I were a Christian. Nay, the very current of my thought runs upon that supposition. There is something new in my views of the divine Being. It never occurs to me now that he may be angry. I talk to him as one might expect a son to address his father. It is manifest that there is a lurking something within which leads to the assumption of my adoption. The question is, Whence came this assumption, and what am I to do with it?*

In reference to this question it is sufficient to observe that the persuasion is so circumstanced that, unless its falsity can be shown, its truth both will be and ought to be assumed.

The man, however, knows that it cannot come from himself. Habit does not produce it, for he never formed such a habit. His own efforts have not created it, for he made no such effort: neither could he thereby create such an effect. All that remains is the possibility of diabolic influence, and that is removed by the circumstances of the case. Satan might possibly counterfeit a voice or a shape; he might insinuate a proposition into the understanding; but he could not thus alter the entire habits and feelings of the soul.

All this I might dwell upon at length. But I will now unfold to you a great mystery, which is this, that there is no need of any examination or ratiocination at all. Do you not perceive that though there be a conviction that one is a child of God, the person who has it is not responsible for it at all, whether it be good, bad, or indifferent? All for which he is responsible is the cry; and as that cry, by the apostle's showing, is in the heart, it is good in any case. That cry, if *heartly*, is a good one, even though the exciting occasion were a suggestion of the devil. I do not indeed believe that the devil *could* cause such a state of mind. But it is the province of subsequent reflection to determine that. He who cries, Abba Father, *in his heart*, does the thing that is right. He cannot do it otherwise.

O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of

* The misfortune of differing from Mr. Wesley will be mine only; therefore I do it with some little freedom—particularly as I cannot well do otherwise.


I cannot accord fully with that expression of his, if intended to describe the experience of all, "That soul is *absolutely* assured this is the voice of God." It may be, many have this experience, but not all I am sure. For another unimportant instance see forward on Rom. viii, 16.

God! How unsearchable are his ways, and his judgments past finding out!

Your remarks lead me to suspect that you have forgotten the time at which this testimony is borne. It is at the precise moment of spiritual birth. If you will consider that, you will perceive how admirably, how exactly adapted to meet the case is this evidence. What kind of evidence does a person so situated need? He needs, 1. A clear and strong assurance. Nothing else can scatter the cloud of guilty fear; and yet, 2. An evidence not from himself; for, at that time, such an evidence he cannot have. Neither would he have time to examine it. 3. He wants an evidence which he himself could not make. For if it were not such, his guilt and fear would impel to the manufacture of it. 4. Yet he wants an evidence which shall require no long trains of thought.

All this he has in such a witness of the Spirit as has been described—begetting the persuasion of adoption *insensibly*, but the feeling of an adopted person *sensibly*. Now, I say that, though there be here an assumption of his adoption, yet he is not at all responsible for it. All for which he is responsible is the feeling, and that feeling is right in any case.

9. We have now to consider the relation between this testimony and conscience.* A brief consideration of the characteristics of conscience will make our way clear.

First, observe that conscience can condemn but cannot acquit. If thy heart condemn thee, God is greater than thy heart. Yea, I judge not mine own self, for I know nothing by myself; yet am I not hereby justified: but he that judgeth me is the Lord. 1 Cor. iv, 4,  Paul walked in all good conscience long before he was adopted, even while a servant of sin.

Conscience testifies to the *habit* of the soul—to the character of our motives and springs of action. It necessarily includes within the sphere of its operations many acts and many moments. From this circumstance may be inferred, 1. Its unfitness as a *primary* witness, in that it cannot testify at the moment of adoption, though that be the very time when testimony is needed—nor to our restoration to a gracious state after we have fallen.

Its adaptation to the work of detecting delusion, which is the office assigned to it by Mr. Wesley, is also apparent. A deluded person is either under the influence of a factitious persuasion—a something which he has excited within himself—or, upon self-examination, he thinks he finds within him the marks of a Christian. In either case, his assurance will refer to his state, not at any precise moment at which he has the assurance, but to his state in general, and is very properly met by a witness who can testify to the habit of the soul. Universally, as the way to refute a false notion in the case of any man possessed of reason is to show the absurdity of it, so in the case of any man possessed of moral perception, the way

* Upon examination I perceive the correctness of my impression respecting Mr. Wesley's appeal to conscience as a test. If you will study his sermons you will perceive that he uses its testimony as a means of detecting delusion. He points the self-deceiver to his fruits. This being the case, that hue and cry of yours about our calling up a fallible witness to confirm an infallible—the witness of man to confirm that of God—is all labor lost. We do no such thing.

to sweep away any vagary about his acceptance is to show the opposition between his life and God's law. We appeal to conscience, not because the really divine witness needs confirmation, but because the testimony of conscience to any man who is capable of understanding it is competent to overthrow any self-delusion which assumes the guise of a divine testimony. You object, in your first number, that, if we allow in any case that a man is to be credited in his profession of a divine testimony, we must credit every such profession. But I might object to the primary laws of belief on the very same ground. That objection, however, forgets a very important thing; that is, that neither this witness, nor the primary laws of belief, are any ground of conviction to any body but the man who has them. I am not at liberty to aver, as proof of any position, that I have a law of belief to that effect. I do, indeed, *affirm* things upon that ground; but I do not expect them to be *believed* because I have such a law, but because he to whom I affirm them has. Study this matter, and you will perceive that the relation between the witness of God's Spirit and the testimony of conscience is precisely the same as the relation between the primary laws of belief and common experience.

Conscience cannot testify to our being pardoned, or regenerated, or adopted. These are either acts of God, or changes in the moral condition of the soul. What then is its office, i. e., for what purpose does the apostle appeal to it?

1. In that passage, "For this is our rejoicing, the testimony of our conscience," &c., I do not suppose the apostle to have any reference to his regeneration at all; but to the motives by which he was actuated in his dealings with men. I know by the divine witness that I am a child of God; but what has been the *established* motive of my conduct with my fellows? That assurance does not tell me whether, in my dealings, I strive to render that which is equal and just—whether as a husband, parent, friend, or neighbor, I am careful to *apply* and *steadily improve* the grace so kindly bestowed. But this is that which, as a Christian, I desire to do for the glory of God and the good of men; this it is my rejoicing to do.

2. It was before remarked that a primary law of belief cannot be urged in argument, except indirectly—except by the admission of him with whom I argue. I say, *there is a stone in sight*, because I see it; but I do not expect another to believe it because *I* see it, but because he sees it himself. Neither can a man urge as proof of his adoption, that he has the witness of it from the divine Spirit, except indirectly. The one with whom he is conversing, having himself experienced such a blessing, and admitting the honesty and capacity of the speaker, besides knowing nothing to the contrary, may be ready to take him at his word. But we are commanded to give to other men a reason of the hope that is in us; and the only *proof*—the only reason properly so called—lies in the fruits.

10. I will now proceed to examine some of your mistakes and objections.

1. Your first and chief mistake consists in representing us as holding that this evidence of our adoption precedes adoption—that God testifies to our sonship, before we are born again. I have already remarked

that the writers mentioned mean no such thing, but simply that it precedes the fruit of our adoption. The regenerating of the soul is God's act, and requires not any *immediate* concurrence of ours. But the production of fruit does; and we of course cannot concur without a certain view of things. Let us take a particular grace, for illustration—as love to God. The basis of love, that state of the soul in which an individual *can* love God, is implanted by the divine Spirit, and is his work alone: but the act of loving God is ours, and of course cannot be put forth without our viewing God in a certain way. Now, what is that view of the Divine Being which prepares us actively to love him? Mr. Wesley answers, it is the view of God, as reconciled. When Mr. Watson speaks of this witnessing operation as preceding his moral operation, he means the full and active exercise of the grace received at pardon. And yet as the regenerating operation, the altered view of God and the exercise of love based upon those two, take place, so far as we can see, in an indivisible point of time, Mr. W. seems to have indulged some latitude of expression, and to have spoken of the witness as preceding the renovation, meaning no doubt the *manifested* renovation.

There is a difficulty here, arising from the room which description occupies beyond event. Strictly speaking, these several things are included in one mass. 1. Faith in the atoning blood. 2. Regeneration. 3. Adoption. 4. The witness of adoption. 5. The exercise of love to God. A man believes, and instantly there is a great change. Perhaps before consciousness has found time to fix upon the act of faith, like lightning from heaven there comes up from the depths of his soul, sitting upon his tongue, the filial cry, Abba, Father. He is not conscious of any of those changes. Perhaps all which he remembers is, that, as he was trying with tearful eyes and an aching heart to behold the cross, heaven sprung up in his heart. Yet, how laborious the description. Thus we proceed. 1. There was an act of faith: the man believed in Christ. 2. Hereupon he was pardoned, &c., through the catalogue. O that God would write a Dictionary of the Spirit! Then would I explain this. After turning it around and around, looking at it above and below, near at hand and afar off, I seem to myself not yet to touch the spot—not to give precisely that shade to the idea which I wish. That, however, will be no occasion of surprise to you, who know how vague and unsatisfactory an account was given by the chief of philosophers of the primary law of belief, which has furnished our analogy. As I have introduced it, let me recur again to the analogy between man and the new man. 1. Look at the body of man. What is it? Is it not a machine *in action*? God has touched it with his ethereal breath, and all its wheels are set in motion. What is the animating principle of it? It is life. It must be endued with life ere it can be set moving. And yet that life is not a separate something, which can be taken out and contemplated by itself. Though there must be life *before* there can be motion, yet you do not understand that things were adjusted thus: 1. The body was endued with life. 2. It was set in motion: but the life was in the motion; it was set moving, and so lives.

2. Look at the mind. That also is a machine in action. As soon as the child has a mind, he is complete in every part. The primary laws of belief, the substratum of intellectual and sentient being, are all there; and yet all we see, and all the child realizes, is the simple and *functional* exercise. You say there must first be a thinking substance before there can be thought; a sentient nature, before there can be sentience; primary laws of belief, before there can be ratiocination. And yet you do not suppose the God of nature to proceed thus: 1. To implant a thinking nature, and then comes thought; 2. A sentient nature, and then comes sensation; 3. A primary law of belief, and then comes belief. Those former are not things which may be viewed, though they may, in a sense, be conceived, separately—nay, they do not *exist* separately. Is not the whole thinking nature in every thought? the whole sentient nature, in every sensation? The whole fabric of primary laws,* in every act of believing? The child which thinks, feels, and believes, has no idea of all this substratum and preliminary beforehand. As he grows up, however, he concludes, by the power of a primary law, that there must be a thinking substance. And yet even now he does not suspect that he is guided by a primary law, until again coming to consider how it is that he is brought to the conclusion that he is a thinking substance, he perceives that he is led by an impulse of his nature, whence he comes finally to the notion of primary laws of belief. But mark: that primary law of belief, that thinking substance, that sentient nature, are not separate entities, but are all bundled together in this one thing, an emotion of desire—an expression of want—a manifestation of joy

* I use the established phrase, though it convey a false idea. These should be entitled a description of that part of our nature by which we believe, and believe *truly*.

—a sigh of anguish, or any one of those external signs by which the living soul within proclaims itself to the beholder without.

Now the new man has his thinking substance. But it is not given to him in an insulated state. He has his sentient nature. But that is not a separate substance, first deposited by the side of the thinking nature, to be used as a mechanist puts together the parts of his machinery. He has his primary law, which I have specified; but that is not apart from the act of filial confidence based upon it. So soon as the new man exists, he exists in action. His power to think, &c., does not exist, except as he feels and thinks. The first manifestation of his feeling is action, and his first act is that of the new-born babe, the cry, Abba, Father.

To follow out the analogy, though variety of circumstances must occasion variety of phenomena, this man for a while thinks and feels, scarcely knowing that he is a man. Time brings leisure for introspection, and he then comes to conclude that these spiritual emotions must have a spiritual nature; in other words, that he must have been born again. Passing onward and inward, in his reflections, he perceives that in his actions and conduct there is a spontaneous, firm persuasion that he himself is a child of God. Now it is precisely here that danger lies. It is precisely here that the necessity of an explicit and full declaration of the doctrine lies; that the child of God may be enabled to understand his own experience. As a man needs to know, in some measure, the laws of his own nature, that he may not produce discord by an untimely or an unintelligent interference, so the spiritual child needs to know the laws of his spiritual existence, that he may not intermeddle with the invisible and delicate machinery which the God of grace has so miraculously endued with spiritual life.

Please attend now to the observations immediately ensuing.

When Mr. Watson and Mr. Wesley say that this evidence must precede holiness and the moral operation of God in the soul, they mean *active*, manifested holiness; they mean that it is implied in our loving God as a Father, that we are aware of His being a Father. But it is not chiefly that our loving God follows as a conclusion from a premise. It is not that the child reasons in his heart, thus, 'God loves me as a Father; therefore I, as a son, will love God. But this fact, that he loves God with filial affection, both *requires* and *implies* the truth of the *instinctive assumption* that God is his Father.

Consider again the phenomena which accompany the primary laws of belief. A person says, I shall be punished to-day. For what? For stealing yesterday. That remark *implies* that he is the same he was yesterday. But that thing is not in the (formal) reasoning. Neither is the person in many cases distinctly aware that that is in his reasoning. But that is the mould in which his thoughts are cast; and in the sense of Mr. Wesley and Mr. Watson, *this man must be aware of his identity* before he can reason thus. So when they say, a man must be aware of his adoption before he can be holy, they mean that by the grace of God he must be *cast anew*, if I may so speak, that his thoughts and feelings may run in this new mould, *I am a child of God*. Observe, now, the phenomena of natural birth. Amid sorrow and anguish he is forced into the present state. Within the little compass of an infant are all the elements of a man—soul, body, and spirit. The thinking, feeling, believing apparatus is all complete, and all in action. But what is it you see? Is it *first*, a thinking substance; secondly, a sentient; thirdly, a law of belief; fourthly, a body, and lastly, all these put together to make a babe? Nothing of all this, but there is a cry of anguish, and straightway the beholders are sure he lives. And yet must there not be all this *before* the child can give signs of life?

So must there be all this before the new man can live. Behold *his* passage into life. Amid the cries and dying groans of the old man, he comes into being. Here, too, are all the elements of newness of life—a pardoned, regenerated sinner adopted into the heavenly family, and beginning to enact the part of a member. But what do you see here? Is it first, pardon; secondly, regeneration; thirdly, adoption; fourthly, a certifying of the same from heaven, and then all things thus made ready, he is set upon acting his part as a child. Nay, what *you* see, and what the child realizes, is the temper and language of spiritual childhood. There was a cry, either in the heart only, or with the lips, Abba, Father; and straightway the angels who had ministered at the progress of his birth exult in its consummation, and cry as they ascend upwards, Unto us a child is born! And yet were not all these *before* he gave signs of life? That is, are they not necessary conditions of it? Certainly they are. But all those necessary conditions are things shown by, and existing in that to which they are necessary.

11. It is time your objections were now examined.

Your first objection is, that this doctrine denies the sufficiency of the promises; not of the promises in general, I suppose, but of that one, Believe and

thou shalt be saved. "Certainly," you say, "if any thing is true, it is true that to deny the view we are maintaining, and teach that a penitent sinner cannot know he is accepted until the fact is communicated to him by special revelation, is to deny the sufficiency and authority of the Scriptures on this point—is to deny that the divine promise is worthy of confidence—is to doubt whether the veracity of Heaven may be relied on—in fine, is to maintain that we have no substantial evidence of the divine placability." "Take an illustration. Suppose a band of dark and designing conspirators," apprehended in acts the penalty of which is death. But instead of executing the penalty, "their sovereign places them on probation, and promises forgiveness to all who truly repent." "Now if one of these men repent, how shall he know that his sovereign pardons him? Truth and common sense reply that the means of knowing it is the promise given him when he was placed on probation."—Spec., vol. ix, p. 179. To all which I answer, that suppose this person should enter into the assembly of the innocent, would he not be asked, Friend, how camest thou in hither? Wast thou not convicted of conspiracy? Upon which he would undoubtedly produce a certificate of his pardon, or be speechless. Or suppose the prince standing by at the time of the man's repentance, what kind of prince would he be, if he would not say, I forgive you? Our doctrine does not destroy the virtue of that promise, seeing it still accomplishes its beneficent purpose of informing men how they may find pardon. You say farther, "If the divine promise is not a means of knowing the believer is accepted, the only reason why it is not such a means is, that the divine veracity is mistrusted?" I think not. It is not that the divine *veracity* is mistrusted, but our *fulfilment* of the term. The offended, and not the offender, should say whether the condition has been met.

You object, secondly, that this doctrine is not warranted by Scripture, for a full answer to which I refer you to Mr. Watson, Mr. Wesley, and Dr. Bangs.

Passing over for the present all other passages, let us attend to two:—Rom. viii, 16: We have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. For the Spirit itself witnesseth with our spirits that we are the children of God; and Gal. iv. 6: Because ye are sons, he hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying within you, Abba, Father.

You ask, Do these texts teach that the only conceivable means of knowing we are accepted, is an immediate revelation? I answer, they say nothing about what is conceivable. Neither do they *say*, this is the *only* mode, yet it is a mode.

Do they teach, you ask, that every believer must expect an immediate revelation? Yes, such a revelation as I have described. Observe, *because ye are sons*. Wherever the reason holds, the rule holds. Whoever is a son, for that very reason he has the Spirit of God's Son sent forth into his heart, crying within him. "Do these texts even treat of the *manner* in which a believing sinner gains a knowledge of his *justification*, or refer to this point at all?" As pointed out they do. Not otherwise.

The following remarks present an interpretation of these passages, somewhat different, perhaps, from that of others, though agreeing with them in the main particular. You have here the chief Scriptural argument, and if you can meet this interpretation with a better, I will refrain from any appeal to Scripture on the subject. 1. I do not understand, by any means, that the divine Spirit approaches the human, visibly and audibly, communicating the fact of his adoption, though the manner of the approach may be more or less direct according to circumstances. *In the first instance*, there is no such proposition as this, I am a child of God, *standing out* in the mind. 2. I do not understand the apostle to represent the Holy Spirit and our spirit as concurring to *testify* to our adoption, but as *concurring in the cry*.

The time at which this transaction takes place is the time of pardon, adoption, and regeneration. The subject of the operation is a human being, just born into the heavenly family, and now about to act his part. A part of the change which has passed upon him is the implantation of the law of belief, as before represented. What now is the Spirit's work? I answer, As God, when he had fully fashioned the body of Adam, breathed into it, and set it in action;—as a mechanist, having adjusted all the parts of his machine, touches some leading parts, and all the parts are put in motion: so the divine Spirit, having adjusted all the parts of this spiritual machine, puts it in motion—sets it crying; in other words, stimulates this new-born child to act a filial part.

The concurrence of our spirit consists in the promptitude with which we recognize our parent, and address to him the cry. We have, then, in these texts three things: 1. The preparatory operation of the Spirit in renewing and qualifying us to cry. 2. His then setting our new spiritual organs upon their work, as God by his breath did at first set in motion the lungs, the heart, the lips.

Hence the apostle says, the *spirit* cries. 3. *Our spirit*, yielding to the impulse of the divine, and lifting up the cry. Hence the apostle says, *whereby we cry*.

You object, thirdly, on page 182, that in one of its particulars the doctrine contradicts the Scriptures, and disturbs our faith in that discourse of the Saviour where he teaches that the Holy Spirit's operations in Christian experience are perceived only by their effects. But if you will consider carefully what has been said, you will perceive there is ground for no such objection. "We have already remarked," you proceed to say, "upon the practical tendency of this part of the doctrine, and shown that this reference to inward impressions, as the leading evidence of acceptance with God, gives a dangerous and destructive prominence to reliance on frames and feelings." In the former number I endeavored to distinguish between this experience and the feeling of him who receives it; and I trust prolonged remark is not now necessary. Take the feeling of joy, for instance. Is not that as plainly distinguishable from the assurance of adoption, as the delight occasioned by the sight of a long-lost friend is from the sight itself?

Recur to the instance already mentioned of a man reasoning to-day about the bearing of his yesterday's conduct upon his present condition. The feeling of identity there is the basis of his reasoning; nay, it is *in* the reasoning. Yet is it not the subject of direct contemplation. So this is the basis of the believer's love, joy, peace, &c. This is in them; yet it is not immediately seen. I hope this brief illustration will clear up, if not the subject, yet our views of the subject. You perceive that this conviction is a something out of the man's own power; a something which he cannot counterfeit, except by an obstinate resort to the spirit of self-delusion.

You are pleased to remark, p. 190, "The fact of Methodists employing a test evinces that they do not experience any such revelations, and that they *practically* feel the falsity of their doctrine." You seem to use that word *practically* by way of softening the expression. However, you are wide of the mark. Methodists *do* experience such revelations; they do *not*, either practically or theoretically, feel the falsity of their doctrine.

Speaking of the case of a certain female, which you had adduced, you say, "We supposed Methodists would admit delusion in this case, and we maintained that upon their principles it could not be detected." Pray, if upon their principles it could not be detected, why did you suppose they would admit it? Your *assumption* that there was delusion, is a specimen of the *credulity* before described. "The writer contends that no delusion can be detected in the case"—for the best of reasons, as he thinks; that is, there is none. "We did not suppose an intelligent Methodist would carry his principles quite so far; but, since he does it, we cannot understand why he does not glory in being termed a mystic." With all humility, Mr. Spectator, I *do* glory in being so termed, that is, if you mean by a mystic such a person as Mr. Wesley; or rather, I am ashamed that I have so little of *his* mystical spirit.

Your fourth objection, having been fully met already, requires no particular examination.

12. I had intended to remark upon some other topics, particularly upon what you say of regeneration. A comparison of our views of that subject with yours, would, I think, be productive of benefit. Manifestly, if we are right on that subject, the entire fabric of New Divinity is wrong; whereas, if you are right, we are altogether in the dark. I hope a competent hand, guided by a sound heart, will set the two in array against each other.

In conclusion, Mr. Spectator, suffer me to say that though in the course of our brief discussion we have used both irony and plainness of speech, yet I trust there will be no continuing root of bitterness. You chose to exercise your right to express your views of John Wesley and Wesleyan Methodism on the witness of the Spirit. It were superfluous in me to say we have no objection to be examined. I suppose you will not ask whether we have or not. You have here our answer. I trust there is in it neither anger, nor malice, nor guile; neither bitterness, nor bigotry, nor excess of self-esteem. If there be, pray tell me, (if you choose to say more.) I do not wish to provoke debate, but I certify you that from *frank* and *manly* discussion we (Methodists) fear nothing. I should be happy to see in the Spectator a full account of the new birth, the manner in which the sinner is brought to it, and the fruits which follow after it, compared, if you please, with Methodist views on the same subject. "Search us and prove us; and see if there be any evil way in us,"—and may God enlighten your eyes to discern clearly.

Having now used all the time and space which circumstances allow me, I conclude with a petition, caught from your own lips, "May the triumphs of truth multiply until all minds are free."

W. M. B.

